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Abstract—Session management is a fundamental component
of web applications: despite the apparent simplicity, correctly
implementing web sessions is extremely tricky, as witnessed
by the large number of existing attacks. This motivated the
design of formal methods to rigorously reason about web session
security which, however, are not supported at present by suitable
automated verification techniques. In this paper we introduce
the first security type system that enforces session security on a
core model of web applications, focusing in particular on server-
side code. We showcase the expressiveness of our type system
by analyzing the session management logic of HotCRP, Moodle,
and phpMyAdmin, unveiling novel security flaws that have been
acknowledged by software developers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the HTTP protocol is stateless, web applications
that need to keep track of state information over multiple
HTTP requests have to implement custom logic for session
management. Web sessions typically start with the submission
of a login form from a web browser, where a registered
user provides her access credentials to the web application.
If these credentials are valid, the web application stores in the
user’s browser fresh session cookies, which are automatically
attached to all subsequent requests sent to the web application.
These cookies contain enough information to authenticate the
user and to keep track of session state across requests.
Session management is essential in the modern Web, yet it
is often vulnerable to a range of attacks and surprisingly hard
to get right. For instance, the theft of session cookies allows an
attacker to impersonate the victim at the web application [35],
[12], [38], while the weak integrity guarantees offered by
cookies allow subtle attacks like cookie forcing, where a
user is forced into an attacker-controlled session via cookie
overwriting [41]. Other common attacks include cross-site
request forgery (CSRF) [28], where an attacker instruments
the victim’s browser to send forged authenticated requests to
a target web application, and login CSRF, where the victim’s
browser is forced into the attacker’s session by submitting a
login form with the attacker’s credentials [9]. We refer to a
recent survey for an overview of attacks against web sessions
and countermeasures [16].
Given the complexity of session management and the range
of threats to be faced on the web, a formal understanding of
web session security and the design of automated verification
techniques is an important research direction. Web sessions
and their desired security properties have been formally stud-
ied in several papers developing browser-side defenses for web
sessions [13], [12], [29], [14]: while the focus on browser-
side protection mechanisms is appealing to protect users of
vulnerable web applications, the deployment of these solutions
is limited since it is hard to design browser-side defenses that
do not cause compatibility issues on existing websites and are
effective enough to be integrated in commercial browsers [16].
Thus, security-conscious developers would better rely on
server-side programming practices to enforce web session
security when web applications are accessed by standard
browsers. Recently, Fett et al. [22] formalized a session
integrity property specific to OpenID within the Web Infras-
tructure Model (WIM), an expressive web model within which
proofs are, however, manual and require a strong expertise.
In this work, we present the first static analysis technique
for web session integrity, focusing on sound server-side pro-
gramming practices. In particular:
1) we introduce a core formal model of web systems, repre-
senting browsers, servers, and attackers who may mediate
communications between them. Attackers can also interact
with honest servers to establish their own sessions and host
malicious content on compromised websites. The goal in
the design of the model is to retain simplicity, to ease the
presentation of the basic principles underlying our analysis
technique, while being expressive enough to capture the
salient aspects of session management in real-world case
studies. In this model, we formalize a generic definition of
session integrity, inspired by prior work on browser-side
security [13], as a semantic hyperproperty [18] ruling out
a wide range of attacks against web sessions;
2) we design a novel type system for the verification of ses-
sion integrity within our model. The type system exploits
confidentiality and integrity guarantees of session data
to endorse untrusted requests coming from the network
and enforces appropriate browser-side invariants in the
corresponding responses to guarantee session integrity;
3) we showcase the effectiveness and generality of our type
system by analyzing the session management logic of
HotCRP, Moodle, and phpMyAdmin. After encoding the
relevant code fragments in our formal model, we use the
type system to establish a session integrity proof: failures
in this process led to the discovery of critical security flaws.
We identified two vulnerabilities in HotCRP that allow an
attacker to hijack accounts of authors and even reviewers,
and one in phpMyAdmin, which has been assigned a
CVE [33]. All vulnerabilities have been reported and
acknowledged by the application developers. We finally
established security proofs for the fixed versions by typing.
II. OVERVIEW
In this Section we provide a high-level overview of our
approach to the verification of session integrity. Full formal
details and a complete security analysis of the HotCRP con-
ference management system are presented in the remainder of
the paper.
A. Encoding PHP Code in our Calculus
The first step of our approach consists in accessing the PHP
implementation of HotCRP and carefully handcrafting a model
of its authentication management mechanisms into the core
calculus we use to model web application code. While several
commands are standard, our language for server-side programs
includes some high-level commands abstracting functionalities
that are implemented in several lines of PHP code. The login
command abstracts a snippet of code checking, e.g., in a
database, whether the provided credentials match an existing
user in the system. Command auth is a security assertion
parametrized by expressions it depends on. In our encoding it
abstracts code performing security-sensitive operations within
the active session: here it models code handling paper submis-
sions in HotCRP. Command start takes as argument a session
identifier and corresponds to the session_start function
of PHP, restoring variables set in the session memory during
previous requests bound to that session.
In the following we distinguish standard PHP variables
from those stored in the session memory (i.e., variables in the
$_SESSION array) using symbols @ and $, respectively. The
reply command models the server’s response in a structured
way by separating the page’s DOM, scripts, and cookies set
via HTTP headers.
B. A Core Model of HotCRP
We assume that the HotCRP installation is hosted at the
domain dC and accessible via two HTTPS endpoints: login,
where users perform authentication using their access creden-
tials, and manage, where users can upload their papers or
withdraw their submissions. The session management logic
is based on a cookie sid established upon login. We now
discuss the functionality of the two HTTPS endpoints; we
denote the names of cookies in square brackets and the name
of parameters in parentheses. The login endpoint expects a
username uid and a password pwd used for authentication:
1. login [](uid , pwd) →֒
2. if uid = ⊥ and pwd = ⊥ then
3. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥〉)}, skip, {})
4. else
5. @r := fresh(); login uid , pwd ,@r ; start @r ; $user := uid ;
6. reply ({link 7→ form(manage , 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉)}, skip, {sid 7→ x})
7. with x = @r
If the user contacts the endpoint without providing access
credentials, the endpoint replies with a page containing a
login form expecting the username and password (lines 2–
3). Otherwise, upon successful authentication via uid and
pwd , the endpoint starts a new session indexed by a fresh
identifier which is stored into the variable @r (line 5). For
technical convenience, in the login command we also specify
the fresh session identifier as a third parameter to bind the
session with the identity of its owner. Next, the endpoint
stores the user’s identity in the session variable $user so that
the session identifier can be used to authenticate the user in
subsequent requests (line 5). Finally, the endpoint sends a reply
to the user’s browser which includes a link to the submission
management interface and sets a cookie sid containing the
session identifier stored in @r (lines 6–7).
The submission management endpoint requires authentica-
tion, hence it expects a session cookie sid . It also expects
three parameters: a paper , an action (submit or withdraw)
and a token to protect against CSRF attacks [9]:
1. manage [sid](paper , action , token) →֒
2. start @sid ;
3. if $user = ⊥ then
4. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥〉)}, skip, {})
5. else if paper = ⊥ then
6. $utoken = fresh();
7. reply ({add 7→ form(manage , 〈⊥,submit, x〉),
8. del 7→ form(manage , 〈⊥, withdraw, x〉)}, skip, {})
9. with x = $utoken
10. else if tokenchk(token , $utoken) then
11. auth paper , action at ℓC ; reply ({}, skip, {})
The endpoint first tries to start a session over the cookie sid :
if it identifies a valid session, session variables from previous
requests are restored (line 2). The condition $user = ⊥ checks
whether the session is authenticated, since the variable is only
set after login: if it is not the case, the endpoint replies with a
link to the login page (lines 3–4). If the user is authenticated
but does not provide any paper in her request, the endpoint
replies with two forms used to submit or withdraw a paper
respectively. Such forms are protected against CSRF with a
fresh token, whose value is stored in the session variable
$utoken (lines 5–9). If the user is authenticated and requests
an action over a given paper, the endpoint checks that the
token supplied in the request matches the one stored in the
user’s session (line 10) and performs the requested action upon
success (line 11). This is modeled via a security assertion in
the code that authorizes the requested action on the paper on
behalf of the owner of the session. The assertion has a security
label ℓC , intuitively meaning that authorization can be trusted
unless the attacker can read or write at ℓC . Security labels
have a confidentiality and an integrity component, expressing
who can read and who can write. They are typically used in
the information flow literature [14] not only to represent the
security of program terms but also the attacker itself. Here we
let ℓC = (https(dC), https(dC)), meaning that authorization
can be trusted unless HTTPS communication with the domain
dC hosting HotCRP is compromised by the attacker.
C. Session Integrity
In this work, we are interested in session integrity. Inspired
by [13], we formalize it as a relational property, comparing
two different scenarios: an ideal world where the attacker
does nothing and an attacked world where the attacker uses
her capabilities to compromise the session. Intuitively, session
integrity requires that any authorized action occurring in the
attacked world can also happen in the ideal world, unless the
attacker is powerful enough to void the security assertions; this
must hold for all sequences of actions of a user interacting with
the session using a standard web browser.
As a counterexample to session integrity for our HotCRP
model, pick an attacker hosting an HTTPS website at the
domain dE 6= dC , modeled by the security label ℓE =
(https(dE), https(dE)). Since ℓE 6⊒ ℓC , this attacker should
not be able to interfere with authorized actions at the sub-
mission management endpoint. However, this does not hold
due to the lack of CSRF protection on the endpoint login. In
particular, pick the following sequence of user actions where
evil stands for an HTTPS endpoint at dE :
~a = load(1, login , {}), submit(1, login ,auth, {1 7→ usr, 2 7→ pwd}),
load(2, evil, {}), submit(1, login ,link, {}),
submit(1,manage , add, {1 7→ paper})
The user opens the login endpoint in tab 1 and submits her
username and password via the authentication form (identified
by the tag auth). She then loads the attacker’s website in tab
2 and moves back to tab 1 where she accesses the submission
management endpoint by clicking the link obtained upon
authentication. Finally, she submits a paper via the add form.
Session integrity is violated since the attacker can reply
with a page containing a script which automatically submits
the attacker’s credentials to the login endpoint, authenticating
the user as the attacker at HotCRP. Thus, the last user action
triggers the security assertion in the attacker’s session rather
than in the user’s session. Formally, this is captured by the
security assertion firing the event ♯[paper,submit]usr,atkℓC ,
modeling that the paper is submitted by the user into the
attacker’s session. As such an event cannot be fired in the ideal
world without the attacker, this violates session integrity.
In practice, an attacker could perform the attack against an
author so that, upon uncareful submission, a paper is registered
in the attacker’s account, violating the paper’s confidentiality.
We also discovered a more severe attack allowing an attacker
to log into the victim’s session, explained in Section V.
D. Security by Typing
Our type system allows for sound verification of session
integrity and is parametric with respect to an attacker label. In
particular, typing ensures that the attacker has no way to forge
authenticated events in the session of an honest user (as in a
CSRF attack) or to force the user to perform actions within
a session bound to the attacker’s identity (e.g., due to a login
CSRF). Failures arising during type-checking often highlight
in a direct way session integrity flaws.
To ensure session integrity, we require two ingredients:
first, we need to determine the identity of the sender of the
request; second, we must ensure that the request is actually
sent with the consent of the user, i.e., the browser is not
sending the request as the attacker’s deputy. Our type system
captures these aspects using two labels: a session label and a
program counter (PC) label. The session label models both the
session’s integrity (i.e., who can influence the session and its
contents) and confidentiality (i.e., who can learn the session
identifier used as access control token). Since the identity
associated with an authenticated event is derived from the
ongoing session, the session label captures the first ingredient.
The PC label tracks who could have influenced the control
flow to reach the current point of the execution. Since a CSRF
attack is exactly a request of low integrity (as it is triggered by
the attacker), this captures the second ingredient. Additionally,
the type system relies on a typing environment that assigns
types to URLs and their parameters, to local variables and to
references in the server memory.
We type-check the code twice under different assumptions.
First, we assume the scenario of an honest user regularly
interacting with the page: here we assume that all URL
parameters are typed according to the typing environment and
we start with a high integrity PC label. Second, we assume the
scenario of a CSRF attack where all URL parameters have low
confidentiality and integrity (since they are controlled by the
attacker) and we start with a low integrity PC label. In both
cases, types for cookies and the server variables are taken from
the typing environment since, even in a CSRF attack, cookies
are taken from the cookie jar of the user’s browser and the
attacker has no direct access to the server memory.
We now explain on a high level why our type system fails
to type-check our (vulnerable) HotCRP model. To type the
security assertion auth paper, action at ℓC in the manage
endpoint, we need a high integrity PC label, a high integrity
session label and we require the parameters paper and action
to be of high integrity. While the types of the parameters are
immediately determined by the typing environment, the other
two labels are influenced by the typing derivation.
In the CSRF scenario, the security assertion is unreachable
due to the presence of the token check instruction (line 10).
When typing, if we assume (in the typing environment) that
$ltoken is a high confidentiality reference, we can conclude
that the check always fails since the parameter token (con-
trolled by the attacker) has low confidentiality, therefore we
do not need to type-check the continuation.1
In the honest scenario, the PC label has high integrity
assuming that all the preceding conditionals have high integrity
guard expressions (lines 3 and 6). The session label is set in
the command start @sid (line 2) and depends on the type
of the session identifier @sid . To succeed in typing, @sid
must have high integrity. However, we cannot type-check the
login endpoint under this assumption: since the code does not
contain any command that allows pruning the CSRF typing
branch (like the token check in the manage endpoint), the
entire code must be typed with a low integrity PC label. This
prevents typing the reply statement where cookie sid is set
(lines 6–7), since writing to a high integrity location from a
low integrity context is unsound. In practice, this failure in
typing uncovers the vulnerability in our code: the integrity of
the session cookie is low since an attacker can use a login
CSRF attack to set a session cookie in the user’s browser.
As a fix, one can protect the login endpoint against CSRF
attempts by using pre-sessions [9]: when the login endpoint
is visited for the first time by the browser, it creates a new
1 This reasoning is sound only when credentials (e.g., session identifiers and
CSRF tokens) are unguessable fresh names. To take into account these aspect,
in the type system we have special types for references storing credentials (cf.
Section IV-A) and we forbid subtyping for high confidentiality credentials.
unauthenticated session at the server-side (using a fresh cookie
pre) and generates a token which is saved into the session
and embedded into the login form. When submitting the login
form, the contained token is compared to the one stored at
the server-side in the pre-session and, if there is a mismatch,
authentication fails:
1. login [pre](uid , pwd , token) →֒
2. if uid = ⊥ and pwd = ⊥ then
3. @r ′ := fresh(); start @r ′; $ltoken := fresh();
4. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥, x〉)}, skip, {pre 7→ y})
5. with x = $ltoken, y = @r ′
6. else
7. start @pre;
8. if tokenchk(token , $ltoken) then
9. @r := fresh(); login uid , pwd ,@r ; start @r ; $user := uid ;
10. reply ({link 7→ form(manage , 〈⊥,⊥,⊥〉)}, skip, {sid 7→ x}
11. with x = @r
The session identified by pre has low integrity but high
confidentiality: indeed, an attacker can cause a random pre
cookie to be set in the user’s browser (by forcing the browser
to interact with the login endpoint), but she has no way
to learn the value of the cookie and hence cannot access
the session. We can thus assume high confidentiality for the
session reference $ltoken in the session identified by pre.
With the proposed fix, the piece of code responsible for
setting the session cookie sid is protected by a token check,
where the parameter token is compared against the high con-
fidentiality session reference $ltoken of the session identified
by @pre (line 8). Similar to the token check in the manage
endpoint, this allows us to prune the CSRF typing branch and
we can successfully type-check the code with a high integrity
type for sid . We refer the reader to Section V-C for a detailed
explanation of typing of the fixed login endpoint.
The HotCRP developer acknowledged the login CSRF vul-
nerability and the effectiveness of the proposed fix, which is
currently under development.
III. A FORMAL MODEL OF WEB SYSTEMS
We present now our model of web systems that includes
the relevant ingredients for modeling attacks against session
integrity and the corresponding defenses and we formally
define our session integrity property.
A. Expressiveness of the Model
Our model of browsers supports cookies and a minimal
client-side scripting language featuring i) read/write access to
the cookie jar and the DOM of pages; ii) the possibility to
send network requests towards arbitrary endpoints and include
their contents as scripts. The latter capability is used to model
resource inclusion and a simplified way to perform XHR
requests. In the model we can encode many security-sensitive
aspects of cookies that are relevant for attacks involving their
theft or overwriting, i.e., cookie prefixes [40] and attributes
Domain and Secure [8]. We also model HSTS [27] which
can improve the integrity guarantees of cookies set by HSTS-
enabled domains. On the server-side we include primitives
used for session management and standard defenses against
CSRF attacks, e.g., double submit cookies, validation of the
Origin header and the use of CSRF tokens.
For the sake of presentation and simplicity, we intentionally
omit some web components that are instead covered in other
web models (e.g., the WIM [22]) but are not fundamental
for session integrity or for modelling our case studies. In
particular, we do not model document frames and cross-frame
communications via the Web Messaging API, web sockets,
local storage, DNS and an equational theory for cryptographic
primitives. We also exclude the Referer header since it
conveys similar information to the Origin header which we
already cover in our model. While we believe that our type
system can be in principle extended to cover also these web
components, the presentation and proof of soundness would
become cumbersome, obfuscating the key aspects of our static
analysis technique.
B. Syntax
We write ~r = 〈r1, . . . , rm〉 to denote a list of elements of
length m = |~r |. We denote with rk the k-th element of ~r and
we let r′ :: ~r be the list obtained by prepending the element
r′ to the list ~r. A map M is a partial function from keys to
values and we write M(k) = v whenever the key k is bound
to the value v in M . We let dom(M) be the domain of M
and {} be the empty map. Given two maps M1 and M2, we
define M1 ⊳M2 as the map M such that M(k) = v iff either
M2(k) = v or k /∈ dom(M2) and M1(k) = v. We write
M1 ⊎M2 to denote M1 ⊳M2 if M1 and M2 are disjoint. We
let M{k 7→ v} be the map obtained from M by substituting
the value bound to k with v.
1) Basics: We let N be a set of names modeling secrets
(e.g., passwords) and fresh identifiers that cannot be forged
by an attacker. Names are annotated with a security label ℓ,
that we omit in the semantics since it has no semantic effect.
R is the set of references used to model cookies and memory
locations, while X is the set of variables used for parameters
and server commands. I is the set of identities representing
users: we distinguish a special identity usr representing the
honest user and we assume that the other identities are under
the attacker’s control.
A URL u is a triple (π, d, v) where π ∈ {http, https} is
the protocol identifier, d is the domain name, and v is a value
encoding the path of the accessed resource. We ignore the port
for the sake of simplicity. The origin of URL u is the simple
label π(d). For origins and URLs, we use ⊥ for a blank value.
We let v range over values, i.e., names, primitive values
(booleans, integers, etc.), URLs, identities and the blank value
⊥. We use z to range both over values and variables.
A page is either the constant error or a map f representing
the DOM of the page. The error page denotes that an error
has occurred while processing a request at the server-side. The
map f associates tags (i.e., strings) to links and HTML forms
contained in the page. We represent them using the notation
form(u, ~z), where u is the target URL and ~z is the list of
parameters provided via the query string of a link or in the
HTTP body of the request for forms.
TABLE I: Syntax (browsers B and scripts s are defined in the technical report [15]).
Basics
Names nℓ, iℓ, jℓ ∈ N References r ∈ R Variables x ∈ X
Identities ι ∈ I ∋ usr Domains d ∈ D URLs u ∈ U
Origins o ∈ O ⊇ O Simple labels l ∈ L ⊇ L Labels ℓ ::= (l, l)
Types τ ∈ T Numbers k,m ∈ N Primitive values pv ::= true | false | k | . . .
Values v ::= pv | n | ι | u | ⊥ ∈ V Metavariables z ∈ V ∪ X Forms f ::= {} | f ⊎ {v 7→ form(u, ~z)}
Pages page ::= error | f Cookies ck ::= {} | ck⊎{r 7→ z} Memories M ::= {} | M ⊎ {r 7→ v}
Servers
Expressions se ::= x | @r | $r | v | fresh()ℓ | se⊙ se′ Commands c ::= skip | halt | c; c′ | @r := se | $r := se
Environments E ::= i,⊥ | i, j | if se then c else c′ | login seu, sepw, seid
Request contexts R ::= n, u, ι, l | start se | auth ~se at ℓ
Databases D ::= {} | D ⊎ {n 7→M} | if tokenchk(e, e′) then c
Trust mappings φ ::= {} | φ ⊎ {n 7→ ι} | if originchk(L) then c
Servers S ::= (D,φ, t) | reply (page , s, ck) with ~x = ~se
Threads t ::= u[~r](~x) →֒ c | ⌈c⌋RE | t ‖ t | redirect (u, ~z, ck) with ~x = ~se
User behavior
Tab IDs tab ∈ N
Inputs p ::= {} | p ⊎ {k 7→ vτ }
Actions a ::= halt | load(tab, u, p) | submit(tab, u, v, p)
Web Systems
Attacker’s Knowledge K ⊆ N
Web Systems W ::= B | S | W ‖W
Attacked Systems A ::= (ℓ,K) ⊲ W
Memories are maps from references to values. We use them
in the server to hold the values of the variables during the
execution, while in the browser they are used to model the
cookie jar. We stipulate that M(r) = ⊥ if r /∈ dom(M), i.e.,
the access to a reference not in memory yields a blank value.
2) Server Model: We let se range over expressions in-
cluding variables, references, values, sampling of a fresh
name (with label ℓ), e.g., to generate fresh cookie values,
and binary operations. Server-side applications are represented
as commands featuring standard programming constructs and
special instructions for session establishment and manage-
ment. Command login seu, sepw, seid models a login oper-
ation with username seu and password sepw. The identity
of the user is bound to the session identifier obtained by
evaluating seid. Command start se starts a new session
or restores a previous one identified by the value of the
expression se. Command auth ~se at ℓ produces an au-
thenticated event that includes data identified by the list
of expressions ~se. The command is annotated with a label
ℓ denoting the expected security level of the event which
has a central role in the security definition presented in
Section III-E. Commands if tokenchk(x, r) then c and
if originchk(L) then c respectively model a token check,
comparing the value of a parameter x against the value of the
reference r, and an origin check, verifying whether the origin
of the request occurs in the set L. These checks are used
as a protection mechanism against CSRF attacks. Command
reply (page, s, ck) with ~x = ~se outputs an HTTP response
containing a page , a script s and a sequence of Set-Cookie
headers represented by the map ck. This command is a binder
for ~x with scope page, s, ck, that is, the occurrences of the
variables ~x in page, s, ck are substituted with the values
obtained by evaluating the corresponding expressions in ~se.
Command redirect (u, ~z, ck) with ~x outputs a message
redirect to URL u with parameters ~z that sets the cookies
in ck. This command is a binder for ~x with scope ~z, ck.
Server code is evaluated using two memories: a global
memory, freshly allocated when a connection is received, and
a session memory, that is preserved across different requests.
We write @r and $r to denote the reference r in the global
memory and in the session memory respectively. To link an
executing command to its memories, we use an environment,
which is a pair whose components identify the global memory
and the session memory (⊥ when there is no active session).
The state of a server is modeled as a triple (D,φ, t) where
the database D is a partial map from names to memories,
φ maps session identifiers (i.e., names) to the corresponding
user identities, and t is the parallel composition of multiple
threads. Thread u[~r](~x) →֒ c waits for an incoming connection
to URL u and runs the command c when it is received. Lists ~r
and ~x are respectively the list of cookies and parameters that
the server expects to receive from the browser. Thread ⌈c⌋RE
denotes the execution of the command c in the environment
E which identifies the memories of D on which the command
operates. R tracks information about the request that triggered
the execution, including the identifier n of the connection
where the response by the server must be sent back, the URL
of the endpoint u, the user ι who sent the request, and the
origin of the request l. The user identity has no semantic
import, but it is needed to spell out our security property.
3) User Behavior: Action halt is used when an unex-
pected error occurs while browsing to prevent the user from
performing further actions. Action load(tab, u, p) models the
user entering the URL u in the address bar of her browser
in tab, where p are the provided query parameters. Action
submit(tab, u, v, p) models the user submitting a form or
clicking on a link (identified by v) contained in the page at
u rendered in tab; the parameters p are the inputs provided
by the user. We represent user inputs as maps from integers
to values vτ annotated with their security type τ . In other
words, we model that the user is aware of the security import
of the provided parameters, e.g., whether a certain input is a
password that must be kept confidential or a public value.
4) Browser Model: Due to lack of space, we present
the browser model only in the technical report [15]. In the
following we write Bι(M,P,~a) to represent a browser without
any active script or open network connection, with cookie jar
M and open pages P which is run by the user ι performing
the list of actions ~a.
5) Web Systems: The state of a web system is the parallel
composition of the states of browsers and servers in the
system. The state of an attacked web system also includes the
attacker, modeled as a pair (ℓ,K) where the label ℓ defines the
attacker power and K is her knowledge, i.e., a set of names
that the attacker has learned by exploiting her capabilities.
C. Labels and Threat Model
Let d ∈ D be a domain and ∼ be the equivalence relation
inducing the partition of D in sets of related domains.2 We
define the set of simple labels L, ranged over by l, as the
smallest set generated by the grammar:
l ::= http(d) | https(d) | l ∨ l | l ∧ l
Intuitively, simple labels represent the entities entitled to read
or write a certain piece of data, inspect or modify the messages
exchanged over a network connection and characterize the
capabilities of an attacker. A label ℓ is a pair of simple labels
(lC , lI), where lC and lI are respectively the confidentiality
and integrity components of ℓ. We let C(ℓ) = lC and
I(ℓ) = lI . We define the confidentiality pre-order ⊑C as the
smallest pre-order on L closed under the following rules:
i ∈ {1, 2}
li ⊑C l1 ∨ l2
i ∈ {1, 2}
l1 ∧ l2 ⊑C li
l1 ⊑C l3
l2 ⊑C l3
l1 ∨ l2 ⊑C l3
l1 ⊑C l2
l1 ⊑C l3
l1 ⊑C l2 ∧ l3
We define the integrity pre-order⊑I on simple labels such that
∀l, l′ ∈ L we have l ⊑I l′ iff l′ ⊑C l, i.e., confidentiality and
integrity are contra-variant. For ⊑C we define the operators
⊔C and ⊓C that respectively take the least upper bound and
the greatest lower bound of two simple labels. We define
analogous operators ⊔I and ⊓I for ⊑I . We let ℓ ⊑ ℓ′ iff
C(ℓ) ⊑C C(ℓ′) ∧ I(ℓ) ⊑I I(ℓ′). We also define bottom and
top elements of the lattices as follows:
⊥C =
∧
d∈D(http(d) ∧ https(d)) ⊤C =
∨
d∈D(http(d) ∨ https(d))
⊥I = ⊤C ⊤I = ⊥C ⊥ = (⊥C ,⊥I) ⊤ = (⊤C ,⊤I)
We label URLs, user actions and cookies by means of the
function λ. We label URLs with their origin, i.e., given u =
(π, d, v) we let λ(u) = (π(d), π(d)). The label is used to:
1) characterize the capabilities required by an attacker to read
and modify the contents of messages exchanged over network
connections towards u; 2) identify which cookies are sent to
and can be set by u. The label of an action is the one of its
URL, i.e., we let λ(a) = λ(u) for a = load(tab, u, p) and
a = submit(tab, u, v, p).
The labelling of cookies depend on several aspects, e.g.,
the attributes specified by the web developer. For instance, a
cookie for the domain d is given the following label:
(http(d) ∧ https(d),
∧
d′∼d(http(d
′) ∧ https(d′)))
2 Two domains are related if they share the same base domain, i.e., the
first upper-level domain which is not included in the public suffix list [41].
For instance, www.example.com and atk.example.com are related
domains, while example.co.uk and atk.co.uk are not.
The confidentiality label models that the cookie can be sent
to d both over cleartext and encrypted connections, while the
integrity component says that the cookie can be set by any of
the related domains of d over any protocol, as dictated by the
lax variant of the Same Origin Policy applied to cookies.
When the Secure attribute is used, the cookie is attached
exclusively to HTTPS requests. However, Secure cookies
can be set over HTTP [8], hence the integrity is unchanged.
This behavior is represented by the following label:
(https(d),
∧
d′∼d(http(d
′) ∧ https(d′)))
Cookie prefixes [40] are a novel proposal aimed at providing
strong integrity guarantees for certain classes of cookies.
In particular, compliant browsers ensure that cookies having
names starting with the __Secure- prefix are set over
HTTPS and the Secure attribute is set. In our label model
they can be represented as follows:
(https(d),
∧
d′∼d https(d
′))
The __Host- prefix strengthens the policy enforced by
__Secure- by additionally requiring that the Domain at-
tribute is not set, thus preventing related domains from setting
it. This is modeled by assigning the cookie the following label:
(https(d), https(d))
We provide additional examples, including the impact of HSTS
on the labelling of cookies, in our technical report [15].
In the model we can also formalize popular attackers from
the web security literature using labels which denote their read
and write capabilities:
1) The web attacker hosts a malicious website on domain d.
We assume that the attacker owns a valid certificate for d,
thus the website is available both over HTTP and HTTPS:
(http(d) ∨ https(d), http(d) ∨ https(d))
2) The active network attacker can read and modify the
contents of all HTTP communications:
(
∨
d∈D http(d),
∨
d∈D http(d))
3) The related-domain attacker is a web attacker who hosts
her website on a related domain of a domain d, thus she
can set (domain) cookies for d. Assuming (for simplicity)
that the attacker controls all the related domains of d, we
can represent her capabilities with the following label:
(
∨
d′∼d
d′ 6=d
(http(d′) ∨ https(d′)),
∨
d′∼d
d′ 6=d
(http(d′) ∨ https(d′)))
D. Semantics
We present now the most relevant rules of semantics in
Table II, deferring to [15] for a complete formalization. In the
rules we use the ternary operator “?:” with the usual meaning:
e ? e′ : e′′ evaluates to e′ if e is true, to e′′ otherwise.
TABLE II: Semantics (excerpt).
Servers
(S-RECV)
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, l) R = n, u, ιb, l i← N
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~r |].M(rk) = (rk ∈ dom(ck)) ? ck(rk) : ⊥ m = |~x |
∀k ∈ [1 . . .m]. vk = (k ∈ dom(p)) ? p(k) : ⊥ σ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm]
(D,φ, u[~r](~x) →֒ c)
α
−→ (D ⊎ {i 7→M}, φ, ⌈cσ⌋Ri,⊥ ‖ u[~r](~x) →֒ c)
(S-RESTORESESSION)
E = i, evalE(se, D) = j j ∈ dom(D)
(D,φ, ⌈start se⌋RE)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈skip⌋Ri,j)
(S-NEWSESSION)
E = i, evalE(se,D) = j j /∈ dom(D)
(D,φ, ⌈start se⌋RE)
•
−→ (D ⊎ {j 7→ {}}, φ, ⌈skip⌋Ri,j)
(S-LOGIN)
R = n, u, ιb, l evalE(seu, D) = ιs
evalE(sepw , D) = ρ(ιs, u) evalE(seid, D) = j
(D, φ, ⌈login seu, sepw, seid⌋
R
E)
•
−→ (D,φ ⊳ {j 7→ ιs}, ⌈skip⌋
R
E)
(S-OCHKSUCC)
R = n, u, ιb, l l ∈ L
(D, φ, ⌈if originchk(L) then c⌋
R
E)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈c⌋
R
E)
(S-TCHKFAIL)
evalE(e1, D) 6= evalE(e2, D)
(D,φ, ⌈if tokenchk(e1, e2) then c⌋
R
E)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈reply (error, skip, {})⌋
R
E)
(S-AUTH)
R = n, u, ιb, l j ∈ dom(φ) α = ♯[~v]
ιb,φ(j)
ℓ
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]. evali,j(sek, D) = vk
(D,φ, ⌈auth ~se at ℓ⌋Ri,j)
α
−→ (D,φ, ⌈skip⌋Ri,j)
(S-REPLY)
R = n, u, ιb, l m = |~x | = |~se| ∀k ∈ [1,m]. evalE(sek, D) = vk
σ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm] α = res(n, u,⊥, 〈〉, ckσ, pageσ, sσ)
(D,φ, ⌈reply (page, s, ck) with ~x = ~se⌋
R
E)
α
−→ (D,φ, ⌈halt⌋
R
E)
Web systems
(A-BROSER)
W
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,l)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ W ′ W ′
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,l)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ W ′′
K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓ)) ? (K ∪ ns(p, ck)) : K
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
•
−→ (ℓ,K′) ⊲ W ′′
(A-BROATK)
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, l) W
α
−→ W ′
I(ℓ) ⊑I I(λ(u))
K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓ)) ? (K ∪ ns(p, ck)) : K
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓ,K′ ∪ {n}) ⊲ W ′
(A-ATKSER)
n← N ιb 6= usr ns(p, ck) ⊆ K
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, l) W
α
−→ W ′
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓ,K ∪ {n}) ⊲ W ′
1) Servers: Rules rely on the function evalE(se,D) that
evaluates the expression se in the environment E using the
database D. The formal definition is in [15], here we provide
an intuitive explanation. The evaluation of @r and $r yields
the value associated to r in the global and the session memory
identified by E, respectively. Expression fresh()ℓ evaluates to
a fresh name sampled from N with security label ℓ. A value
evaluates to itself. Evaluation of binary operations is standard.
Rule (S-RECV) models the receiving of a connection n at
the endpoint u, as indicated by the action req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, l).
A new thread is spawned where command c is executed after
substituting all the occurrences of variables in ~x with the
parameters p received from the network. We use the value ⊥
for uninitialized parameters. The environment is i,⊥ where i
identifies a freshly allocated global memory and ⊥ that there is
no ongoing session. The references of the global memory in ~r
are initialized with the values in ck (if provided). In the request
context we include the details about the incoming connection,
including the origin l of the page that produced the request (or
⊥, e.g., when the user opens the page in a new tab). The thread
keeps listening for other connections on the same endpoint.
The evaluation of command start se is modeled by rules
(S-RESTORESESSION) and (S-NEWSESSION). If se evaluates
to a name j ∈ dom(D), we resume a previously established
session, otherwise we create a new one and allocate a new
empty memory that is added to the database D. We write E =
i, to denote that the second component of E is immaterial.
In both cases the environment is updated accordingly.
Rule (S-LOGIN) models a successful login attempt. For
this purpose, we presuppose the existence of a global partial
function ρ mapping the pair (ιs, u) to the correct password
where ιs is the identity of the user and u is the login endpoint.
The rule updates the trust mapping φ by associating the session
identifier specified in the login command with the identity ιs.
Rules (S-OCHKSUCC) and (S-TCHKFAIL) treat a success-
ful origin check and a failed token check, respectively. In
the origin check we verify that the origin of the request is
in a set of whitelisted origins, while in the token check we
verify that two tokens match. In case of success we execute
the continuation, otherwise we respond with an error message.
Rule (S-AUTH) produces the authenticated event ♯[~v]ιb,ιsℓ
where ~v is data identifying the event, e.g., paper and action
in the HotCRP example of Section II-B. The event is annotated
with the identities ιb, ιs, representing the user running the
browser and the account where the event occurred, and the
label ℓ denoting the security level associated to the event.
Rule (S-REPLY) models a reply from the server over the
open connection n as indicated by the action res. The response
contains a page page , script s and a map of cookies ck,
where all occurrences of variables in ~x are replaced with
the evaluation results of the expressions in ~se. The third and
the fourth component of res are the redirect URL and the
corresponding parameters, hence we use ⊥ to denote that no
redirect happens. We stipulate that the execution terminates
after performing the reply as denoted by the instruction halt.
2) Web Systems: The semantics of web systems regulates
the communications among browsers, servers and the attacker.
Rule (A-BROSER) synchronizes a browser sending a request
req with the server willing to process it, as denoted by the
matching action req. Here the attacker does not play an
active role (as denoted by action •) but she may update her
knowledge with new secrets if she can read the contents of
the request, modeled by the condition C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓ).
Rule (A-BROATK) uniformly models a communication
from a browser to a server controlled by the attacker and an
attacker that is actively intercepting network traffic sent by the
browser. These cases are captured by the integrity check on
the origin of the URL u. As in the previous rule, the attacker
updates her knowledge if she can access the communication’s
contents. Additionally, she learns the network identifier needed
to respond to the browser. In the trace of the system we
expose the action intercepted/forged by the attacker. Rule
(A-ATKSER) models an attacker opening a connection to
an honest server. We require that the identity denoting the
sender of the message belongs to the attacker and that the
contents of the request can be produced by the attacker using
her knowledge. Sequential application of the two rules lets
us model a network attacker acting as a man-in-the-middle to
modify the request sent by a browser to an honest server.
E. Security Definition
On a high level, our definition of session integrity requires
that for each trace produced by the attacked web system, there
exists a matching trace produced by the web system without
the attacker, which in particular implies that authenticated
actions cannot be modified or forged by the attacker. Before
formalizing this property, we introduce the notion of trace.
Definition 1. The system A generates the trace γ = α1 ·. . .·αk
iff the system can perform a sequence of steps A
α1−→ . . .
αk−−→
A′ for some A′ (also written as A
γ
−→∗A′).
Traces include attacker actions, authenticated events ♯[~v]ιb,ιsℓ
and • denoting actions without visible effects or synchroniza-
tions not involving the attacker. Given a trace γ, we write
γ ↓ (ι, ℓ) for the projection containing only the authentication
events of the type ♯[~v]ιb,ιsℓ with ι ∈ {ιb, ιs}. A trace γ is
unattacked if it contains only • actions and authenticated
events, otherwise γ is an attacked trace.
Now we introduce the definition of session integrity.
Definition 2. A web system W preserves session integrity
against the attacker (ℓa, K) for the honest user usr performing
the actions ~a if for any attacked trace γ generated by the sys-
tem (ℓa,K) ⊲ Busr({}, {},~a) ‖W there exists an unattacked
trace γ′ generated by the same system such that for all labels
ℓ′ we have:
I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(ℓ
′) ⇒ γ ↓ (usr, ℓ′) = γ′ ↓ (usr, ℓ′).
Intuitively, this means that the attacker can only produce au-
thenticated events in her account or influence events produced
by servers under her control. Apart from this, the attacker
can only stop on-going sessions of the user but cannot intrude
into them: this is captured by the existential quantification over
unattacked traces that also lets us pick a prefix of any trace.
IV. SECURITY TYPE SYSTEM
We now present a security type system designed for the
verification of session integrity on web applications. It consists
of several typing judgments covering server-side programs and
browser scripts. Due to space constraints, in this Section we
cover only the part related to server code and refer to [15] for
the typing rules of browser scripts.
A. Types
We introduce security types built upon the labels defined in
Section III-C. We construct the set of security types T , ranged
over by τ , according to the following grammar:
τ ::= ℓ | cred(ℓ)
We also introduce the set of reference types TR =
{ref(τ) | τ ∈ T } used for global and session references and
we define the following projections on security types:
label(ℓ) = ℓ label(cred(ℓ)) = ℓ
I(τ ) = I(label(τ )) C(τ ) = C(label(τ ))
Security types extend the standard security lattice with the type
cred(ℓ) for credentials of label ℓ. We define the pre-order⊑ℓa ,
parametrized by the attacker label ℓa, with the following rules:
ℓ ⊑ ℓ′
ℓ ⊑ℓa ℓ
′
C(τ) = C(τ ′) I(τ) ⊑I I(τ
′)
τ ⊑ℓa τ
′
C(τ) ⊔C C(τ
′) ⊑C C(ℓa) I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ) ⊓I I(τ
′)
τ ⊑ℓa τ
′
Intuitively, security types inherit the subtyping relation for
labels but this is not lifted to the confidentiality label of
credentials, since treating public values as secret credentials is
unsound. However, types of low integrity and confidentiality
(compared to the attacker’s label) are always subtype of each
other: in other words, we collapse all such types into a single
one, as the attacker controls these values and is not limited by
the restrictions enforced by types.
B. Typing Environment
Our typing environment Γ = (ΓU ,ΓX ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV) is a
5-tuple and conveys the following information:
• ΓU : U → (L2× ~T ×L) maps URLs to labels capturing the
security of the network connection, the types of the URL
parameters and the integrity label of the reply;
• ΓX : X → T maps variables to types;
• ΓR@ ,ΓR$ : R → TR map global references and session
references, respectively, to reference types;
• ΓV : V → (L2× ~T ×L) maps values used as tags for forms
in the DOM to the corresponding type. We typically require
the form’s type to match the one of the form’s target URL.
Now we introduce the notion of well-formedness which rules
out inconsistent type assignments.
Definition 3. A typing environment Γ is well-formed for λ and
ℓa (written λ, ℓa,Γ ⊢ ⋄) if the following conditions hold:
1) for all URLs u ∈ U with ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr we have
a) C(ℓu) = C(λ(u)) ∧ I(λ(u)) ⊑I I(ℓu)
b) for all k ∈ [1 . . . |~τ |] we have C(τk) ⊑C C(ℓu) ∧
I(ℓu) ⊑I I(τk)
2) for all references r ∈ R with ΓR@(r) = τ
a) C(τ) ⊑C C(λ(r)) ∧ I(λ(r)) ⊑I I(τ)
b) for all u ∈ U if C(λ(r)) ⊑C (λ(u))∧I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u))
then C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa)
c) if I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(r)) and τ = cred(·) then C(τ) ⊑C
C(ℓa)
Conditions (1a) and (2a) ensure that the labels of URLs and
cookies in the typing environment are at most as strict as in the
function λ introduced in Section III-C. For instance, a cookie
r with confidentiality label C(λ(r)) = http(d) ∧ https(d)
is attached both to HTTP and HTTPS requests to domain
d. It would be unsound to use a stronger label for typing,
e.g., https(d), since we would miss attacks due to the cookie
leakage over HTTP. In the same spirit, we check that URLs
do not contain parameters requiring stronger type guarantees
than those offered by the type assigned to the URL’s network
connection (1b).
Additionally, well-formedness rules out two inherently in-
secure type assignments for cookies. First, if a low integrity
URL can read a cookie, then the cookie must have low
confidentiality since the attacker can inject a script leaking
the cookies, as in a typical XSS (2b). Second, cookies that
can be set over a low integrity network connection cannot be
high confidentiality credentials since the attacker can set them
to a value she knows (2c).
C. Intuition Behind the Typing Rules
The type system resembles one for standard information
flow control (IFC) where we consider explicit and implicit
flows for integrity, but only explicit flows for confidentiality:
since our property of interest is the integrity of web sessions,
regarding confidentiality we are only interested in preventing
credentials (e.g., cookies and CSRF tokens) from being leaked,
as they are used for access control. The leakage of other values
does not impact our property. The type system restricts the
operations on credentials to be exclusively equality checks,
hence, the leak of information through implicit flows is limited
to one bit. This is consistent with the way credentials are
handled by real web applications. A treatment of implicit flows
for confidentiality would require a declassification mechanism
to handle the bit leaked by credential checks, thus complicating
our formalism without adding any tangible security guarantee.
The server-side code is type-checked twice under different
assumptions: first, we consider the case of an honest user
visiting the server; second, we consider a CSRF attempt where
the attacker forces the user’s browser to send a request to the
server. We do not consider the case of the attacker visiting
the server from her own browser since we can prove that such
a session is always well-typed, which is close in spirit to the
opponent typability lemma typically employed in type systems
for cryptographic protocols [26], [4].
Intuitively, our type system checks 1) the user’s identity
and 2) the intention of the user to perform authenticated
actions. In typing, this is captured by two dedicated labels.
The session label ℓs records the owner of the active session
and is used to label references in the session memory. The
label typically equals the one of the session identifier, thus
it changes when we resume or start a new session. Formally,
ℓs ∈ L2 ∪ {×} where × denotes no active session.
The program counter label pc ∈ L tracks the integrity of
the control flow. A high pc implies that the control flow is
intended by the user. The pc is lowered in conditionals with a
low integrity guard, as is standard in IFC type systems. In the
CSRF typing branch, pc will be permanently low: we have to
prune this typing branch to type-check high integrity actions.
To prune a typing branch, we can use token checks or origin
checks. In the former, the user submits a CSRF token that is
compared to a specific session reference or cookie. In the latter
we check whether the origin of the request is contained in a
whitelist. For both, there are cases in which we statically know
that the check fails, allowing us to prune typing branches.
We also briefly comment on another important attack,
namely cross-site scripting (XSS): we can model XSS vul-
nerabilities by including a script from an attacker-controlled
domain, which causes a failure in typing. XSS prevention is
orthogonal to the goal of our work and must be solved with
alternative techniques, e.g., proper input filtering or CSP [39].
D. Explanation of the Typing Rules
1) Server Expressions: Typing of server expressions is
ruled by the judgement Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ , meaning that the
expression se has type τ in the typing environment Γ within
the session ℓs. Names have type cred(ℓ) where ℓ is the
label provided as annotation (T-ENAME, T-EFRESH). Values
different from names are constants of type ⊥, i.e., they have
low confidentiality and high integrity (T-EVAL). Rule (T-
EUNDEF) gives any type to the undefined value ⊥. This
is required since the initial memory and empty parameters
contain this value and still have to be well-typed. The types
of variables and references in the global memory are read from
the corresponding environments (T-EVAR,T-EGLOBREF).
For session references (T-ESESREF) we combine the in-
formation stored in the environment with the session label
ℓs, which essentially acts as an upper bound on the types of
references. In a honest session, ℓs has high confidentiality,
thus the session memory can be used to store secrets. In the
attacker session, instead, the types of all session references
are lowered to at most ℓa. Typing fails if no session is active,
i.e., ℓs = ×. The computed type for a reference is a credential
type if and only if it is such also in the environment.
Binary operations are given the join of the types of the two
operands (T-EBINOP). However, on credentials we allow only
equality checks to limit leaks through implicit flows. Finally,
(T-ESUB) lets us use subtyping ⊑ℓa on expressions.
2) Server References: Typing of server references is ruled
by the judgment Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(τ) meaning that the
reference r has the reference type ref(τ) in the typing
environment Γ within the session ℓs. This judgement is used to
derive the type of a reference we want to write to, in contrast
to the typing of expressions which covers typing of references
from which we read. While (T-RGLOBREF) just looks up
the type of the global reference in the typing environment, in
TABLE III: Type system.
Server expressions
(T-ENAME)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
nℓ : cred(ℓ)
(T-EFRESH)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
fresh()ℓ : cred(ℓ)
(T-EVAL)
v 6∈ N
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
v : ⊥
(T-EUNDEF)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
⊥ : τ
(T-EVAR)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
x : ΓX (x)
(T-EGLOBREF)
Γ
R@
(r) = ref(τ)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
@r : τ
(T-ESESREF)
ℓs 6= × ΓR$ (r) = ref(τ
′)
ℓ = (C(τ ′) ⊓C C(ℓs), I(τ
′) ⊔I I(ℓs))
τ = (τ ′ 6= cred(·)) ? ℓ : cred(ℓ)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
$r : τ
(T-EBINOP)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : τ Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se′ : τ ′
(τ, τ ′ 6= cred(·)) ∨ ⊙ is =
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se⊙ se′ : τ ⊔ τ ′
(T-ESUB)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : τ ′ τ ′ ⊑ℓa τ
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : τ
Server references
(T-RGLOBREF)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
@r : Γ
R@
(r)
(T-RSESREF)
ℓs 6= × ΓR$(r) = ref(τ
′) ℓ = (C(τ ′) ⊓C C(ℓs), I(τ
′) ⊔I I(ℓs))
τ = (τ ′ 6= cred(·)) ? ℓ : cred(ℓ)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
$r : ref(τ)
(T-RSUB)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(τ ′) τ ⊑ℓa τ
′
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(τ)
Server-side commands
(T-SKIP)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
skip : ℓs, pc
(T-SEQ)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c : ℓs
′, pc′
Γ, ℓs
′, pc′ ⊢cℓa,C c
′ : ℓs
′′, pc′′
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c; c′ : ℓs
′′, pc′′
(T-LOGIN)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
seu : τ Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
sepw : cred(ℓ) Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
sesid : cred(ℓ
′)
C(cred(ℓ)) ⊑C C(cred(ℓ
′)) I(cred(ℓ)) ⊔I pc ⊑I I(cred(ℓ
′))
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
login seu, sepw, sesid : ℓs, pc
(T-START)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : cred(ℓ)
ℓs
′ = (C(cred(ℓ)) ⊑C C(ℓa)) ? ℓa : ℓ
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
start se : ℓs
′, pc
(T-SETGLOBAL)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
@r : ref(τ) Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : τ
pc ⊑I I(τ)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
@r := se : ℓs, pc
(T-SETSESSION)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
$r : ref(τ) Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : τ
pc ⊑I I(τ)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
$r := se : ℓs, pc
(T-IF)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se : τ pc′ = pc ⊔I I(τ) Γ, ℓs, pc
′ ⊢cℓa,C c : ℓs
′′, pc1
Γ, ℓs, pc
′ ⊢cℓa,C c
′ : ℓs
′′′, pc2 pc
′′ = pc1 ⊔I pc2 ℓs
′ = (ℓs
′′ = ℓs
′′′) ? ℓs
′′ : ×
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
if se then c else c′ : ℓs
′, pc′′
(T-PRUNETCHK)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(cred(ℓ)) Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
x : τ
C(τ) 6= C(cred(ℓ)) C(cred(ℓ)) 6⊑C C(ℓa) b = csrf
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
if tokenchk(x, r) then c : ℓs, pc
(T-TCHK)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(cred(ℓ)) Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
x : cred(ℓ)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c : ℓs
′, pc
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
if tokenchk(x, r) then c : ℓs
′, pc
(T-PRUNEOCHK)
∀l ∈ L.I(ℓa) 6⊑I l u ∈ P b = csrf
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
if originchk(L) then c : ℓs, pc
(T-OCHK)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c : ℓs
′, pc
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
if originchk(L) then c : ℓs
′, pc
(T-AUTH)
ℓs 6= × ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~se|].Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
sek : τk(
I(ℓa) ⊑I
⊔
I
1≤k≤| ~se|
I(τk) ⊔I pc ⊔I I(ℓs)
)
⇒ I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ℓ)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,C
auth ~se at ℓ : ℓs, pc
(T-REPLY)
ΓU(u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr
pc
′ = pc ⊔I lr Γ
′
X = x1 : τ1, . . . , x|~se| : τ|~se| Γ
′ = (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV) ∀k ∈ [1 . . . | ~se|].Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
sek : τk ∧ C(τk) ⊑C C(ℓu)
∀r ∈ dom(ck).Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(τr) ∧ Γ
′, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
ck(r) : τr ∧ pc
′ ⊑I I(τr) Γ
′, b, pc′ ⊢sℓa,P s b = csrf ⇒ ∀x ∈ vars(s). C(Γ
′
X (x)) ⊑C C(ℓa)
b = hon ⇒ pc ⊑I lr ∧
(
page = error ∨ ∀v ∈ dom(page).Γ′, v, pc′ ⊢fℓa page(v)
)
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ℓu) ⇒ ∀k ∈ [1 . . . | ~se|]. C(τk) ⊑C C(ℓa)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
reply (page, s, ck) with ~x = ~se : ℓs, pc
(T-REDIR)
ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ, lr Γ
′
X = x1 : τ1, . . . , x|~se| : τ|~se| Γ
′
= (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV)
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~se|].Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
sek : τk ∧ C(τk) ⊑C C(ℓu) ∀r ∈ dom(ck).Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(τr) ∧ Γ
′, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
ck(r) : τr ∧ pc ⊑I I(τr)
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ℓu)⇒ ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]. C(τk) ⊑C C(ℓa) b = csrf ⇒ ∀x ∈ vars(~z). C(Γ
′
X (x)) ⊑C C(ℓa)
ΓU(u
′) = ℓ′u,
~τ ′, b = hon ⇒
(
pc ⊑I I(ℓu) ∧m = |~z | = |~τ ′| ∧ ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m].Γ
′, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
zk : τ
′
k ∧ τ
′
k ⊑ℓa τk
)
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
redirect (u′, ~z, ck) with ~x = ~se : ℓs, pc
Forms
(T-FORM)
ΓV(v) = ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ, lr pc ⊑I I(ℓu) m = |~z | = |~τ | ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m].Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
zk : τ
′
k ∧ τ
′
k ⊑ℓa τk
Γ, v, pc ⊢
f
ℓa
form(u, ~z)
Server threads
(T-PARALLEL)
Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t Γ
0 ⊢tℓa,P t
′
Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t ‖ t
′
(T-RECV)
λ, ℓa,Γ
0 ⊢ ⋄ Γ0U(u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr m = |~τ | = |~x |
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~r |]. C(Γ0
R@
(rk)) ⊑C C(ℓu) ∧ I(ℓu) ⊑I I(Γ
0
R@
(rk))
ΓX = x1 : τ1, . . . , xm : τm (Γ
0
U ,ΓX ,Γ
0
R@
,Γ0
R$
,Γ0V),×, I(ℓu) ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,hon,P)
c : , I(ℓu)
Γ′X = x1 : ℓa, . . . , xm : ℓa (Γ
0
U ,Γ
′
X ,Γ
0
R@
,Γ0
R$
,Γ0V ),×,⊤I ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,csrf,P)
c : ,⊤I
Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P u[~r](~x) →֒ c
(T-RSESREF) we have analogous conditions to (T-ESESREF)
for session references. Subtyping for reference types is contra-
variant to subtyping for security types (T-RSUB).
3) Server Commands: The judgement Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P)
c : ℓs
′,pc′ states that in the typing environment Γ with session
label ℓs and program counter label pc, the command c bound
to the endpoint at URL u can be typed in the typing branch
b ∈ {hon, csrf} against the attacker ℓa with a set of protected
URLs P containing all URLs that are relying on an origin
check to prevent CSRF attacks. After the execution of c, the
session label is updated to ℓs
′ and the program counter label is
updated to pc′. If the individual components of the tuple are
not needed in a typing rule, we let C = (u, b,P). The branch b
tracks whether we are typing the scenario of an honest request
(b = hon) or the CSRF case (b = csrf).
Rule (T-SKIP) does nothing, while (T-SEQ) types the sec-
ond command with the session label and program counter label
obtained by typing the first command. Rule (T-LOGIN) veri-
fies that the password and the session identifier are credentials
and that the latter is at least as confidential as the password,
since the identifier can now also be used for authentication.
Finally, we check that the integrity of the password and pc
are at least as high as the integrity of the session identifier
to prevent an unauthorized party from influencing the identity
associated to the session.
Rule (T-START) updates the session label that serves as an
upper bound for labels of references in the session memory in
the continuation. We prevent the content of the session mem-
ory from being of higher confidentiality or integrity than the
session secret. We check that the expression se is a credential,
i.e., it has type cred(ℓ). If se has low confidentiality, the
attacker can enter the session and we change the session label
to ℓa, otherwise we use the label ℓ specified in the type of se.
Rules (T-SETGLOBAL) and (T-SETSESSION) ensure that
no explicit flow violates the confidentiality or integrity poli-
cies, where for integrity we additionally consider the pc label.
Rule (T-IF) lowers pc based on the integrity label of the
guard expression and uses it to type-check the two branches. In
the continuation we use the join of the returned pcs in the two
branches. Using a higher pc in the continuation is unsound
since reaching the continuation can depend on the branch
taken (if one of the branches contains a reply command). If
typing the two branches yields two different session labels, we
use the session label × in the continuation to signal that the
session state cannot be statically predicted and thus no session
operation should be allowed.
Rules (T-TCHK) and (T-PRUNETCHK) handle CSRF token
checks. In (T-PRUNETCHK) we statically know that the
equality check fails since the type of the memory reference
and that of the parameter are not compatible, hence we do not
type-check the continuation. We use this rule only when typing
the CSRF scenario. Rule (T-TCHK) covers the case where the
check may succeed and we simply type-check the continuation
c. We do not change pc since a failure in the check produces
an error page causing the user to stop browsing.
Similarly, rules (T-OCHK) and (T-PRUNEOCHK) cover
origin checks. We can prune the CSRF typing branch if the
URL is protected (u ∈ P) and all whitelisted origins have
high integrity, since an invariant enforces that the origin of a
CSRF attack to a protected URL is always of low integrity.
Rule (T-AUTH) ensures that the attacker cannot affect
any component leading to an authenticated event (pc, ℓs or
any expression in ~se) unless the event is annotated with a
low integrity label. Since authenticated events are bound to
sessions, we require ℓs 6= ×.
Rule (T-REPLY) combines pc with the expected integrity
label of the response lr for the current URL to compute pc
′
which is used to type the response. In the honest typing branch,
we require pc′ = lr, which establishes an invariant used when
typing an include command in a browser script, where we
require that the running script and the included script can be
typed with the same pc ((T-BINCLUDE), Appendix D). Then
we check further properties, using a typing environment Γ′
containing types for the variables used in the response:
• no secret data is included in the response if the network
connection does not guarantee its confidentiality;
• value types and pc respect the types of the cookies in Γ;
• the returned script is well typed (rules in Appendix D);
• no confidential data is given to the script in the CSRF typing
branch, since it might be included by an attacker’s script;
• in the honest typing branch we check that the returned
page is either the error page or all contained forms are
well typed (T-FORM). We do not perform this check in the
CSRF branch: A CSRF attack is either triggered by a script
inclusion or through a redirect. In the first case the attacker
cannot access the DOM, which in a real world browser is
enforced by the Same Origin Policy. In the second case,
well-formed user behavior (Section IV-E) ensures that the
user will not interact with the DOM in this scenario;
• no high confidentiality data is included in replies over a low
integrity network connection, since the attacker could inject
scripts to leak secrets embedded in the response.
Rule (T-REDIR) performs mostly the same checks as (T-
REPLY). However, instead of typing script and DOM, we
perform checks on the URL similar to the typing of forms.
4) Forms: The judgement Γ, v,pc ⊢fℓa f says that a form
f identified by the name v is well-typed in the environment
Γ under the label pc. Our rule for typing forms (T-FORM)
first checks that the type of the form name matches the type
of the target URL. This is needed since for well-formed user
behavior (Section IV-E) we will assume that the user relies
on the name of a form to ensure that her inputs are compliant
with the expected types. With pc ⊑I I(ℓu) we check that the
thread running with program counter label pc is allowed to
trigger requests to u. In this way we can carry over the pc
from one thread where the form has been created to the one
receiving the request since we type-check the honest branch
with pc = I(ℓu). Finally, we check that the types of all form
values comply with the expected type for the corresponding
URL parameter. account for implicit flows of integrity.
5) Server Threads: The judgement Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t states that a
thread t is well-typed in the environment Γ0 against an attacker
at label ℓa and with a set P of protected URLs.
Rule (T-PARALLEL) states that the parallel composition of
two threads is well-typed if both are well-typed. We refer to
the technical report [15] for rules for typing running threads
(i.e., t = ⌈c⌋RE), as they are only necessary for the proofs.
Essentially, (T-RECV) checks that the environment is well-
formed and that the network connection type ℓu is strong
enough to guarantee the types of the cookies, akin to what is
done for parameters in the definition of well-formed environ-
ments. Then we type-check the command twice with ℓs = ×,
since no session is initially active. In the first branch we let
b = hon: parameters are typed according to the type of u in
Γ0U which is reflected in the environment ΓX . As the honest
user initiated the request, we let pc = I(ℓu), i.e., we use the
integrity label of the network connection as pc. This allows us
to import information about the program counter from another
(well-typed) server thread or browser script that injected the
form into the DOM or directly triggered the request.
In the second branch we let b = csrf: parameters are chosen
by the attacker, hence they have type ℓa in Γ
′
X . As the attacker
initiated the request (via an honest browser), we let pc = ⊤I .
E. Formal Results
We now introduce the notion of navigation flow, which
identifies a sequence of navigations among different pages
occurring in a certain tab and triggered by the user’s interaction
with the elements of the DOM of rendered pages. A navigation
flow is a list of user actions consisting of a load on a certain
tab followed by all actions of type submit in that tab (modeling
clicks on links and submissions of forms) up to the next load.
A formal definition is presented in Definition 6 in Appendix E.
Now we introduce the notion of well-formedness to con-
strain the interactions of an honest user with a web system.
Definition 4. The list of user actions ~a is well-formed for the
honest user usr in a web system W with respect to a typing
environment Γ0 and an attacker ℓa iff
1) for all actions a′ in ~a we have:
• if a′ = load(tab, u, p), ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr then for all
k ∈ dom(p) we have p(k) = vτ
′
⇒ τ ′ ⊑ℓa τk;
• if a′ = submit(tab, u, v′, p), ΓV(v
′) = ℓu, ~τ , lr then for
all k ∈ dom(p) we have p(k) = vτ
′
⇒ τ ′ ⊑ℓa τk.
2) (ℓa,K0) ⊲ Busr({}, {},~a) ‖ W
γ
−→ ∗(ℓa,K′) ⊲
Busr(M,P, 〈〉) ‖ W
′ for some K′,W ′,M, P where γ is
an unattacked trace;
3) for every navigation flow ~a ′ in ~a, we have that I(ℓa) ⊑I
I(λ(a′j)) implies I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(a
′
k)) for all j < k ≤ |
~a′|.
Condition 1 prevents the user from deliberately leaking
secrets by enforcing that the expected parameter types are
respected. While the URL in a load event is the target URL
and we can directly check its type, in a submit action it refers
to the page containing the form: intuitively, this models a
user who knows which page she is actively visiting with a
load and which page she is currently on when performing a
submit. However, we do not expect the user to inspect the
target URL of a form. Instead, we expect the user to identify
a form by its displayed name (the parameter v′ in submit)
and input only data matching the type associated to that form
name. For instance, in a form named “public comment”, we
require that the user enters only public data. Typing hence has
to enforces that all forms the user interacts with are named
correctly. Otherwise, an attacker could abuse a mismatch of
form name and target URL in order to steal confidential data.
Condition 2 lets us consider only honest runs in which
the browser terminates regularly. Concretely, this rules out
interactions that deliberately trigger an error at the server-side,
e.g., the user loads a page expecting a CSRF token without
providing this token, or executions that do not terminate due
to infinite loops, e.g., where a script recursively includes itself.
Condition 3 requires that the user does not navigate a
trusted website reached by interacting with an untrusted page.
Essentially, this rules out phishing attempts where the attacker
influences the content shown to the user in the trusted website.
Definition 5. A server S is fresh if S = ({}, {}, t) where t is
the parallel composition of threads of the type u[~r](~x) →֒ c.
A system W is a fresh cluster if it is the parallel composition
of fresh servers.
We assume that every server is in its initial state, i.e., no
command is running or has been run on it. This is consistent
with the assumption that there is no browser in the system.
We now present the main technical result, namely that well-
typed clusters preserve the session integrity property from
Definition 2 for all well-formed interactions of the honest user
with the system, if her passwords are confidential.
Theorem 1. Let W be a fresh cluster, ℓa an attacker with
knowledge K, Γ0 a typing environment, P a set of protected
URLs and let ~a be a list of well-formed user actions for
usr in W with respect to Γ0 and ℓa. Assume that for all u
with ρ(usr, u) = nℓ we have C(ℓ) 6⊑C C(ℓa) and for all
nℓ ∈ K we have C(ℓ) ⊑C C(ℓa). Then W preserves session
integrity against ℓa with knowledge K for the honest user usr
performing the list of actions ~a if Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t for all servers
S = ({}, {}, t) in W .
The proof builds upon a simulation relation connecting a run
of the system with the attacker with a corresponding run of the
system without the attacker in which the honest user behaves
in the same way and high integrity authenticated events are
equal in the two runs. Due to its length, the proof is in the
full version of the paper [15].
V. CASE STUDY
Now we resume the analysis of HotCRP, started in
Section II where we described the login CSRF and proposed
a fix, and describe the remaining session integrity problems
we discovered by typing its model in our core calculus.
We postpone to Appendix F the encoding of Moodle and
phpMyAdmin, as well as the new vulnerability.
A. Methodology
We type-check the HotCRP model of Section II against
different attackers, including the web-, related-domain-, and
network attacker. Two scenarios motivate the importance of
the related-domain attacker in our case study. First, many
conferences using HotCRP deploy the system on a subdomain
of the university organizing the event, e.g., CSF 2020: any user
who can host contents on a subdomain of the university can
act as the attacker. Second, anybody can host a conference on
a subdomain of hotcrp.com or access the administrative panel
of test.hotcrp.com: by exploiting a stored XSS vulnerability
in the admin panel, it is possible to show on the homepage
of the conference a message containing JavaScript code that
tampers with cookies to implement some of the attacks below.
Failures in type-checking highlight code portions that we
analyze manually, as they likely suffer from session integrity
flaws. Once a problem is identified, we implement a patch in
our HotCRP model and try to type-check it again; this iterative
process stops when we manage to establish a security proof
by typing (Section V-C).
B. Cookie Integrity Attacks
Our fix against login CSRF does not ensure the integrity of
session cookies against network and related-domain attackers:
the former can compromise cookie integrity by forging HTTP
traffic, while the latter can set cookies for the target website
by using the Domain attribute. Attackers can thus perform
cookie forcing to set the their session cookies in the victim’s
browser, achieving the same outcome of a login CSRF.
Even worse, the lack of cookie integrity combined with
a logical vulnerability on HotCRP code enables a session
fixation attack, where the attacker manages to force a known
cookie into the browser of the victim before she authenticates
which is used by HotCRP to identify the victim’s session
after login. With the known cookie, the attacker can then
access the victim’s session to steal submitted papers, send fake
reviews, or deanonymize reviewers. HotCRP tries to prevent
session fixation by checking during login whether the provided
session cookie (if any) identifies a session where no variable
is set: in such a case, the value of the cookie is changed
to an unpredictable random string. However, some session
variables are not properly unset during logout, thus the above
check can be voided by an attacker with an account on the
target website that obtains a valid cookie by authenticating and
logging out. At this point, the attacker can inject this cookie
into the victim’s browser to perform the attack.
These attacks are captured in typing as follows: although we
have a certain liberty in the choice of our initial environment,
no possible type for sid leads to a successful type derivation
since sid must have a credential type. As the attacker can
set the cookie, it must have low integrity by well-formedness
of the typing environment. Since the attacker can write (low
confidentiality) values of her knowledge into sid, it may not be
a credential of high confidentiality, again by well-formedness
of the environment. Hence we must assume that sid is a
credential of low confidentiality and integrity. However, since
the user’s password has high confidentiality, typing fails in the
login endpoint when applying rule (T-LOGIN).
A possible solution against these threats relies on the
adoption of cookie prefixes (cf. Section III-C) which pro-
vide high integrity guarantees against network and related-
domain attackers. This protection cannot be applied by de-
fault in HotCRP due to backward compatibility reasons, i.e.,
hotcrp.com relies on cookies shared across multiple domains to
link different conferences under the same account. However,
the developer has fixed the bug causing the session fixation
vulnerability and we are discussing with him the option to
offer cookie prefixes as an opt-in security mechanism during
the HotCRP setup.
C. Typing Example
We now show how the login endpoint on domain dC
can be typed against an attacker controlling a domain dE
that is related to dC , assuming that the session cookie is
secured with the __Host- prefix. We let the attacker label
ℓa = (http(dE) ∨ https(dE), http(dE) ∨ https(dE)), and
let ℓC = (https(dC), https(dC)), ℓLH = (⊥C , https(dC)),
ℓHL = (https(dC),⊤I). We then consider a minimal environ-
ment Γ sufficient to type the login page, with:
ΓU = {login 7→ (ℓC , (ℓLH , cred(ℓC), cred(ℓHL)), https(dC)),
manage 7→ (ℓC , (ℓC , ℓLH , cred(ℓHL)), https(dC))}
ΓR@ = {r 7→ cred(ℓC), r
′ 7→ cred(ℓHL),
sid 7→ cred(ℓC), pre 7→ cred(ℓHL)}
ΓR$ = {user 7→ ℓLH , ltoken 7→ cred(ℓHL)}
ΓV = {auth 7→ ΓU (login),link 7→ ΓU (manage)}
We typecheck the code under two different assumptions in (T-
RECV). Our goal is to prune the CSRF typing branch before
the security critical part and type it only in the honest setting.
We start with the honest typing branch. When typing the
conditional in rule (T-IF), we do not lower pc since the
integrity label of the guard and pc is https(dC). In the then
branch, we have the assignment @r ′ := fresh()ℓHL , which
types successfully according to (T-SETGLOBAL). The start
statement with the freshly sampled value yields a session
label ℓs = (https(dC),⊤I). The next assignment $ltoken :=
fresh()ℓHL also succeeds according to (T-SETSESSION). The
session label does not affect the type of the reference $ltoken
in this case. For the reply we successfully check that the URL
is well-formed and may be produced with the current pc (T-
FORM), that the empty script is well-typed, and that y = @r ′
may be assigned to the cookie pre (T-REPLY). In the else
branch of the conditional, we start a session over the cookie
@pre, leading to a session label ℓs = (https(dC),⊤I) (T-
START). The conditions in (T-TCHK) are fulfilled for the
tokenchk command and we continue typing without any
additional effect. Since we still have pc = https(dC), the
assignment @r := fresh()ℓC type-checks. As the password is
of the same type as the reference @r containing the session
secret, the login also type-checks successfully (T-LOGIN). The
start statement over a credential of type cred(ℓC) gives us
the session label ℓs = ℓC . For the reply, we successfully check
that we may include the form with the current pc and that it
is well formed (which is trivial, since it contains only ⊥), that
the empty script is well-typed and that we may assign the
value of @r to the cookie sid (T-REPLY).
The then branch of the CSRF case types similarly to the
honest case, since all references used in it and the cookie pre
have integrity label ⊤I . Additionally, in the CSRF branch,
we do not type the DOM (T-REPLY). In the else branch we
start a session with session label ℓs = (https(dC),⊤I) (T-
START). When performing the tokenchk, we can apply rule
(T-PRUNETCHK), since Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa $ltoken : cred(ℓHL) and
Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa token : ℓa cannot be given the same confidentiality
label. Hence, we do not have to type-check the continuation.
VI. RELATED WORK
Formal foundations for web security have been proposed in
a seminal paper [1], using a model of the web infrastructure
expressed in the Alloy model-checker to find violations of
expected web security goals. Since then, many other papers
explored formal methods in web security: a recent survey [11]
covers different research lines. We discuss here the papers
which are closest to our work.
In the context of web sessions, [12] employed reactive
non-interference [10] to formalize and prove strong confi-
dentiality properties for session cookies protected with the
HttpOnly and Secure attributes, a necessary condition
for any reasonable notion of session integrity. A variant
of reactive non-interference was also proposed in [29] to
formalize an integrity property of web sessions which rules
out CSRF attacks and malicious script inclusions. The paper
also introduced a browser-side enforcement mechanism based
on secure multi-execution [21]. A more general definition
of web session integrity, which we adapted in the present
paper, was introduced in [13] to capture additional attacks, like
password theft and session fixation. The paper also studied a
provably sound browser-based enforcement mechanism based
on runtime monitoring. Finally, [14] proposed the adoption of
micro-policies [20] in web browsers to prevent a number of at-
tacks against web sessions and presented Michrome, a Google
Chrome extension implementing the approach. None of these
papers, however, considered the problem of enforcing a formal
notion of session integrity by analyzing web application code,
since they only focused on browser-side defenses.
Formal methods found successful applications to web ses-
sion security through the analysis of web protocols, which
are the building blocks of web sessions when single sign-
on services are available. Bounded model-checking was em-
ployed in [3] and [2] to analyze the security of existing
single sign-on protocols, exposing real-world attacks against
web authentication. WebSpi is a ProVerif library designed to
model browser-server interactions, which was used to analyze
existing implementations of single sign-on based on OAuth
2.0 [7] and web-based cloud providers [6].
Web protocols for single sign-on have also been manually
analyzed in the expressive Web Infrastructure Model (WIM):
for instance, [23] focused on OAuth 2.0, [24] considered
OpenID Connect, and [22] analyzed the OpenID Financial-
grade API. While the WIM is certainly more expressive than
our core model, proofs are at present manual and require a
strong human expertise. In terms of security properties, [22]
considers a session integrity property expressed as a trace
property that is specific to the OpenID protocol flow and
the resources accessed thereby, while our definition of session
integrity is generic and formulated as a hyperproperty.
Server-side programming languages with formal security
guarantees have been proposed in several research papers. Ex-
amples include SELinks [19], UrFlow [17], SeLINQ [37] and
JSLINQ [5]. All these languages have the ability to enforce
information flow control in multi-tier web applications, poten-
tially including a browser, a server and a database. Information
flow control is an effective mechanism to enforce session
integrity, yet these papers do not discuss how to achieve
web session security; rather, they propose new languages and
abstractions for developing web applications. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no published work on the formal security
analysis of server-side programming languages, though the
development of accurate semantics for such languages [25] is
undoubtedly a valuable starting point for this kind of research.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced a type system for the verification of session
integrity for web applications encoded in a core model of
the web, and used it to assess the security of the session
management logic of HotCRP, Moodle, and phpMyAdmin.
During this process we unveiled novel critical vulnerabilities
that we responsibly disclosed to the applications’ developers,
validating by typing the security of the fixed versions.
We are currently developing a type-checker to fully auto-
mate the analysis, which we intend to make available as open
source. Notice that type annotations are typically straightfor-
ward, as they depend on the web application specification
and are easily derivable from it (e.g., the security label of
cookies captures their attributes) and typing derivations are
mostly deterministic, with a few exceptions (e.g., subtyping)
that however follow recurrent patterns (e.g., subtyping is used
in assignments to upgrade the value type to the reference type).
Furthermore, while in this work we focused on a concise
web model to better illustrate the foundational aspects of our
analysis technique, it would be interesting to extend the type
system to cover richer web models, e.g., the WIM model [22],
as well as additional web security properties. We also plan
to automize the verification process for PHP code, e.g., by
developing an automated translation from real world code into
our calculus. While the type annotations for values are guided
by their security level and the attacker model, it would be
interesting to design a type inference algorithm. Finally, we
would like to formalize our theory in a proof assistant.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been partially supported by the the European
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research (grant agreement 771527-BROWSEC); by the
Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through the project PROFET
(grant agreement P31621); by the Austrian Research Promo-
tion Agency (FFG) through the Bridge-1 project PR4DLT
(grant agreement 13808694) and the COMET K1 SBA.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Akhawe, A. Barth, P. E. Lam, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Song, “Towards
a Formal Foundation of Web Security,” in Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2010, 2010, pp. 290–
304.
[2] A. Armando, R. Carbone, L. Compagna, J. Cue´llar, G. Pellegrino, and
A. Sorniotti, “An Authentication Flaw in Browser-Based Single Sign-
On Protocols: Impact and remediations,” Computers & Security, vol. 33,
pp. 41–58, 2013.
[3] A. Armando, R. Carbone, L. Compagna, J. Cue´llar, and M. L. Tobarra,
“Formal Analysis of SAML 2.0 Web Browser Single Sign-On: Breaking
the SAML-Based Single Sign-On for Google Apps,” in Proceedings of
the 6th ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering,
FMSE 2008, 2008, pp. 1–10.
[4] M. Backes, C. Hrit¸cu, and M. Maffei, “Union, Intersection and Refine-
ment Types and Reasoning About Type Disjointness for Secure Protocol
Implementations,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 22, pp. 301–353,
2014.
[5] M. Balliu, B. Liebe, D. Schoepe, and A. Sabelfeld, “JSLINQ: Building
Secure Applications across Tiers,” in Proceedings of the 6th ACM
Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY
2016, 2016, pp. 307–318.
[6] C. Bansal, K. Bhargavan, A. Delignat-Lavaud, and S. Maffeis, “Keys
to the Cloud: Formal Analysis and Concrete Attacks on Encrypted
Web Storage,” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2013, 2013, pp. 126–146.
[7] ——, “Discovering Concrete Attacks on Website Authorization by
Formal Analysis,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 22, no. 4, pp.
601–657, 2014.
[8] A. Barth, “Http state management mechanism,” 2011, available at
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265.
[9] A. Barth, C. Jackson, and J. C. Mitchell, “Robust Defenses for Cross-
Site Request Forgery,” in Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2008, 2008, pp. 75–88.
[10] A. Bohannon, B. C. Pierce, V. Sjo¨berg, S. Weirich, and S. Zdancewic,
“Reactive Noninterference,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2009, 2009, pp. 79–
90.
[11] M. Bugliesi, S. Calzavara, and R. Focardi, “Formal methods for web
security,” Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming, vol. 87, pp.
110–126, 2017.
[12] M. Bugliesi, S. Calzavara, R. Focardi, and W. Khan, “CookiExt:
Patching the Browser Against Session Hijacking Attacks,” Journal of
Computer Security, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 509–537, 2015.
[13] M. Bugliesi, S. Calzavara, R. Focardi, W. Khan, and M. Tempesta,
“Provably Sound Browser-Based Enforcement of Web Session Integrity,”
in Proceedings of the 27th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Sym-
posium, CSF 2014, 2014, pp. 366–380.
[14] S. Calzavara, R. Focardi, N. Grimm, and M. Maffei, “Micro-Policies
for Web Session Security,” in Proceedings of the 29th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2016, 2016, pp. 179–193.
[15] S. Calzavara, R. Focardi, M. Maffei, N. Grimm, and M. Tempesta,
“Language-Based Web Session Integrity (full version),” 2020. [Online].
Available: https://sites.google.com/site/lbwebsec/
[16] S. Calzavara, R. Focardi, M. Squarcina, and M. Tempesta, “Surviving the
Web: A Journey into Web Session Security,” ACM Computing Surveys,
vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 13:1–13:34, 2017.
[17] A. Chlipala, “Static Checking of Dynamically-Varying Security Policies
in Database-Backed Applications,” in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX
Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI
2010, 2010, pp. 105–118.
[18] M. R. Clarkson and F. B. Schneider, “Hyperproperties,” Journal of
Computer Security, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 1157–1210, September 2010.
[19] B. J. Corcoran, N. Swamy, and M. W. Hicks, “Cross-Tier, Label-Based
Security Enforcement for Web Applications,” in Proceedings of the ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, SIGMOD
2009, 2009, pp. 269–282.
[20] A. A. de Amorim, M. De´ne`s, N. Giannarakis, C. Hritcu, B. C. Pierce,
A. Spector-Zabusky, and A. Tolmach, “Micro-Policies: Formally Veri-
fied, Tag-Based Security Monitors,” in Proceedings of the 36th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, S&P 2015, 2015, pp. 813–830.
[21] D. Devriese and F. Piessens, “Noninterference through Secure Multi-
execution,” in Proceedings of the 31st IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, S&P 2010, 2010, pp. 109–124.
[22] D. Fett, P. Hosseyni, and R. Ku¨sters, “An Extensive Formal Security
Analysis of the OpenID Financial-Grade API,” in Proceedings of the
40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, S&P 2019, 2019, pp.
453–471.
[23] D. Fett, R. Ku¨sters, and G. Schmitz, “A Comprehensive Formal Security
Analysis of OAuth 2.0,” in Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2016, 2016, pp. 1204–
1215.
[24] ——, “The Web SSO Standard OpenID Connect: In-depth Formal
Security Analysis and Security Guidelines,” in Proceedings of the 30th
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2017, 2017, pp.
189–202.
[25] D. Filaretti and S. Maffeis, “An Executable Formal Semantics of PHP,”
in Proceedings of the 28th European Conference in Object-Oriented
Programming, ECOOP 2014, 2014, pp. 567–592.
[26] R. Focardi and M. Maffei, Types for Security Protocols. IOS Press,
2011, pp. 143–181.
[27] J. Hodges, C. Jackson, and A. Barth, “Http strict transport security
(hsts),” 2012, available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797.
[28] N. Jovanovic, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel, “Preventing Cross Site Request
Forgery Attacks,” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2006,
2006, pp. 1–10.
[29] W. Khan, S. Calzavara, M. Bugliesi, W. D. Groef, and F. Piessens,
“Client Side Web Session Integrity as a Non-interference Property,”
in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information
Systems Security, ICISS 2014, 2014, pp. 89–108.
[30] MITRE, “CVE-2018-10188,” April 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10188/
[31] ——, “CVE-2018-16854,” November 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16854/
[32] ——, “CVE-2018-19969,” December 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19969/
[33] ——, “CVE-2019-12616,” June 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12616/
[34] Moodle HQ, “Moodle Learning Platform.” [Online]. Available:
https://moodle.org
[35] N. Nikiforakis, W. Meert, Y. Younan, M. Johns, and W. Joosen,
“SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking,” in
Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Engineering Secure
Software and Systems, ESSoS 2011, 2011, pp. 87–100.
[36] phpMyAdmin Development Team, “phpMyAdmin Database Adminis-
tration Software.” [Online]. Available: https://www.phpmyadmin.net
[37] D. Schoepe, D. Hedin, and A. Sabelfeld, “SeLINQ: Tracking In-
formation Across Application-Database Boundaries,” in Proceedings
of the 19th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Functional
Programming, ICFP 2014, 2014, pp. 25–38.
[38] S. Tang, N. Dautenhahn, and S. T. King, “Fortifying Web-Based Appli-
cations Automatically,” in Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2011, 2011, pp. 615–626.
[39] W3C, “Content Security Policy Level 2,” December 2016. [Online].
Available: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/
[40] M. West, “Cookie Prefixes.” [Online]. Available:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-cookie-prefixes-05
[41] X. Zheng, J. Jiang, J. Liang, H. Duan, S. Chen, T. Wan, and N. Weaver,
“Cookies Lack Integrity: Real-World Implications,” in Proceedings of
the 24th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2015, 2015,
pp. 707–721.
APPENDIX
A. Browser Model
The syntax of the scripting language supported in our
browser model is given in Table IV. We let be range over
expressions including references (for cookies), values, DOM
elements, and binary operations defined over expressions, e.g.,
TABLE IV: Syntax of browsers.
Browsers
Expressions be ::= x | r | v | dom(be, be′) | be⊙ be′
Scripts s ::= skip | s; s′ | r := be | include(u, ~be)
| setdom(be′, u, ~be)
Connections N ::= {} | {n 7→ (tab, u, l)}
Pages P ::= {} | P ⊎ {tab 7→ (u, page)}
Tasks T ::= {} | {tab 7→ s}
Output queue Q ::= {} | {α}
Browsers B ::= (N,M, P, T,Q,~a)ι
arithmetic and logical operations. In particular, expression
dom(be, be′) extracts a value from the DOM of the page where
the script is running: the expression be identifies the tag of the
form in the page, while be′ specifies the parameter of interest
in the form. For simplicity, we stipulate that dom(be, be′)
selects the URL of the form if be′ evaluates to 0.
Command skip does nothing, while s; s′ denotes the stan-
dard command concatenation. Command r := be assigns to
reference r the value obtained by evaluating the expression
be. Command include(u, ~be) retrieves the script located at
URL u providing ~be as parameters: we use this construct
to model both contents inclusion and a simplified version of
XHR requests which is not subject to SOP restrictions which
are applied by real browsers. Command setdom(be′, u, ~be)
substitutes a form in a page, where be′ is the tag of the form
to be replaced, u and ~be are respectively the URL and the
parameters of the new form.
The state of a browser is (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb where ιb
is the identity of the user who wants to perform the list of
actions ~a. The network store N maps connection identifiers
to triples (tab, u, l) where tab identifies the tab that initiated
the connection, u is the contacted endpoint and l is the origin
that has been sent in the Origin header of the request and
it is needed to correctly handle the header during redirects.
M is the cookie jar of the browser, which is modeled as a
map from references to values. P maps tab identifiers to pairs
(u, page) representing the URL and the contents of the web
page and T tracks running scripts: if T = {tab 7→ s}, script s
is running on the page contained in tab. Finally, Q is a queue
(of maximum size 1) of browser requests that is needed to
handle redirects in our model.
Finally, we presuppose the existence of the set of domains
∆ ⊆ D containing all domains where HSTS is enabled, which
essentially models the HSTS preload list3 that is shipped with
modern browsers.
B. More on Cookie Labels
Now we resume the discussion about the labelling of
cookies that we started in Section III-C.
When a cookie is set with a Domain attribute whose value
is a domain d, the cookie will be attached to all requests
towards d and its subdomains. This behavior is modelled by
the labelling
(
∧
d′≤d http(d
′) ∧ https(d′),
∧
d′∼d(http(d
′) ∧ https(d′)))
3 https://hstspreload.org
where ≤ is a preorder defined on D such that d ≤ d′ iff d is
subdomain of d′.
We discuss now the impact of HSTS on cookie labels:
since this security policy prevents browsers from communi-
cating with certain domains over HTTP, essentially it prevents
network attackers from setting cookies by modifying HTTP
responses coming from these domains. In particular, the label
for a Secure cookie for domain d becomes the following:
(https(d),
∧
d′∼d
d′ /∈∆
http(d′) ∧
∧
d′∼d https(d
′)))
If HSTS is enabled for d and all its related domains, then
the cookie label is the same as that of cookies with the
__Secure- cookie prefix, i.e.:
(https(d),
∧
d′∼d https(d
′))
C. Complete Semantics
1) Browsers: We present the browser semantics in Table V
where we exclude non-deterministic behaviors by requiring
that i) at most one network connection is open at any
time; ii) the user performs an action only when there are no
pending network connections and no script is running, which
amounts to asking that the user waits that the current page is
completely rendered. This design choice is made to simplify
our security proof and it has no impact the expressiveness of
our model.
First we define the semantics of expressions in terms of the
function eval ℓ(be,M, f) that evaluates the expression be in
terms of the cookie jar M , the DOM of the webpage f and the
security context ℓ. Rule (BE-REFERENCE) models the access
to the cookie jar, which is allowed only if the confidentiality
level of the reference is below that of the security context.
Rule (BE-DOM) selects a value from the DOM of the page
depending on the values of the expressions be and be′. Rules
(BE-VAL) and (BE-BINOP) are standard.
Our semantics relies on the auxiliary functions get ck and
upd ck to select the cookies to be attached to an outgoing
request and to update the cookie jar with the cookies provided
in an incoming response, respectively. Given a cookie jar M
and a URL u, we let get ck(M,u) be the map ck such that
ck(r) = v iff M(r) = v and C(λ(r)) ⊑C C(λ(u)). Given
a cookie jar M , a URL u and a map of cookies ck, we let
upd ck(M,u, ck) = M⊳(ck ↑ u) where ck ↑ u is the map ck′
such that ck′(r) = v iff ck(r) = v and I(λ(u)) ⊑I I(λ(r)).
We describe now the rules of the browser semantics. Rule
(B-LOAD) models the loading of a new page as dictated by
the action load(tab, u, p). The browser opens a new network
connection represented by the fresh name n and sends a
request to the server located at u providing the parameters
p and attaching the cookies ck selected from the cookie jar,
with an empty origin header, as represented by the action
req(ιb, n, u, p, ck,⊥). If the protocol of the URL u is HTTP,
we only allow the request if HSTS is not activated for the
domain. In the connections store we associate n to the triple
(tab, u,⊥). Similarly, rule (B-INCLUDE) models the embed-
ding of a script with the include directive of our scripting
TABLE V: Semantics of browsers.
Expressions
(BE-VAL)
evalℓ(v,M, f) = v
(BE-BINOP)
evalℓ(be,M, f) = v evalℓ(be
′,M, f) = v′
evalℓ(be⊙ be
′,M, f) = v ⊙ v′
(BE-REFERENCE)
C(λ(r)) ⊑C C(ℓ)
evalℓ(r,M, f) = M(r)
(BE-DOM)
evalℓ(be,M, f) = v
′ evalℓ(be
′,M, f) = v′′ {v′ 7→ form(u, ~v)} ∈ f v′′ = 0⇒ v′′′ = u v′′ 6= 0⇒ v′′′ = vv′′
evalℓ(dom(be, be
′),M, f) = v′′′
Browser
(B-LOAD)
n← N ck = get ck(M,u) α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck,⊥) (orig(u) = http(d)⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({},M,P, {}, {}, load(tab, u, p) :: ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({n 7→ (tab, u,⊥)},M,P, {}, {α}, ~a)ιb
(B-INCLUDE)
n← N ck = get ck(M,u) {tab 7→ (u′, f)} ∈ P
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~be|] : p(k) = evalλ(u′)(bek ,M, f) α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u
′)) (orig(u′) = http(d) ⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({},M, P, {tab 7→ include(u, ~be)}, {}, ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({n 7→ (tab, u, orig(u′))}, M,P, {tab 7→ skip}, {α}, ~a)ιb
(B-RECVLOAD)
α = res(n, u,⊥, , ck, page , s)
M ′ = upd ck(M,u, ck) ~a ′ = (page = error) ? (halt :: ~a) : ~a
({n 7→ (tab, u, o)},M,P, {}, {}, ~a)ιb
α
−→ ({},M ′, P ⊳ {tab 7→ (u, page)}, {tab 7→ s}, {}, ~a ′)ιb
(B-RECVINCLUDE)
α = res(n, u,⊥, , ck, page , s) M ′ = upd ck(M,u, ck)
({n 7→ (tab, u, o)},M, P, {tab 7→ s′}, {}, ~a)ιb
α
−→ ({},M ′, P, {tab 7→ s; s′}, {}, ~a)ιb
(B-REDIRECT)
α = res(n, u, u′, ~v, ck, , ) M ′ = upd ck(M,u, ck) n′ ← N ck′ = get ck(M ′, u′)
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~v |] : p(k) = vk o
′ = (o = orig(u′)) ? o : ⊥ α′ = req(ιb, n
′, u′, p, ck′, o′) (orig(u′) = http(d) ⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({n 7→ (tab, u, o)},M, P, {}, {}, ~a)ιb
α
−→ ({n′ 7→ (tab, u′, o′)},M ′, P, {}, {α′}, ~a)ιb
(B-SUBMIT)
{tab 7→ (u, f)} ∈ P {v′ 7→ form(u′, ~v)} ∈ f ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~v |]. p′(k) = k ∈ dom(p) ? p(k) : vk
n← N ck = get ck(M,u′) α = req(ιb, n, u
′, p′, ck, orig(u)) (orig(u′) = http(d) ⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({}, M,P, {}, {}, submit(tab, u, v′, p) :: ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({n 7→ (tab, u′, orig(u′))},M, P, {}, {α}, ~a)ιb
(B-FLUSH)
(N,M,P, T, {α}, ~a)ιb
α
−→ (N,M,P, T, {}, ~a)ιb
(B-SEQ)
({}, M,P, {tab 7→ s}, {}, ~a)ιb
α
−→ ({},M ′, P ′, {tab 7→ s′}, {}, ~a)ιb
({},M, P, {tab 7→ s; s′′}, {}, ~a)ιb
α
−→ ({},M ′, P ′, {tab 7→ s′; s′′}, {}, ~a)ιb
(B-SKIP)
({},M, P, {tab 7→ skip; s}, {}, ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({}, M,P, {tab 7→ s}, {}, ~a)ιb
(B-END)
({},M, P, {tab 7→ skip}, {}, ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({}, M,P, {}, {}, ~a)ιb
(B-SETREFERENCE)
{tab 7→ (u, f)} ∈ T ℓ = λ(u) evalℓ(be,M, f) = v I(ℓ) ⊑I I(λ(r))
({},M, P, {tab 7→ r := be}, {}, ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({},M{r 7→ v}, P, {tab 7→ skip}, {}, ~a)ιb
(B-SETDOM)
ℓ = λ(u′) evalℓ(be
′,M, f) = v′ ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~be|]. vk = evalℓ(bek,M, f)
({},M, P ⊎ {tab 7→ (u′, f)}, {tab 7→ setdom(be′, u, ~be)}, {}, ~a)ιb
•
−→ ({}, M,P ⊎ {tab 7→ (u′, f{v′ 7→ form(u, ~v)})}, {tab 7→ skip}, {}, ~a)ιb
language. Compared to (B-LOAD), the main differences are
that i) the list of expressions ~be specified in the instruction are
evaluated; ii) the request contains the origin of the page where
the script is executed. Notice that the execution of the script
is paused until a response is received: this behavior is similar
to what happens in standard browsers when embedding scripts
or using synchronous XHR requests.
Rule (B-RECVLOAD) models the receiving of a webpage
over a pending network connection, represented by the transi-
tion label res(n, u,⊥, , ck, page, s). As a result, the connec-
tion n is closed, the cookie jar is updated with the cookies ck
attached to the response, the content of the tab associated to n
is replaced with the received page and the script s is executed
in that tab. In case the page error is received, we prepend the
action halt to the list of user actions: since this action is not be
consumed by any of the semantic rules, this models a cautious
user that interrupts the navigation when an unexpected error
occurs during the navigation. Rule (B-RECVINCLUDE) is
similar to the previous rule: the main differences are that i) the
page contained in tab is left unchanged and the one sent by
the server is discarded, therefore the user continues interacting
with the website even when the error page is received by the
browser; ii) the script s sent by the server is prepended to
the script s′ that is waiting to run on the page. Rule (B-
REDIRECT) models the receiving of a redirect from the server
to URL u′ with parameters ~v, represented by the transition
label res(n, u, u′, ~v, ck, , ). The cookie jar is updated with
the cookies ck set in the response and a new request to u′
with the appropriate cookies and parameters is prepared by
the browser and added to the output queue. If the origin o
of the original request matches the origin orig(u′) of the new
target, the origin header remains the same for the new request,
otherwise it is set to ⊥. The redirect is only allowed if it
respects the HSTS settings for the new target.
Rule (B-SUBMIT) models the user clicking on a link or
submitting a form in the page identified by URL u which is
currently open in the browser at the specified tab. For each
parameter we first check if the user has inserted a value by
inspecting the map p, otherwise we fallback to the pre-filled
parameter contained in the form. A new network connection
is opened, cookies from the cookie jar are attached to the
outgoing request and the HSTS settings are checked as in (B-
LOAD). The origin of the request is the origin of the URL u
of the page containing the form. Rule (B-FLUSH) outputs on
the network the request in the output queue produced by rules
(B-LOAD), (B-INCLUDE) (B-REDIRECT) and (B-SUBMIT).
The remaining rules describe how scripts are processed.
Rule (B-SEQ) models sequencing of script commands, (B-
SKIP) processes the skip command and (B-END) terminates
the script execution. Rule (B-SETREFERENCE) models the
setting of a cookie by a script, which is allowed if the integrity
label of the reference is above that of the URL of the page
where the script is running. Finally, rule (B-SETDOM) models
the update of a form in the DOM of the page where the script
is running.
2) Servers: In Table VI we give the rules of the server
semantics that were not presented in Section III-D. Rule
(S-SEQ) is used for sequencing commands, (S-SKIP) to
evaluate skip, (S-IFTRUE) and (S-IFFALSE) for condition-
als, (S-OCHKFAIL) and (S-TCHKSUCC) cover the missing
cases of origin and token check, (S-SETGLOBAL) and (S-
SETSESSION) respectively update the value of a reference
in the global memory and in the session memory. Rule (S-
REDIRECT) models a redirect from the server to the URL
u′ with parameters ~z that sets the cookies ck in the user’s
browser. The page and script components of the action res
are respectively the empty page and the empty script, as they
will be anyway discarded by the browser. As in rule (S-
REPLY) shown in Table II, all occurrences of variables in
~x contained in the response are replaced with the results of
the evaluations of the corresponding expressions in ~se and
we stipulate that the execution terminates after sending the
message. Finally, rules (S-LPARALLEL) and (S-RPARALLEL)
handle the parallel composition of threads.
3) Web Systems: We report in Table VII the rules of the
web systems semantics that were not presented in the body
of the paper. Rules (W-LPARALLEL) and (W-RPARALLEL)
model the parallel composition of web systems. Rule (A-
NIL) is applied when no synchronizations between two entities
occur.
Rule (A-SERBRO) models an honest server providing a
response to a browser over a pending connection. Here the
knowledge of the attacker is extended either if she can read the
messages using her network capabilities. Rule (A-SERATK)
models the reception of a response from an honest server by
the attacker. We require that the attacker knows the connection
identifier n to prevent her from intercepting arbitrary traf-
fic and we extend her knowledge with the contents of the
message. Rule (A-ATKBRO) models the attacker providing a
response to a browser either using her network capabilities or
a server under her control. In this case we require that the
attacker is able to produce the contents of the response using
her knowledge K, which amounts to asking that all names in
the response are known to the attacker.
Finally, rule (A-TIMEOUT) is used to process requests
to endpoints not present in the system W (e.g., attacker-
controlled endpoints in a run without the attacker): in such
a case, we let the browser process an empty response.
D. Typing Rules for Scripts
Table VIII presents the typing rules that were not introduced
in the body of the paper due to lack of space.
1) Browser Expressions: Typing of browser expressions
is ruled by the judgement Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ , meaning that
the expression se has type τ in the typing environment Γ
and typing branch b. Rules are similar to those for server
expressions, but in this case we do not carry around the
session label since there are no session references. Rule (T-
BEDOM) is used to type reading data from the DOM, where
we conservatively assume the type ⊤T in the honest branch
and ℓa otherwise, since in the latter case we know that the
type of all values in the DOM is upper bounded by ℓa.
2) Browser References: Typing of references in the browser
is ruled by the judgment Γ ⊢brℓa r : ref(τ) meaning that
the reference r has reference type ref(τ) in the environment
Γ. Compared to server references, the main difference is that
there are no session references on the browser side.
3) Scripts: The typing judgment for scripts Γ,pc, b ⊢sℓa,P s
reads as follows: the script s is well-typed in the environment
Γ under the program counter label pc in the typing branch b.
Three straight-forward to type scripts are (T-BSKIP) that
trivially does nothing, (T-BSEQ) checks both the concatenated
commands and (T-BASSIGN) handles reference assignments
just like (T-SETGLOBAL).
In the honest branch, (T-BSETDOM) performs the same
checks as (T-FORM), namely that the script with program
counter label pc is allowed to trigger a request to URL u,
that the parameters of the generated form respect the type of
the URL, and that the type associated to the name of the form
matches the type of the URL. For the attacked case, we just
require that all parameters have type ℓa, as in the CSRF branch
in rule (T-REPLY). Notice that we restrict the first expression
in setdom to be a value, so that we can statically look up
the associated type in ΓV .
Rule (T-BINCLUDE) performs the same checks on the URL
parameters as the previous rule, but additionally requires in the
honest case that the integrity of the network connection is high
to prevent an attacker from injecting her own script which
would then be executed in the context of the original page.
Furthermore, we require that the included URL is not protected
by an origin check as otherwise an attacker could abuse this
to indirectly trigger a CSRF with the expected origin. We also
require that the expected integrity label of the reply of the
included URL u is the same as the pc used to type the current
script: this is needed since executing a script that was typed
with a program counter label of higher integrity leads to a
privilege escalation, e.g., it could write to a high integrity
reference which the current script should not be allowed to
do. Including a script of lower integrity is also problematic
since we type scripts in the same context as the DOM of the
page, thus we would allow a low integrity script to write into
the current (high integrity) DOM.
E. Formal Results
Definition 6. Let ~a be a list of user actions containing ak =
load(tab, u, p). The navigation flow initiated from ak is the
list of actions ak :: nf (~a ⇓ k, tab) where ~a ⇓ k is the list
obtained from ~a by dropping the first k elements and function
nf is defined by the following rules:
nf (〈〉, tab) = 〈〉 nf (load(tab, u, p) :: ~a, tab) = 〈〉
a = submit(tab, u, v, p) nf (~a, tab) = ~a ′
nf (a :: ~a, tab) = a :: ~a ′
a 6= submit(tab, u, v, p) a 6= load(tab, u, p) nf (~a, tab) = ~a ′
nf (a :: ~a, tab) = ~a ′
F. Case Studies
Besides the case study on HotCRP that we have presented in
the body of the paper, we have also analyzed other two popular
PHP applications: phpMyAdmin [36], a software for database
administration, and Moodle [34], an e-learning platform. We
discuss now the encoding of the session management logic in
these applications and some session integrity vulnerabilities
affecting them, either novel or taken from recent CVEs.
1) Moodle: we present now the login endpoint implement-
ing the authentication logic on Moodle. The endpoint expects
the cookie sid which is used to store session data and the
credentials of the user, namely the username uid and the
password pwd . Its encoding in our calculus is the following:
1. login [sid ](uid , pwd) →֒
2. if @sid = ⊥ then
3. @sid = fresh();
4. start @sid ;
5. if $uid 6= ⊥ then
6. redirect (profile , 〈〉, {});
7. else if uid = ⊥ then
8. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥〉)}, skip, {sid 7→ x})
9. with x = @sid ;
10. else
11. @sid = fresh(); login uid , pwd ,@sid ; start @sid ;
12. $uid = uid ; $sesskey = fresh();
13. redirect (profile , 〈〉, {sid 7→ x}) with x = @sid ;
If no cookie sid has been provided, e.g., when the user visits
the website for the first time, a fresh cookie is generated (lines
2–3). The session identified by sid is then started (line 4): if
the identifier denotes a valid session, session variables stored
when processing previous requests are restored. If the user
previously authenticated on the website, the session variable
$uid is different from the undefined value ⊥ and a redirect
to the profile endpoint (that here we do not model) is sent to
the browser (lines 5–6). If the user is not authenticated and
did not provide a pair of credentials, the server replies with a
page containing the login form and a new cookie sid is set into
the user’s browser (lines 7–9). Finally, if the user has provided
valid credentials, the endpoint starts a fresh session (to prevent
fixation), stores in the session memory the user’s identity and
a fresh value in $sesskey which is used to implement CSRF
protection, then redirects the user to the profile endpoint and
sets the new session identifier in the cookie sid in the user’s
browser (lines 10–13).
Since login does not perform any origin or token check
before performing the login command, the endpoint is vul-
nerable to Login CSRF attacks, as it was the case for Moodle
until November 2018 [31]. As discussed in Section II-D for
HotCRP, this problem is captured when typing since the
cookie must be of low integrity since no CSRF check is
performed when it is set, therefore it cannot be used to perform
authenticated actions of high integrity.
The solution implemented by Moodle developers uses pre-
sessions, as we proposed for HotCRP in Section II. In particu-
lar, developers decided for convenience to use the same cookie
to handle both pre-sessions and sessions: this promotion of
the cookie from low integrity, to handle the pre-session, to
high integrity, when the session identifier is refreshed after
authentication, cannot be modeled in our type system since we
have a single static type environment for references, therefore
type-checking would fail. In our encoding we model the fix by
using two different cookies, pre and sid, which are set to the
same value and respectively used in the pre-session and the
session. The problem can also be solved in the type system
by distinguishing two different typing environments, but we
leave this for future work.
1. login [pre](uid , pwd , ltoken) →֒
2. if @pre = ⊥ then
3. @pre = fresh();
4. start @pre;
5. if $uid 6= ⊥ then
6. redirect (profile , 〈〉, {});
7. else if uid = ⊥ then
8. if $ltoken = ⊥ then
9. $ltoken = fresh();
10. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥, x〉)}, skip, {pre 7→ y})
11. with x = $ltoken, y = @pre ;
12. else
13. @ltoken = $ltoken ; $ltoken = fresh();
14. if tokenchk(ltoken ,@ltoken) then
15. @sid = fresh(); login uid , pwd ,@sid; start @sid;
16. $uid = uid ; $sesskey = fresh();
17. redirect (profile , 〈〉, {sid 7→ x, pre 7→ y})
18. with x = @sid , y = @sid ;
The main differences compared to the previous encoding are
the following: i) the endpoint now expects a third ltoken which
is used to implement CSRF protection (line 1); ii) the login
form is enriched with a CSRF token which is stored in the
pre-session memory (lines 8–11); iii) the token stored in the
session memory is compared to the one provided by the user
before performing the authentication (line 14). After applying
the fix, it is possible to perform high integrity authenticated
actions within session started from the cookie sid since it is
possible to assign it a high integrity credential type when type-
checking against the web attacker.
2) phpMyAdmin: we show now the encoding of the session
management logic for phpMyAdmin. In the following we
model two HTTPS endpoints hosted on domain dP : login,
where database administrators can authenticate using their
access credentials, and drop, where administrators can remove
databases from the system.
We briefly discuss some implementation details of php-
MyAdmin before presenting our encoding of the endpoints:
• for CSRF and login CSRF protection, phpMyAdmin inspects
all incoming POST requests to check whether they contain
a parameter token which is equal to the value stored in the
(pre-)session memory;
• the parameters provided by the user are retrieved using
the $_REQUEST array which allows to uniformly access
POST and GET parameters: in our encodings we model
this behavior by using two different variables for each input
of interest, e.g., g pwd and p pwd for the password when
provided via GET or POST, respectively;
• a single cookie is used for pre-sessions and sessions while,
as in the case of Moodle, we use two cookies pre and sid;
• upon authentication, username and password are stored
encrypted in two cookies: in our model we store them in
the clear and use strong cookie labels to provide cookies
with the confidentiality and integrity guarantees given by
encryption.
We start with the encoding of the login endpoint. As parame-
ters it expects the username and the password, both provided
via GET and POST, and the login CSRF token, while as
cookies we have pre for the pre-session, uid and pwd where
the credentials are stored upon authentication. The encoding
in our calculus is the following:
1. login [pre, uid , pwd ](g uid , p uid , g pwd , p pwd , token) →֒
2. if @uid 6= ⊥ and @pwd 6= ⊥ then
3. redirect (index , 〈〉, {});
4. if @pre = ⊥ then
5. @pre = fresh();
6. start @pre;
7. if g uid = ⊥ and p uid = ⊥ then
8. $token = fresh();
9. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, x〉)}, skip,
10. {pre 7→ y}) with x = $token, y = @pre;
11. else if p uid 6= ⊥ then
12. if tokenchk(token, $token) then
13. @sid = fresh(); login p uid , p pwd ,@sid ;
14. start @sid ; $token = fresh();
15. redirect (index , 〈〉, {uid 7→ x, pwd 7→ y, pre 7→ z,
16. sid 7→ z}) with x = p uid , y = p pwd , z = @sid;
17. else
18. @sid = fresh(); login uid , pwd ,@sid ;
19. start @sid ; $token = fresh();
20. redirect (index , 〈〉, {uid 7→ x, pwd 7→ y, pre 7→ z, sid 7→ z})
21. with x = g uid , y = g pwd , z = @sid ;
First the endpoint checks whether the user is already authenti-
cated by checking whether cookies uid and pwd are provided:
in this case, the user is redirected to the index endpoint (that
here we do not model) showing all the databases available
on the website (lines 2–3). Next the session identified by
cookie pre is started or a fresh one is created (lines 4–6).
If the user has not sent her credentials, the page replies with
a page containing the login form. This form contains a fresh
CSRF token that is randomly generated for each request and
stored in the session variable $token . The response sent by
the server contains the fresh pre-session cookie generated by
the server (lines 7–10). Finally authentication is performed: a
fresh session is started, a new token for CSRF protection is
generated and the user is redirected to the index endpoint. The
response sets into the user’s browser the cookies for session
management and those containing the credentials. The only
difference is that when login is performed via POST then the
token checking is performed (lines 11–16), otherwise it is not
(lines 17–21).
Now we present the encoding for the drop endpoint, where
we let ℓP = (https(dP ), https(dP )). The endpoint expects
three cookies: the session cookie sid and those containing the
credentials stored during the login. As parameters, it expects
the name of the database to be deleted (provided either via
GET and POST) and the CSRF token. The encoding in our
calculus follows:
1. drop[sid ,uid , pwd ](g db, p db, token) →֒
2. if @uid = ⊥ or @pwd = ⊥ then
3. redirect (login , 〈〉, {});
4. start @sid ;
5. if p db 6= ⊥ then
6. if tokenchk(token , $token) then
7. auth @uid ,@pwd , p db at ℓP ;
8. else
9. auth @uid ,@pwd , g db at ℓP ;
10. reply ({}, skip, {});
First the endpoint checks where the user is authenticated by
inspecting the provided cookies: if it is not the case, the
user is redirected to the login endpoint (lines 2–3). After
starting the session identified by the cookie sid, the endpoint
drops the specified database after authenticating to the DBMS
using the credentials stored in the cookies: this operation is
abstractly represented using the auth command. Like in the
login endpoint, the CSRF token is verified when the database
to be removed is provided via POST (lines 5–7) and not if
sent via GET (lines 8–9).
Both endpoints are vulnerable to CSRF attacks due to the
security-sensitive commands performed without any token or
origin check: the login command in login on line 18 and
the auth command in drop on line 9. Until December 2018,
several sensitive endpoints of phpMyAdmin where vulnerable
to CSRF vulnerabilities analogous to the one presented for the
drop endpoint [30], [32]. The login CSRF, instead, is a novel
vulnerability that we have discovered and has been recently
assigned a CVE [33].
Type-checking captures the issue for the login CSRF vul-
nerability for the same reason of the other case studies, namely
that the session cookie must be typed as low integrity and this
prevents performing high integrity actions in the session. The
standard CSRF is captured since it is not possible to apply
rule (T-AUTH) when typing the auth of the drop endpoint
in the csrf typing branch.
The fix implemented by phpMyAdmin developers is the
same for both vulnerabilities, i.e., using the $_POST array
rather than the $_REQUEST array to retrieve the parameters
provided by the user: this ensures that all sensitive operations
are performed via POST, thus the CSRF token is always
checked. To model this fix in our encoding we just get read of
the input variables that represent GET parameters and remove
the authenticated actions involving them. The encoding of the
login endpoint becomes the following:
1. login [pre, uid , pwd ](p uid , p pwd , token) →֒
2. if @uid 6= ⊥ and @pwd 6= ⊥ then
3. redirect (index , 〈〉, {});
4. if @pre = ⊥ then
5. @pre = fresh();
6. start @pre ;
7. if p uid = ⊥ then
8. $token = fresh();
9. reply ({auth 7→ form(login , 〈⊥,⊥, x〉)}, skip, {pre 7→ y})
10. with x = $token, y = @pre ;
11. else if tokenchk(token, $token) then
12. @sid = fresh(); login p uid , p pwd ,@sid ;
13. start @sid ; $token = fresh();
14. redirect (index , 〈〉, {uid 7→ x, pwd 7→ y, pre 7→ z, sid 7→ z})
15. with x = p uid , y = p pwd , z = @sid ;
The encoding of the fixed drop endpoint is the following:
1. drop[sid ,uid , pwd ](p db, token) →֒
2. if @uid = ⊥ or @pwd = ⊥ then
3. redirect (login , 〈〉, {});
4. start @sid ;
5. if tokenchk(token, $token) then
6. auth @uid ,@pwd , p db at ℓP ;
7. reply ({}, skip, {});
After applying the fix, it is possible to successfully type-check
our encoding of the phpMyAdmin session management logic
against the web attacker.
TABLE VI: Semantics of servers (remaining rules).
Expressions
(SE-VAL)
evalE(v, D) = v
(SE-BINOP)
evalE(se, D) = v evalE(se
′, D) = v′
evalE(se⊙ se
′, D) = v ⊙ v′
(SE-READGLOBAL)
evali, (@r , D) = D(i, r)
(SE-READSESSION)
evali,j($r , D) = D(j, r)
(SE-FRESH)
n← N
evalE(fresh(), D) = n
Server
(S-SEQ)
(D,φ, ⌈c⌋
R
E)
α
−→ (D
′
, φ
′
, ⌈c
′
⌋
R
E′ )
(D,φ, ⌈c; c′′⌋RE)
α
−→ (D′, φ′, ⌈c′; c′′⌋RE′ )
(S-SKIP)
(D,φ, ⌈skip; c⌋RE)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈c⌋RE)
(S-IFTRUE)
evalE(se, D) = true
(D,φ, ⌈if se then c else c′⌋RE)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈c⌋RE)
(S-IFFALSE)
evalE(se, D) = false
(D,φ, ⌈if se then c else c′⌋RE)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈c′⌋RE)
(S-OCHKFAIL)
R = n, u, ιb, o o 6∈ O
(D,φ, ⌈if originchk(O) then c⌋RE)
•
−→ (D, φ, ⌈reply (error, skip, {})⌋RE)
(S-TCHKSUCC)
evalE(e1, D) = evalE(e2, D)
(D,φ, ⌈if tokenchk(e1, e2) then c⌋
R
E)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈c⌋
R
E)
(S-SETGLOBAL)
E = i, evalE(se, D) = v
(D,φ, ⌈@r := se⌋
R
E)
•
−→ (D{i 7→ D(i){r 7→ v}}, φ, ⌈skip⌋
R
E)
(S-SETSESSION)
evali,j(se, D) = v
(D,φ, ⌈$r := se⌋Ri,j)
•
−→ (D{j 7→ D(j){r 7→ v}}, φ, ⌈skip⌋Ri,j)
(S-REDIRECT)
R = n, u, ιb, l m = |~x | = | ~se| ∀k ∈ [1,m]. evalE(sek, D) = vk
σ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm] α = res(n, u, u
′, ~zσ, ckσ, {}, skip)
(D,φ, ⌈redirect (u′, ~z, ck) with ~x = ~se⌋RE)
α
−→ (D,φ, ⌈halt⌋RE)
(S-LPARALLEL)
(D,φ, t)
α
−→ (D
′
, φ
′
, t
′′
)
(D,φ, t ‖ t′)
α
−→ (D′, φ′, t′′ ‖ t′)
(S-RPARALLEL)
(D,φ, t
′
)
α
−→ (D
′
, φ
′
, t
′′
)
(D,φ, t ‖ t′)
α
−→ (D′, φ′, t ‖ t′′)
TABLE VII: Semantics of web systems (remaining rules).
(W-LPARALLEL)
W
α
−→ W ′
W ‖W
′′ α
−→ W
′
‖ W
′′
(W-RPARALLEL)
W
α
−→ W ′
W
′′
‖ W
α
−→ W
′′
‖ W
′
(A-NIL)
W
α
−→ W ′ α ∈ {•, ♯[~v]
ιb,ιs
ℓ′
}
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓ,K) ⊲ W
′
(A-SERBRO)
W
res(n,u,u′,~v,ck,page,s)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ W ′ W ′
res(n,u,u′,~v,ck,page,s)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ W ′′
K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓ)) ? (K ∪ ns(ck, page, s, ~v)) : K
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
•
−→ (ℓ,K
′
) ⊲ W
′′
(A-SERATK)
n ∈ K α = res(n, u, u′, ~v, ck, page, s)
W
α
−→ W ′ K′ = K ∪ ns(ck, page, s, ~v)
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓ,K
′
) ⊲ W
′
(A-ATKBRO)
α = res(n, u, u′, ~v, ck, page, s) W
α
−→ W ′
I(ℓ) ⊑I I(λ(u)) {n} ∪ ns(ck, page, s, ~v) ⊆ K
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓ,K) ⊲ W
′
(A-TIMEOUT)
W
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,o)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ W
′
W
′
6
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,o)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
W ′
res(n,u,⊥,{},{},{},skip)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ W ′′ K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓ)) ? (K ∪ ns(p, ck)) : K
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
•
−→ (ℓ,K
′
) ⊲ W
′′
TABLE VIII: Typing rules for scripts.
Browser expressions and references
(T-BEVAR)
Γ, b ⊢beℓa x : ΓX (x)
(T-BEREF)
Γ, b ⊢beℓa r : ΓR@(r)
(T-BEVAL)
v 6∈ N
Γ, b ⊢beℓa v : ⊥
(T-BEUNDEF)
Γ, b ⊢beℓa ⊥ : τ
(T-BENAME)
Γ, b ⊢beℓa n
ℓ : cred(ℓ)
(T-BEDOM)
ℓ = (b = hon) ? ⊤ : ℓa
Γ, b ⊢beℓa dom(be, be
′) : ℓ
(T-BEBINOP)
Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
se : τ Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
se
′
: τ
′
(τ = ℓ ∧ τ = ℓ′) ∨ ⊙ is =
Γ, b ⊢beℓa se⊙ se
′ : τ ⊔ τ ′
(T-BESUB)
Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ
′ τ ′ ⊑ℓa τ
Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ
(T-BREF)
Γ ⊢brℓa r : ΓR@ (r)
(T-BRSUB)
Γ ⊢brℓa r : ref(τ
′) τ ⊑ℓa τ
′
Γ ⊢brℓa r : ref(τ)
Scripts
(T-BSEQ)
Γ, pc, b ⊢sℓa,P s Γ, pc, b ⊢
s
ℓa,P
s′
Γ, pc, b ⊢sℓa,P s; s
′
(T-BSKIP)
Γ, pc, b ⊢sℓa,P skip
(T-BASSIGN)
Γ ⊢brℓa r : ref(τ) Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
be : τ pc ⊑I I(τ)
Γ, pc, b ⊢sℓa,P r := be
(T-BSETDOM)
ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr m = |~be| = |~τ | ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m].Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
bek : τ
′
k
(b = hon ⇒ ΓV (v) = ΓU(u) ∧ pc ⊑I I(ℓu) ∧ ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m]. τ
′
k ⊑ℓa τk)
(b 6= hon ⇒ ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m]. τ ′k ⊑ℓa ℓa)
Γ, pc, b ⊢
s
ℓa,P
setdom(v, u, ~be)
(T-BINCLUDE)
ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr m = |~be| = |~τ | ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m].Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
bek : τ
′
k
(b = hon ⇒ I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(ℓu) ∧ lr = pc ∧ pc ⊑I I(ℓu) ∧ ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m]. τ
′
k ⊑ℓa τk ∧ u 6∈ P)
(b 6= hon ⇒ ∀k ∈ [1 . . .m]. τ ′k ⊑ℓa ℓa)
Γ, pc, b ⊢sℓa,P include(u,
~be)
G. Outline
In appendix H we introduce notation and helper functions used in the proof.
In appendix I we present an extended version of the semantics, containing additional annotations, as well as additional or
modified typing rules needed to type running code. We show that the semantic rules are equivalent to the ones presented in
the paper and that the typing rules yield the same result for statical code.
In appendix J we prove the property of subject reduction for the system: This tells us that all components of the system are
well-typed at any point of time. This also includes, that the attacker does not learn any secrets.
In appendix K we introduce a relation between two websystems, that intuitively captures their equality on all high integrity
components. We show that an attacked websystem is always in relation with its unattacked version.
In appendix L we combine results from the previous sections to show our main theorem.
H. Preliminaries
Here we introduce some notation that will be used in the remainder of the proof
Definition 7 (Notation). We define the following functions:
• For a websystem W we define servers(W ) to be the set of all servers in W
• For a websystem W we define browsers(W ) to be the set of all browsers in W
• For a server S = (D, t, φ) we define urls(S) to be the set of all threads of the form u[~r](~x) →֒ c.
• For a server S = (D, t, φ) we define running(S) to be the set of all threads of the form ⌈c⌋l,µnu,E .
• For a thread of the form t = ⌈c⌋l,µnu,E we let int(t) = l
• For a thread of the form t = ⌈c⌋l,µnu,i,j and a database D we let memg(D, t) = D(i).
• For a thread of the form t = ⌈c⌋l,µnu,i,j and a database D we let mems(D, t) = D(j).
• For a typing environment Γ and two memories M and M ′, we write M =Γ,⊥I M
′ if for all r with Γ(r) = ⊥I we have
M(r) = M ′(r)
• For a reference type τr = ref(τ) we let refτ (τr) = τ .
• We define a join ⊔˜ on types that behaves like the regular join ⊔ if it is defined and defaults to ⊤ otherwise . This case does
not occur when using well-typed pages, but is needed so that the extended semantics is as expressive as the original one.
• For a running server thread t = ⌈c⌋l,µE,R we let int⊔(t) = l ⊔I
⊔
I l′∈{l′ | reset l′∈c} l’
•
I. Extended Semantics and Typing Rules
In this section we introduce additional and modified rules for the semantics and the type system.
The extended semantics is presented in table IX, table X and table XI and contains the following changes
• We annotate running server threads, browser state, the DOM, and network requests and replies with an integrity label l ∈ L
and an attacked state µ ∈ {hon, att}. Intuitively, l is dynamically tracking which domains have influenced the current state
of the execution, while µ is a binary flag that tells us whether the attacker used his capabilities to directly influence the
current state.
• We annotate values with a security type in code, DOM and memory. Constants will be initialized with security label ⊥ .
• We annotate events with an integrity label (a second one). This label is used to synchronize the execution of the unattacked
and the attacked websystem in the relation: High integrity events have to be processed in sync, while low integrity events
may be processed individually.
• We introduce a new command reset l for servers to “reset the pc” after a conditional.
• We partition the database D = (D@, D$) into two different mappings for global and server memories.
• We split the rule (A-TIMEOUT) into two seperate rules (A-TIMEOUTSEND) and (A-TIMEOUTRECV). We therefore introduce
a buffer in the network state that keeps track of open connections that require a response.
• Partitioning of names: All vτ ∈ V values are now annotated with a security type that gives us runtime information. All
primitive values have by default the type τ = ⊥ and hence can be given any security label ℓ (due to subtyping). Since for
names nτ ∈ N we have τ = cred(ℓ) for some ℓ, we cannot use subtyping on confidentiality if C(τ) 6⊑C C(ℓa). We hence
partition the set of names N = N0
⊎
l 6⊑CC(ℓa)
Nl into one set N0 of low confidentiality names and one set Nl for each high
confidentiality label l.
1) Detailed explanation of changes to browser semantics:
• (BE-VAL) simply adds the type
• (BE-BINOP) adds types, and assigns the join of the input types to the result. If the join is not defined, a default type is
assigned, so that execution is not blocked because of types. This however will not happen when interacting with well-typed
pages.
• (BE-REFERENCE) stays the same
• (BE-DOM) adds types, and hence also returns the type of the value stored in the DOM.
• (B-LOAD) adds the integrity label of the URL and the hon flag to the request. Additionally, the request is marked as a
high integrity sync action. This means that all load events have to be processed in sync between the attacked and unattacked
system. The browser state is labelled as high integrity and honest, since after the load there is now no external influence on
the browser thread (open pages and browser memory are tracked separately)
• (B-INCLUDE) uses the join of the browser integrity label and the url integrity label, as well as the browser’s current attack
state as annotations on the request. The event’s integrity label is the browser’s integrity label. The parameters are evaluated
using the label of the DOM of the current tab.
• (B-RECVLOAD) receives a response to a load event, labelled with an integrity label and an attacked state, and uses these
labels for the DOM and the browser state. The integrity of the response event is always high, which means that it will be
processed in sync between the attacked and unattacked system
• (B-RECVINCLUDE) joins the integrity label and attacked state of the current browser state with the ones from the network
response and uses them in the continuation.
• (B-REDIRECT) annotates the event with its integrity label, and uses the same integrity label and attacked state for the request
that is written into the buffer.
• (B-SUBMIT) uses the integrity label and attacked mode from the DOM for the request, combined with the integrity label of
the target URL
• (B-FLUSH) adds the annotation to the event.
• (B-SEQ) simply propagates annotations
• (B-SKIP) does nothing. Synchronization label is integrity label of browser state
• (B-END) does nothing. Synchronization label is integrity label of browser state
• (B-SETREFERENCE) evaluates the expression and stores it in the memory, with the computed type, taking the integrity label
of the current browser state into account.
• (B-SETDOM) updates the DOM labelling by combining its original integrity label and the attacked sate with the ones of the
browser state.
2) Detailed Explanation of Changes to Server Semantics:
• (SE-VAL) also contains the type
• (SE-FRESH) propagates the type annotation of the fresh expression to the value
• (SE-BINOP) is just like (BE-BINOP)
• (SE-READGLOABL), (SE-READSESSION) look up the reference in the corresponding part of the database
• (S-SEQ) just propagates the annotations
• (S-IFTRUE), (S-IFFALSE) lower the integrity label, based on the type of the guard. A reset command is added after the
body, to bring the integrity label back to its original value.
• (S-SKIP) just propagates the annotations
• (S-RESET) restores the integrity label to the provided value.
• (S-TCTRUE), (S-TCFALSE) just propagate the annotations
• (S-RECV) takes the annotations from the request and uses them for the newly started thread.
• (S-RESTORESESSION) and (S-NEWSESSION) just propagate the annotations
• (S-LOGIN) just propagates the annotations
• (S-AUTH) just propagates the annotations
• (S-REPLY), (S-REDIRECT) use the annotations of the current thread for the reply
• (S-OCHCKSUCC), (S-OCHCKFAIL) just propagate the annotations
• (S=LPARALLEL), (R-PARALLEL) juts propagate the labelling of the events of sub threads
3) Detailed Explanation of Changes to the Semantics of Web Systems with the attacker: For the proof it is required that
every rule only performs a single step in a browser. We hence have to split up the rule (A-TIMEOUT) into two separate rules.
For this reason we introduce a buffer TO that stores the request that requires the timeout-response. As long as this buffer
contains an element, no other rule can be taken.
• (W-LPARALLEL), (W-RPARALLEL) and (A-NIL) simply propagate the annotations.
• (A-BROWSERSERVER) “forwards” the request with the same annotations. We use the sync label of the browser event for
the event in the websystem and use the integrity label of the browser event as the sync label for the server event.
• (A-SERVERBROWSER) does the same in the other direction. Again we use the browser event’s label for the websystem
event.
• (A-TIMEOUTSEND) (A-TIMEOUTRECV) are two individual rules that together equivalent to the rule (A-TIMEOUT)
• (A-BROATK)“forwards” the request with the same annotations.
• (A-ATKSER) sends an event labelled with low integrity and attacker mode att and annotated with low integrity.
• (A-SERATK) “forwards” the request with the same annotations.
• (A-ATKBRO) creates a response with low integrity and attacked mode att. The event can have any annotation – since the
browser expects different annotations in different cases.
Lemma 1 (Semantic Equivalence). We show that the extended semantics does not effect the original semantics, i.e., any step
taken in the new semantics can be taken in the old semantics and vice versa.
Proof. • One can directly observe that the integrity label and the attacker state are simply annotations and do not prevent or
allow additional steps in the semantics.
• The same is true for the type annotations on values.
• The commad reset l is just modifying the integrity label of the thread, but is otherwise a no-op (S-RESET), so adding it in
(T-IFTRUE) and (T-IFFALSE) does not impact the behaviour of the program.
• The split of (A-TIMEOUT) into two seperate rules does not impact the semantics as no other rule can be used as long as
there is a pending timeout response in the buffer TO.
4) Detailed explanation of changes to Typing Rules:
• (T-EFRESH) assigns the type ℓa to a fresh() expression if it is typed in the attacker’s run.
• (T-RUNNING) allows us to type running server threads. The typing branch is determined based on the browser identity and
the attacked mode of the thread. The typing environment for global variables is determined by the browser identity. If it is
the honest users’ browser, then the “normal” typing environment is used (since the cookies come from the honest browser).
Otherwise, we use an environment where every type is ℓa. We then type the code of the thread, inferring the session label
from the session identifier and using the integrity label as pc.
• (T-EVAL) now gives values their annotated type.
• (T-AUTHATT) does not perform any checks for authenticated events when typing the attackers branch.
• (T-HALT) trivially checks the halt command (which only occurs at runtime)
• (T-REPLYERR) trivially checks the response with an error message.
• (T-RESET) raises the pc for the continuation to the label proviced in the reset statement.
• (T=BEVAL) now gives values their annotated type.
• (T-BERERFAIL) allows us to give type ⊥ to a browser reference if it may not be read by the script. . This rule (and the
next one) is needed to ensure that scripts provided by the attacker can be typed (although they will not execute correctly).
• (T-BASSIGNFAIL) allows us to type any assignment to a browser reference, if the script is not allowed to write to it.
Lemma 2 (Semantic Equivalence). Whenever we have Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) S : ℓs,pc with the rules presented in the paper,
then we also have Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) S : ℓs,pc with new rules, if all constants are annotated with type. ⊥
Proof. We look at the changes introduced
• The change in rule (T-EFRESH) only affects typing the attacker’s session, which we do not do in the original version.
• Rule (T-RUNNING) only types running threads, which we do not do in the original version.
• Rule (T-EVAL) and (T-BEVAL) are only used for constants in the original version, hence the claim follows from the
assumption on the annotation of constants.
• Rule (T-RESET) is only used for the reset command which is not contained in the original version (since it is only introduced
at runtime)
• Rules (T-BEREFFAIL) and (T-BASSIGNFAIL) are just more permissive, since they allow us to type more browser scripts.
• Rule (T=AUTHATT) covers a case for typing the attacker’s branch, which we do not do in the orignial version.
• Rules (T-HALT) and (T-REPLYERR) cover two additional cases that appear at runtime.
TABLE IX: Extended semantics of browsers.
Expressions
(BE-VAL)
evalℓ(v
τ ,M, f, l, ℓ) = vτ
(BE-BINOP)
evalℓ(be,M, f, l, ℓ) = v
τ evalℓ(be
′,M, f, l, ℓ) = v′τ
′
evalℓ(be⊙ be
′,M, f, l, ℓ) = (v ⊙ v′)τ⊔˜τ
′
(BE-REFERENCE)
C(λ(r)) ⊑C C(ℓ)
evalℓ(r,M, f, l, ℓ) = M(r)
(BE-DOM)
evalℓ(be,M, f, l, ℓ) = v
τ evalℓ(be
′,M, f, l, ℓ) = v′τ
′
{v 7→ form(u, ~vτ )} ∈ f v′ = 0⇒ v′′τ
′′
= u⊥ v′ 6= 0⇒ v′′τ
′′
= v
τv′
v′
evalℓ(dom(be, be
′),M, f, l, ℓ) = v′′
Browser
(B-LOAD)
n← N α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u))
I(λ(u)),hon ck = get ck(M,u) (orig(u) = http(d) ⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({},M,P, {}, {}, load(tab, u, σ) :: ~a)ιb,l,µ
•@⊥I−−−−→ ({n 7→ (tab, u,⊥)},M, P, {}, {α@⊥I}, ~a)
ιb ,⊥I ,hon
(B-INCLUDE)
n← N ck = get ck(M,u) {tab 7→ (u′, f, l′, µ′)} ∈ P
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~be|] : p(k) = evalλ(u′)(bek ,M, f, l
′, λ(u′)) α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u
′))l⊔II(λ(u)),µ
′
(orig(u) = http(d) ⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({}, M,P, {tab 7→ include(u, ~be)}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
•@l
−−→ ({n 7→ (tab, u, orig(u′))}, M,P, {tab 7→ skip}, {α@l}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
(B-RECVLOAD)
M ′ = upd ck(M,u, ck) α = res(ιb, n,⊥, u, ck, page, s)
l′,µ ~a ′ = (page = error ∧ ιb = usr) ? (halt :: ~a) : ~a
({n 7→ (tab, u, o)},M, P, {}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
α@⊥I−−−−→ ({}, M ′, P ⊳ {tab 7→ (u, page, l′, µ′)}, {tab 7→ s}, {}, ~a ′)ιb,l
′,µ′
(B-RECVINCLUDE)
M ′ = upd ck(M,u, ck) α = res(ιb, n, u,⊥, ck, page, s)
l′,µ′ µ′′ = (µ = att ∨ µ′ = att) ? att : hon
({n 7→ (tab, u, o)}, M,P, {tab 7→ s′}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
@l′
−−→ ({}, M ′, P, {tab 7→ s; s′}, {}, ~a)ιb,l
′⊔I l,µ
′′
(B-REDIRECT)
α = res(n, u, u′, ~v, ck, , )l
′,µ′ M ′ = upd ck(M,u, ck) n′ ← N ck′ = get ck(M ′, u′)
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~v |] : p(k) = vk o
′ = (o = orig(u′)) ? o : ⊥ α′ = req(ιb, n
′, u′, p, ck′, o′)l
′,µ′ (orig(u′) = http(d) ⇒ d 6∈ ∆)
({n 7→ (tab, u, o)},M,P, {}, {}, {})ιb ,l,µ~a
α@l′
−−−→ ({n′ 7→ (tab, u′, o′)},M ′, P, {}, {α′@l′}, {})ιb,~a,lµ
(B-SUBMIT)
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u))
l′⊔II(λ(u
′)),µ′
{tab 7→ (u, f, l′, µ′)} ∈ P {v′ 7→ form(u′, ~v)} ∈ f ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~v |]. p(k) = k ∈ dom(p) ? p(k) : vk n← N ck = get ck(M,u)
({}, M,P, {}, {}, submit(tab, u, v′, p) :: ~a)ιb,l,µ
•@⊥I−−−−→ ({n 7→ (tab, u′, orig(u′))}, M,P, {}, {α@⊥I}, ~a)
ιb,l
′⊔II(λ(u)),µ
′
(B-FLUSH)
(N,M,P, T, {α@l′}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
α@l′
−−−→ (N,M, P, T, {}, ~a)ιb ,l,µ
(B-END)
({}, M,P, {tab 7→ skip}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
•@l
−−→ ({},M,P, {}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
(B-SEQ)
({},M, P, {tab 7→ s}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
α@l
−−−→ ({}, M ′, P ′, {tab 7→ s′}, {}, ~a)ιb,l
′,µ′
({}, M,P, {tab 7→ s; s′′}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
α@l
−−−→ ({}, M ′, P ′, {tab 7→ s′; s′′}, {}, ~a)ιb,l
′,µ′
(B-SKIP)
({},M,P, {tab 7→ skip; s}, {}, ~a)ιb ,l,µ
•@l
−−→ ({},M, P, {tab 7→ s}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
(B-SETREFERENCE)
{tab 7→ (u, f, l′, µ′)} ∈ P ℓ = λ(u) evalℓ(be,M, f, l
′, ℓ) = vτ I(ℓ) ⊑I I(λ(r))
({},M,P, {tab 7→ r := be}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
•@l
−−→ ({}, M{r 7→ vτ⊔˜I l}, P, {tab 7→ skip}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
(B-SETDOM)
ℓ = λ(u′) {tab 7→ (u′, f, l′, µ′)} ∈ P
evalℓ(be
′,M, f, l′, ℓ) = v′ ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~be|]. vk = evalℓ(bek ,M, f, l
′, ℓ) µ′′ = (µ = att ∨ µ′ = att) ? att : hon
({},M,P ⊎ {tab 7→ (u′, f, l′, µ′)}, {tab 7→ setdom(be′, u, ~be)}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
•@l
−−→
({}, M,P ⊎ {tab 7→ (u′, f{v′ 7→ form(u, ~v)}, l ⊔I l
′, µ′′)}, {tab 7→ skip}, {}, ~a)ιb,l,µ
TABLE X: Extended semantics of servers.
Expressions
(SE-VAL)
evalE(v
τ ,D) = vτ
(SE-FRESH)
n← NC(τ)
evalE(fresh()
τ ,D) = nτ
(SE-BINOP)
evalE(se,D) = v
τ evalE(se
′, D) = v′τ
′
evalE(se⊙ se
′,D) = (v ⊙ v′)τ⊔τ
′
(SE-READGLOBAL)
eval i, (@r , (D@,D$)) = D@(i, r)
(SE-READSESSION)
eval i,j($r , (D@,D$)) = D$(j, r)
Server
(S-SEQ)
(D,φ, ⌈c⌋l,µR,E)
α@l
−−−→ (D′, φ′, ⌈c′⌋l
′,µ
R,E′
)
(D, φ, ⌈c; c′′⌋l,µR,E)
α@l
−−−→ (D′, φ′, ⌈c′; c′′⌋l
′,µ
R,E′
)
(S-IFTRUE)
evalE(se,D) = true
τ l′ = l ⊔I I(τ)
(D,φ, ⌈if se then c else c′⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D, φ, ⌈c; reset l⌋l
′,µ
R,E)
(S-TCTRUE)
evalE(se,D) = v
τ evalE(se
′, D) = v′τ
′
v = v′
(D,φ, ⌈if tokenchk(se, se′) then c⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D, φ, ⌈c⌋l,µR,E)
(S-SKIP)
(D, φ, ⌈skip; c⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D,φ, ⌈c⌋l,µR,E)
(S-RESET)
(D, φ, ⌈reset l′⌋l,µR,E)
•@l′
−−−→ (D, φ, ⌈skip⌋l
′,µ
R,E)
(S-IFFALSE)
evalE(se,D) = false
τ l′ = l ⊔I I(τ)
(D, φ, ⌈if se then c else c′⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D, φ, ⌈c′; reset l⌋l
′,µ
R,E)
(S-TCFALSE)
evalE(se,D) = v
τ evalE(se
′, D) = v′τ
′
v 6= v′
(D,φ, ⌈if tokenchk(se, se′) then c⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D, φ, ⌈reply (error, skip, {})⌋l,µR,E)
(S-RECV)
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ i← N ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~r |].M(rk) = (rk ∈ dom(ck)) ? ck(rk) : ⊥
m = |~x | ∀k ∈ [1 . . . µ]. vk = (k ∈ dom(p)) ? p(k) : ⊥ σ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm]
(D,φ, u[~r](~x) →֒ c)
α@l
−−−→ (D ⊎ {i 7→M}, φ, ⌈cσ⌋l,µ
(n,u,ιb,o),(i,⊥)
‖ u[~r](~x) →֒ c)
(S-RESTORESESSION)
E = i, evalE(se,D) = j
τ j ∈ dom(D)
l′ = C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa) ? ⊥ : label(τ)
(D,φ, ⌈start se⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D,φ, ⌈skip⌋l
′,µ
R,i,j)
(S-NEWSESSION)
E = i, evalE(se,D) = j
τ
j /∈ dom(D) l′ = C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa) ? ⊥ : label(τ)
(D,φ, ⌈start se⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D ⊎ {j 7→ {}}, φ, ⌈skip⌋l
′,µ
R,i,j)
(S-OCHKFAIL)
R = n, u, ιb, o o 6∈ O
(D, φ, ⌈if originchk(O) then c⌋l,µR,E)
•
−→ (D,φ, ⌈reply (error, skip, {})⌋l,µR,E)
(S-OCHKSUCC)
R = n, u, ιb, o o ∈ L
(D,φ, ⌈if originchk(L) then c⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D, φ, ⌈c⌋l,µR,E)
(S-SETGLOBAL)
E = i, evalE(se,D) = v D = (D@,D$)
(D, φ, ⌈@r := se⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D{i 7→ D@(i){r 7→ v}}, φ, ⌈skip⌋
l,µ
R,E)
(S-SETSESSION)
eval i,j(se,D) = v D = (D@,D$)
(D, φ, ⌈$r := se⌋l,µR,i,j)
•@l
−−→ (D{j 7→ D$(j){r 7→ v}}, φ, ⌈skip⌋
l,µ
R,i,j)
(S-LOGIN)
evalE(se,D) = ιs evalE(se
′,D) = ρ(ιs, u) evalE(se
′′,D) = n
(D, φ, ⌈login se, se′, se′′⌋l,µR,E)
•@l
−−→ (D, φ ⊳ {n 7→ ιs}, ⌈skip⌋
l,µ
R,E)
(S-AUTH)
R = n, u, ιb, o j ∈ dom(φ)
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]. eval i,j(sek, D) = vk
(D,φ, ⌈auth ~se at ℓ⌋l,µR,i,j)
♯[~v]
ιb,ιs
ℓ
@l
−−−−−−−→ (D, φ, ⌈skip⌋l,µR,i,j)
(S-REPLY)
R = n, u, ιb, o m = |~x | = |~se| ∀k ∈ [1,m]. evalE(sek,D) = vk
σ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm] α = res(ιb, n, u,⊥, ckσ, pageσ, sσ)
l,µ
(D, φ, ⌈reply (page, s, ck) with ~x = ~se⌋l,µR,E)
α@l
−−−→ (D,φ, ⌈halt⌋l,µR,E)
(S-LPARALLEL)
(D, φ, t)
α@l
−−−→ (D′, φ′, t′′)
(D,φ, t ‖ t′)
α@l
−−−→ (D′, φ′, t′′ ‖ t′)
(S-REDIRECT)
R = n, u, ιb, o m = |~x | = |~se| ∀k ∈ [1,m]. evalE(sek,D) = vk
σ = [x1 7→ v1, . . . , xm 7→ vm] α = res(n, u, u
′, ~zσ, ckσ, {}, skip)l,µ
(D,φ, ⌈redirect (u′, ~z, ck) with ~x = ~se⌋l,µR,E)
α@l
−−−→ (D, φ, ⌈halt⌋l,µR,E)
(S-RPARALLEL)
(D, φ, t′)
α@l
−−−→ (D′, φ′, t′′)
(D, φ, t ‖ t′)
α@l
−−−→ (D′, φ′, t ‖ t′′)
TABLE XI: Extended semantics of web systems with the attacker.
(W-LPARALLEL)
W
α@l
−−−→W ′
W ‖W ′′
α@l
−−−→W ′ ‖W ′′
(W-RPARALLEL)
W
α@l
−−−→W ′
W ′′ ‖W
α@l
−−−→W ′′ ‖W ′
(A-NIL)
TO = {} W
α@l
−−−→W ′ α ∈ {•, ♯[~v]
ιb,ιs
ℓ′
}
(ℓa,K) ⊲ W
α@l
−−−→ (ℓa,K) ⊲ W
′
(A-BROWSERSERVER)
TO = {} W
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,o)
l,µ@l′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→W ′ W ′
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,o)
l,µ@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→W ′′ K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓa)) ? (K ∪ {n} ∪ ns(p, ck)) : K
(ℓa,K) ⊲ W
•@l′
−−−→ (ℓa,K
′) ⊲ W ′′
(A-SERVERBROWSER)
TO = {} W
res(ιb,n,u,u
′,ck,page,s)l,µ@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→W ′
W ′
res(ιb,n,u,u
′,ck,page,s)l,µ@l′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→W ′′ K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓa) ∨ ιb 6= usr) ? (K ∪ {n} ∪ ns(ck, page, s)) : K
(ℓa,K) ⊲ W
•@l′
−−−→ (ℓa,K
′) ⊲ W ′′
(A-BROATK)
TO = {} α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
µ,l W
α
−→ @l′W ′
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u))
K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓa)) ? (K ∪ ns(p, ck)) : K
(ℓa,K) ⊲ W
α@l′
−−−→ (ℓa,K
′ ∪ {n}) ⊲ W ′
(A-ATKSER)
TO = {} n← N ιb 6= usr ns(p, ck) ⊆ K
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
att,⊤I W
α
−→W ′
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α@⊤I−−−−→ (ℓ,K ∪ {n}) ⊲ W ′
(A-SERATK)
TO = {} n ∈ K α = res(n, u, u
′, ~v, ck, page, s)µ,l
W
α@l′
−−−→W ′ K′ = K ∪ ns(ck, page, s, ~v)
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α@l′
−−−→ (ℓ,K′) ⊲ W ′
(A-ATKBRO)
TO = {} α = res(n, u, u
′, ~v, ck, page , s)att,⊤I W
α@l
−−−→W ′
I(ℓ) ⊑I I(λ(u)) {n} ∪ ns(ck, page , s, ~v) ⊆ K
(ℓ,K) ⊲ W
α@l
−−−→ (ℓ,K) ⊲ W ′
(A-TIMEOUTSEND)
W
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,o)
l,µ@l′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→W ′
W ′ 6
req(ιb,n,u,p,ck,o)
l,µ@l′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ K′ = (C(λ(u)) ⊑C C(ℓa)) ? (K ∪ {n} ∪ ns(p, ck)) : K TO = {} T
′
O = {(ιb, n, u, l, µ)}
(ℓa,K) ⊲ W
•@l′
−−−→ (ℓa,K
′) ⊲ W ′
(A-TIMEOUTRECV)
TO = {(ιb, n, u, l, µ)} T
′
O = {} W
res(ιb,n,u,⊥,{},{},skip)
l,µ@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→W ′
(ℓa,K) ⊲ W
•@l′
−−−→ (ℓa,K
′) ⊲ W ′
TABLE XII: Extended Typing Rules
(T-EFRESH)
τ = (b = att) ? ℓa : cred(ℓ)
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
fresh()ℓ : τ
(T-RUNNING)
ιb 6= usr ⇒ b = att µ = hon ∧ ιb = usr ⇒ b = hon
µ = att ∧ ιb = usr ⇒ b = csrf Γ
′
R@
= (ιb = usr) ? ΓR@ : { 7→ ℓa} (ΓU ,ΓX ,Γ
′
R@
,ΓR$ ,ΓV ), jlabel(j), l ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c : , l
Γ ⊢tℓa,P ℓa⌈c⌋
l,µ
(i,j),(n,u,ιb ,u)
(T-EVAL)
v 6∈ N
Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
vτ : τ
(T-AUTHATT)
b = att
Γ, ℓs, pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
auth ~se at ℓ : ℓs, pc
(T-HALT)
Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
halt : ℓs, pc
(T-REPLYERR)
Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
reply (error, skip, {}) : ℓs,pc
(T-RESET)
Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
reset l : ℓs, l
(T-BEVAL)
v 6∈ N
Γ, b ⊢beℓa v
τ : τ
(T-BEREFFAIL)
C(λ(r)) 6⊑C C(λ(u))
Γ, b ⊢beℓa r : ⊥
(T-BASSIGNFAIL)
I(λ(u)) 6⊑I I(λ(r))
Γ, pc, b ⊢sℓa,P r := be
J. Subject Reduction
In this section we prove subject reduction for the web system. This is needed to ensure that the system is always in a
well-typed state, which in turn is required to prove that our high integrity relation is preserved.
We look at typing of different components of the web system individually. Concretely we will define typing for reqeusts
and responses, browsers, servers and websystems as a whole.
We start by defining well-typed requests and responses. Then we define well-typed browsers and show that typing is preserved
when the browser takes a step, if the browser only receives well-typed responses, and show that the browser only sends out
well-typed requests. We then define well-typed servers and show that typing is presered whenever the server takes a step, if all
requests received by the server are well typed, and that all responses produced by the server are well-typed. We furthermore
show that all requests and responses produced by the attacker are well-typed. Finally, we defined well-typed web-systems and
show that typing is preserved whenever the websystem takes a step.
Definition 8 (Request Typing). For a request α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ (resp. α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ) with ΓU (u) =
ℓu, ~τ , lr we have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α if
1) if µ = hon and ιb = usr then
• for all k ∈ dom(p) we have if p(k) = v
τ ′k
k then τ
′
k ⊑ℓa τk
• l ⊑ℓa I(ℓu)
2) if µ = att then
• for all k ∈ dom(p) we have if p(k) = v
τ ′k
k then τ
′
k ⊑ℓa ℓa
3) if ιb = usr
• for all c ∈ dom(ck) we have if
– ck(c) = vτcc then τc ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR@(c))
– C(λ(r)) ⊑ℓa C(λ(u))
• o = ⊥ ∨ o ⊑I l
4) if ιb 6= usr then for all c ∈ dom(ck) we have if ck(c) = v
τc
c then τc ⊑ℓa ℓa
Intuivietly, according to definition 8 a request is well-typed, if
1) for all honest requests, all parameter types are respected and the integrity label is below the integrity label of the URL
2) for all attacked requests, all parameters are of the attacker’s type and if the attacker is performing the request then the
integrity label is the one of the attacker
3) For all (attacked and honest) requests from the users browser, all cookies respsect their type from the environment
4) For all requests by the attacker, all cookies have the type of the attcker.
5) The integrity label of the request includes at least the origin of the request
We now in a similar fashion define well-typed responses.
Definition 9 (Response Typing). For a response α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l,µ (resp. α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l,µ)
with ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr we have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α
1) For all vτ ∈ values(ck, page, s, u′) we have C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓu) ⊔C C(ℓa)
2) If ιb 6= usr, then for all v
τ ∈ values(ck, page, s, u′) we have τ ⊑ℓa ℓa
3) if ιb = usr and µ = att then Γ, att,⊤I ⊢sℓa,P s and I(ℓa) ⊑I l
4) if ιb = usr then for all r ∈ dom(ck) with ck(r) = vτ we have
• If λ(u) ⊑I λ(r) then τ ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR@(r)) and l ⊑I I(refτ (ΓR@r))
• If λ(u) 6⊑I λ(r) then τ ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR@(r)) or τ ⊑ℓa ℓa
5) if ιb = usr and µ = hon then page = error or for all v ∈ dom(page) with page(v) = form(u ′′, ~vτ ) we have
• ΓU (u
′′) = ΓX (v)
• with ΓU (u
′′) = ℓu, ~τ ′, lr, for all i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |] we have τi ⊑ℓa τ
′
i
6) if ιb = usr and µ = att then page = error or for all v ∈ dom(page) with page(v) = form(u ′, ~v), for all i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |] we
have τi ⊑ℓa ℓa
7) ιb = usr and µ = hon then Γ, hon, lr ⊢sℓa,P s and l ⊑I lr
8) if u′ 6= ⊥ and ιb = usr then with ΓU(u′) = ℓu, ~τ ′, lr, for all i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |] we have τi ⊑ℓa τ
′
i
Intuitively, according to definition 9 a response is well-typed if
1) For all honest responses we have that the page is either the error page, or that it is well-typed, i.e., the type of the form
name matchs the type of the URL and all parameters respect the URL type.
2) For all attacked responses to the honest user, we have that the page is the error page or all parameters contained in the
DOM are of type ℓa
3) For all honest responses, the script is well typed with pc set to the expected return type of the URL, and the integrity of
the response must be below that return type
4) For all attacked responses to the honest user, the script is well-typed with pc = ⊤I and the integrity of the resopnse is
low.
5) For all responses to the honest users, the cookies respect the typing environment
6) For all responses to the attacker, all cookies are of type ℓa.
Definition 10 (Browser Typing). Let B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb,l,µ be a browser. We write Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B, if ιb = usr and
1) µ = att⇒ I(ℓa) ⊑I l
2) ∀r ∈ dom(M),M(r) = vτ ∧ τ ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR@(r))
3) For all tab ∈ dom(P ) with P (tab) = (u, page, l′, µ′) and page 6= error we have for all v ∈ dom(page) with page(v) =
form(u ′, ~vτ )
• if µ′ = hon and ΓU (u
′) = ℓu, ~τ ′, lr then
– ΓU(u
′) = ΓX (v)
– l′ ⊑I I(ℓu)
– ∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |]. τi ⊑ℓa τ
′
i
• if µ′ = att then
– ∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |].τi ⊑ℓa ℓa
– I(ℓa) ⊑I l′
4) If T = {tab 7→ s} and P (tab) = (u, page, l′, µ′) with ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr then
• if µ = hon then l′ ⊑I lr and Γ, hon, lr ⊢
s
ℓa,P
s
• if µ = att then Γ, att, I(ℓa) ⊢sℓa,P s
5) If Q = {α@l′}, then we have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α.
6) For ~a we have
• for every navigation flow ~a ′ in ~a, we have that I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(a′j)) implies I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(a
′
k)) for all j < k ≤ |
~a′|.
• for all tab ∈ dom(P ) with P (tab) = (u, page, l′, µ′) we have that for all a ∈ nf (~a, tab) that I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u)) implies
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(a)).
• If N = {n 7→ (tab, u, o)} and T = {} then we have that for all a ∈ nf (~a, tab) that I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u)) implies
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(a)).
• for all actions a′ in ~a we have:
– if a′ = load(tab, u, p) and ΓU(u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr then for all k ∈ dom(p) we have that if p(k) = vτ
′
then τ ′ ⊑ℓa τk;
– if a′ = submit(tab, u, v′, p) and ΓV(v
′) = ℓu, ~τ , lr then for all k ∈ dom(p) we have that if p(k) = vτ
′
then
∗ τ ′ ⊑ℓa τk.
∗ if I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(u) then additionally τ ′ ⊑ℓa ℓa.
7) If N = {n 7→ (tab, u, o)} and
• if T = {tab 7→ s} then
– if P (tab) = (u′, page, l′, µ′) and ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr and ΓU (u
′) = ℓ′u, ~τ
′, l′r then lr = l
′
r.
– if µ = hon then I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(λ(u′))
Intuitively, according to definition 10 a browser is well-typed, if all its components are well-typed. Concretely, we require
that:
1) Whenever the state of the browser is directly influenced by the attacker, then the integrity of the browser is low.
2) All values in the memory respect the typing environment.
3) For a non empty DOM
• If the DOM is honest
– The type of the form name matches the type of the URL
– The integrity label of the DOM is below the intergrity label of the URL
– All parameters have the expted type.
• If the DOM is attacked
– All parameters have the attacker’s type.
– The integrity of the DOM is low.
4) If a script is running in a tab
• if the browser is not attacked then the browser’s integrity is below the integrity of the expected response type for the URL
of the DOM in the same tab and the script code is well-typed in the honest typing branch using the expected response
type as the pc.
• if the browser is attacked, then the script is well-typed using the attacker’s label as pc.
5) All requests in the buffer are well typed.
6) For all user actions we have that
• The user will never perform a submit on a (supposedly) integrity page that he received over a tainted connection.
• The user’s inputs respect the parameter types.
7) Whenever the browser has a script running in the context of URL u and is waiting for the response of a script inclusion
from URL u′, then the two URLs have the same expected response type.
We now prove that whenever a browser expression containing variables is well typed in a typing environment, then it is
also well-typd if we substitute the variables with concrete values of the expected type.
Lemma 3 (Browser Expression Substitution). Whenver we have Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ and we have a substituion σ with dom(σ) =
dom(ΓX ) and ∀x ∈ dom(ΓX ). σ(x) = v
τx
x with τx ⊑ℓa ΓX (x) then for all Γ
′
X , we have (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV), b ⊢
be
ℓa
beσ : τ ,
Proof. We perform an induction on the typing derrivation of Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ :
• (T-BEVAR). Then be = x and beσ = vτxx with τx ⊑ℓa ΓX (x). The claim follows directly from rule (T-BVAL) and (T-BSUB).
• (T-BEREF). Then be = r = beσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-BEVAL). Then be = vτv = beσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-BEUNDEF). Then be = ⊥ = beσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-BENAME). Then be = nτn = beσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-BEDOM). Then be = dom(be1, be2) and beσ = dom(be1σ, be2σ) and the claim follows immediately using (T=BEDOM).
• (T-BEBINOP) Then be = be1 ⊙ be2 with Γ, b ⊢beℓa be1 : τ1 and Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
be2 : τ2 and τ = τ1 ⊔ τ2. We also have
beσ = be1σ⊙ be2σ. By induction we know that Γ, b ⊢beℓa be1σ : τ
′
1 and Γ, b ⊢
be
ℓa
be2σ : τ
′
2 with τ
′
1 ⊑ℓa τ1 and τ
′
2 ⊑ℓa τ2. We
then know that τ ′1 ⊔ τ
′
2 ⊑ℓa τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ , and the claim follows by (T-BINOP) and (T-BESUB).
• (T-BESUB) follows by induction and by the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
We now prove the same claim on the level of scripts.
Lemma 4 (Browser Substitution). Whenver we have Γ,pc, b ⊢sℓa,P s and we have a substituion σ with dom(σ) = dom(ΓX )
and ∀x ∈ dom(ΓX ). σ(x) = vτxx with τx ⊑ℓa ΓX (x) then for all Γ
′
X , we have (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV),pc, b ⊢
s
ℓa,P
sσ.
Proof. We do the proof by induction on the typing derivation.
• (T-BSEQ): Then s = s1, s2. The claim follows by applying the induction hypothesis to s1 and s2 and applying rule (T-BSEQ).
• (T-BSKIP): The claim follows trivially.
• (T-BASSIGN): Then we have s = r := be. with
– Γ ⊢brℓa r : ref(τ)
– Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ
– pc ⊑I I(τ)
Using lemma 3 and (T-BESUB), we get Γ, b ⊢beℓa beσ : τ and the claim follows immediately.
• (T-BSETDOM): Then s = setdom(v, u, ~be). The claim follows by applying of lemma 3 and (T-BESUB) for every bei in
~be.
• (T-BINCLUDE): Then s = include(u, ~be), The claim follows by applying of lemma 3 and (T-BESUB) for every bei in ~be.
Now, we show that typing is preserved under the evaluation of expressions.
Lemma 5 (Browser Expression Typing). Let B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb,l,µ be a browser with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B. Let T = {tab 7→ s}
and {tab 7→ form(u, f)} ∈ P , ℓ = λ(u). Then for any browser expression be, if Γ, µ ⊢beℓa be : τ and eval ℓ(be,M, f) = v
τ ′
then τ ′ ⊑ℓa τ .
Proof. We perform the proof by induction over the expresssion be.
• be = x: In this case, eval ℓ(se,M, f) is undefined, so we don’t have to show anything.
• be = vτ We have eval ℓ(v
l,M, f) = vτ so the claim is trivial.
• be = be1 ⊙ be2: By induction we know
– Γ, µ ⊢beℓa be1 : τ1 and eval ℓ(be1,M, f) = v
τ ′1
1 and τ
′
1 ⊑ℓa τ1
– Γ, µ ⊢beℓa be2 : τ2 and eval ℓ(be2,M, f) = v
τ ′2
2 and τ
′
2 ⊑ℓa τ2
Let now vτ
′
= v
τ ′1
1 ⊙ v
τ ′2
2 . Then we know that τ
′ = τ ′1 ⊔I τ
′
2. (T-BEBINOP) we have τ = τ1 ⊔ τ2, the claim follows.
• be = r: then the claim immediately follows from rule (T-BEREF) and property 2 of definition 10.
• be = dom(be1, be2): We distinguish two cases:
– If µ = hon then as a consequence by rule (T-BEDOM), we have τ = ⊤. The claim is then trivial since for all τ ∈ T we
have τ ′ ⊑ℓa τ .
– If µ = att, then by rule (BE-DOM) the value is either a URL parameter or the URL itself. From property 3, we know
that for all paramters v of any URL in the DOM we have Γ, µ ⊢beℓa v : τ
′ with τ ′ ⊑ℓa ℓa. For any URL u we have
Γ, µ ⊢beℓa u : ⊥. Thus the claim holds.
We now show subject reduction for the browser for internal steps i.e., whenever a well-typed browser takes a step, it results
in another well-typed browser.
Lemma 6 (Browser Subject Reduction). Let B,B′ be browsers with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B such that B
•@
−−→ B′. Then we have
Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B
′.
Proof. Let B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb,l,µ and B′ = (N ′,M ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)ιb,l,µ be browsers as in the lemma. We know that
ιb = usr and do a proof by indcution on the step taken. We show that all properties of definition 10 hold for B
′.
• (B-LOAD):
– Property 1 is trivial, since µ′ = hon.
– Property 2 is trivial, since M = M ′
– Property 3 is trivial, since P = P ′
– Property 4 is trivial, since T = {}.
– For property 5 we have Q′ = {α} with α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u))I(λ(u)),hon and hence have to show that Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α.
We show that all the properties of definition 8 are fulfilled.
∗ Property 1 follows immedately from property 6 of definition 10 for B
∗ Property 2 is trivial since we have µ = hon
∗ Property 3 follows immedately from property 2 of definition 10 for B and lemma 5 and the fact that o = ⊥
∗ Property 4 is trivial since ιu = usr
– Property 6 for B′ follows directly from property 6 of definition 10 for B. The navigation flow started by the load action
is the same as nf (~a, tab)
– Property 7 is trivial since T ′ = {}
• (B-INCLUDE)
– Property 1 is trivial, since µ′ = µ and l = l′
– Property 2 is trivial, since M = M ′
– Property 3 is trivial, since P = P ′
– Property 4 is trivial, since T = {tab 7→ skip}
– For property 5 we haveQ′ = {α} with α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u′))l⊔II(λ(u)),µ
′
and hence have to show that Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α.
We show that all the properties of definition 8 are fulfilled.
∗ For property 1 We distinguish two cases:
1) if µ = hon then it follows from property 4 of definition 10 for B using rule (T-BINCLUDE) and lemma 5
2) if µ = att then the claim is trivial
∗ For property 2 We distinguish two cases:
1) if µ = hon then the claim is trivial
2) if µ = att then it follows from property 4 of definition 10 for B using rule (T-BINCLUDE) and lemma 5
∗ Property 3 follows immedately from property 2 of definition 10 for B and lemma 5
∗ Property 4 is trivial since ιu = usr
– Property 6 of definition 10 for B′ follows directly from property 6 for B.
– Property 7 follows from property 4 of definition 10 for B using rule (T-BINCLUDE)
• (B-SUBMIT) Then we have
– a = submit(tab, u′, v, p′)
– {tab 7→ (u, f, l′′, µ′′)} ∈ P
– {v′ 7→ form(u ′, ~vτ )} ∈ f
– ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~v |]. p(k) = k ∈ dom(p′) ? p′(k) : vτkk
– Property 1 follows from property 3 of definition 10 for B.
– Property 2 is trivial, since M = M ′
– Property 3 is trivial, since P = P ′
– Property 4 is trivial, since T = {}
– For property 5 we have Q′ = {α} with α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, orig(u))l
′⊔II(λ(u
′)),µ′ and hence have to show that Γ ⊢ℓa,usr
α. We show that all the properties of definition 8 are fulfilled.
∗ For property 1 we distinguish two cases:
1) if µ′′ = hon then it follows from property 3 and 6 of definition 10 for B
2) if µ′′ = att then the claim is trivial
∗ For property 2 we distinguish two cases:
1) if µ′′ = hon the claim is trivial
2) if µ′′ = hon then it follows from property 3 and 6 of definition 10 for B
∗ Property 2 is trivial since we have µ′′ = hon
∗ Property 3 follows immedately from property 2 of definition 10 for B and lemma 5
∗ Property 4 is trivial since ιu = usr
– Property 6 of definition 10 for B′ follows from property 6 for B.
– Property 7 is trivial since T = {}.
• (B-SEQ) Then T = {tab 7→ s} with s = s1; s2 and from (B-BSEQ) we know Γ,⊤, (⊥C , lr) ⊢
s
ℓa,P
s2. We apply the indcution
hypothesis for the browser stepping from script s1 to s
′
1. This immediately gives us all properties from definition 10 except
the typing of the script Γ,⊤, (⊥C , lr) ⊢sℓa,P s
′
1; s2, but this claim follows immediately by applying rule (T-BSEQ).
• (B-SKIP) Then T = {tab 7→ s} with s = skip; s′ By rule (T-BSEQ) we have Γ,⊤, (⊥C , lr) ⊢sℓa,P s
′. Since nothing besides
the script changes, the claim follows immediately.
• (B-END) is trivial, since the only change from B to B′ is that T ′ = {}, in which case we don’t have to show anything for
the script.
• (B-SETREFERENCE) Then T = {tab 7→ s} with s = r := be. We have P = P ′ and claim 3 of definition 10 is trivial and
since T ′ = {tab 7→ skip} claim 4 follows immediately from rule (T-BSKIP).
By rule (B-SETREFERENCE) we have
– {tab 7→ (u, f, l′, µ′)} ∈ P
– ℓ = λ(u)
– eval ℓ(be,M, f, l
′, ℓ) = vτ
– M ′ = M{r 7→ vτ}
All properties of definition 10 except for property 2 are trivial.
For property 2 it is sufficient to show that τ ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR@(r)).
By rule (T-BASSIGN) we get that If
– Γ ⊢brℓa r : ref(τ
′)
– Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : τ
′
By lemma 5 we get τ ⊑ℓa τ
′ and the claim follows using rules (T-BRSUB) and (T-BREF) and the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
• (B-SETDOM) Then T = {tab 7→ s} with s = setdom(be, u, ~be).
All properties of definition 10 except for property 3 are trivial, so we only show this one.
We assume the following setting analog to rule (B-SETDOM)
– P = P0 ⊎ {tab 7→ (u′, f, l′, µ′)}.
– ℓ = λ(u′)
– eval ℓ(be
′,M, f) = v′
– ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~be|]. vτkk = eval ℓ(bek,M, f)
– µ′′ = (µ = att ∨ µ′ = att) ? att : hon
Then P ′ = P0 ⊎ {tab 7→ (u′, f{v′ 7→ form(u, ~v)}, l′′, µ′′)}. We now do a case analysis:
– µ = µ′ = hon: Then µ′′ = hon and we need to show that with ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr
1) ΓU (u
′) = ΓX (v)
2) l′′ = l ⊔I l′ ⊑I I(ℓu) and
3) ∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |]. τ ′i ⊑ℓa τi
(1) follows immediately from the same property for B. From definition 10, we know by property 3 that l′ ⊑I I(ℓu) and
by property 4 we know with ΓU (u
′) = ℓ′u, ~τ
′, l′r that l ⊑I l
′
r and by rule (T-BSETDOM) we know that l
′
r ⊑I I(ℓu) and
(2) follows.
(3) follows immediately from rule (T-BSETDOM) and lemma 5.
– µ = att ∨ µ′ = att: Then µ′′ = att and we need to show that
1) ∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~v |].τi ⊑ℓa ℓa
2) I(ℓa) ⊑I l
′
(1) follows immediately from rule (T-BSETDOM) and lemma 5. For (2) we perform a case distinction
1) If µ′ = att the claims follow immediately from the same claims or B.
2) Otherwise we have µ = att and (2) follows from property 1 of definition 10.
Lemma 7 (Browser Request). Whenever a browser B
α
−→ B′ with α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)l,µ and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B. then Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α
and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B
′
Proof. Let B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb,l,µ and We know that rule (B-FLUSH) is used. We hence have Q = {α@l′ and B′ =
(N,M,P, T, {}, ~a′)ιb,l,µ. Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B
′ then follows immediately from Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B We get Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α by property 5 of
definition 10.
The next lemma states that a well-typed browser receiving a well-typed response is still a well-typed browser.
Lemma 8 (Browser Response). Whenever a for a browser B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb,l,µ we have B
α
−→ B′ with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B,
α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l
′′,µ′′ with l ⊑I l′′ and µ = µ′′∨µ′′ = att∧I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u)) and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α then Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B
′.
Proof. B′ = (N ′,M ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)ιb,l
′,µ′ We show that B′ fulfills the properties of definition 10. We know that the step α
was taken using rule (B-RECVLOAD) (B-RECVINCLUDE), or (B-REDIRECT). In all cases property 2 of definition 10 follows
immediately from porperty 4 of definition 9. We now do a case distinction on the rule used
• (B-RECVLOAD)
– Property 1 follows immediately from property 3 of definition 9
– For property 3 we do a case distinction:
∗ if µ′ = hon then the claim follows from property 5 of definition 9.
∗ if µ′ = att then the claim follows from from 6 of definition 9.
– Property 4 follows from property 7 of definition 9 for µ′ = hon and from 3 of definition 9 if µ′ = att.
– Property 5 is trivial.
– Property 6 follows from the same property for B. the nf on the tab for the page in B′ is the same as the one for the
network connection in B
– Property 7 is trivial.
• (B-RECVINCLUDE)
– Property 1 follows immediately from property 3 of definition 9 and property 1 of definition 10 for B.
– Property 3 is trivial
– For property 4 we do a case distinction:
∗ If µ′′ = hon, then µ = µ′ = hon and the claim follows from property 7 of definition 9 and property 4 of definition 10
for B, using rule (T-BSEQ) and property 7 of definition 10
∗ if µ′′ = att then µ′ = att . We distinguish two cases:
· If µ = att the claim follows immediately using property 3 of definition 9 and property 4 of definition 10 for B,
using rule (T-BSEQ)
· f µ = hon then by the assumption in the lemma we have I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u)) which is in contradition to property 7
of definition 10, hence this case is impossible.
– Property 5 is trivial.
– Property 6 is trivial
– Property 7 is trivial.
• (B-REDIR)
– Property 1 is trivial.
– Property 3 is trivial.
– Property 4 is trivial.
– For property 5 we know that Q′ = {α′} with α′ = req(ιb, n′, u′, p, ck′, o′)l
′′′,µ′′′ and hence have to show that Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α
′.
We show that all the properties of definition 8 are fulfilled.
∗ Property 1
∗ Property 2
∗ Property 3 follows immedately from property 2 of definition 10 for B and lemma 5 and the fact that o = ⊥
∗ Property 4 is trivial since ιu = usr
– Property 6 is trivial.
– Property 7 .
We have now shown all lemmas for browser steps and move on to the server. First, we introduce typing for the server:
Definition 11 (Server Typing). Let S = (D,φ, t) be a server with D = (D@, D$). We write Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S, if
1) • if ιb = usr then for all i ∈ dom(D@), for all r ∈ dom(D@(i)) we have if D@(i)(r) = vτ then τ ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR@(r))
• if ιb 6= usr then for all i ∈ dom(D@), for all r ∈ dom(D@(i)) we have if D@(i)(r) = vτ then τ ⊑ℓa ℓa
2) for all i ∈ dom(D$), for all r ∈ dom(D$(j)) we have if D$(j)(r) = v
τ then τ ⊑ℓa refτ (ΓR$(r)) ⊓ℓs jlabel(j)
3) for all u ∈ urls(S), for all j ∈ dom(φ)we have that C(ρ(φ(j), u)) ⊑C C(jlabel(j)) and I(jlabel(j)) ⊑I I(ρ(φ(j), u))
4) Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t
5) For all t ∈ threads(S) with t = ⌈c⌋l,µ(n,u,ιu,o),(i,j) we have o = ⊥ ∨ o ⊑I l
Intuitively, according to definition 11 a server is well typed if
1) For the global memories we have that
• for honest users, all values respect the typing environment
• for the attacker, all values are of the attackers type ℓa
2) All values in session memories respect the typing environment (taking the label of the session identifier into account)
3) All sessions are protected by session identifiers whose security guarantees are stronger than the one of the passwords
corresponding to the identity stored in the session.
4) All server threads are well-typed.
5) For all threads the integrity label is as least as low as the origin
We now show the same lemmas we showed for the browser on the server side , starting with the substitution of variables
in server expressions.
Lemma 9 (Server Expression Substitution). Whenver we have Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ and we have a substituion σ with dom(σ) =
dom(ΓX ) and ∀x ∈ dom(ΓX ). σ(x) = vτxx with τx ⊑ℓa ΓX (x) then for all Γ
′
X , (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV), b ⊢
se
ℓa
seσ : τ .
Proof. We perform an induction on the typing derrivation of Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ :
• (T-EVAR). Then se = x and seσ = vτxx with τx ⊑ℓa ΓX (x). The claim follows directly from rule (T-EVAL) and (T-SUB).
• (T-ESESREF). Then se = @r = seσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-EGLOBREF). Then se = $r = seσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-EVAL). Then se = vτv = seσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-EUNDEF). Then se = ⊥ = seσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-ENAME). Then se = nτn = seσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-EFRESH). Then se = fresh()τ = seσ and the claim is trivial.
• (T-EBINOP) Then se = se1 ⊙ se2 with Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se1 : τ1 and Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se2 : τ2 and τ = τ1 ⊔ τ2. We also have
seσ = se1σ ⊙ se2σ. By induction we know that Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se1σ : τ
′
1 and Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
se2σ : τ
′
2 with τ
′
1 ⊑ℓa τ1 and τ
′
2 ⊑ℓa τ2.
We then know that τ ′1 ⊔ τ
′
2 ⊑ℓa τ1 ⊔ τ2 = τ , and the claim follows by (T-BINOP) and (T-BESUB).
• (T-ESUB) follows by induction and by the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
To show the substitution lemma for server commands we first need to show auxiliary lemmas that deal with the program
counter.
First, we show that whenever server code can be typed with a pc, it can also be typed with any pc of higher integrity.
Lemma 10 (Server Program Counter Substitution). Whenver we have Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c : ℓs
′,pc′ and pc∗ ⊑I pc then
Γ, ℓs,pc
∗ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) cσ : ℓs,pc
∗∗ with pc∗∗ ⊑I pc′.
Proof. We perform the proof by induction on the typing derivation
• (T-SKIP) The claim is trivial
• (T-LOGIN) The claim follows from the transitivity of ⊑I
• (T-START) The claim is trivial
• (T-SETGLOBAL) The claim follows from the transitivity of ⊑I
• (T-SETSESSION) The claim follows from the transitivity of ⊑I
• (T-SEQ) The claim follows by induction on the two subcommands.
• (T-IF): Then c = if se then c1 else c2 with
– Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ .
– pc′ = pc ⊔I I(τ)
– Γ, ℓs,pc
′′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c1 : ℓs
′′,pc1
– Γ, ℓs,pc
′′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c2 : ℓs
′′′,pc2
– pc′′ = ((c and c′ do not contain reply or redir) ? pc : pc′) ⊔I pc1 ⊔I pc2
Let pc′′′ = pc∗ ⊔I I(τ), then pc′′′ ⊑I pc′ and we can apply the induction hypothesis for c1 and c2 and get
– Γ, ℓs,pc
′′′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c1 : ℓs
′′,pc∗1
– Γ, ℓs,pc
′′′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c2 : ℓs
′′′,pc∗2
with pc∗1 ⊑I pc1 and pc
∗
2 ⊑I pc2 and the claim follows by appltying (T-IF).
• (T-PRUNECHECK) The claim is trivial
• (T-TCHECK) The claim is trivial
• (T-OCHCK) The claim is trivial
• (T-TCHCK)
• (T-REPLY) With ΓU(u) = ℓu,~t, lr, we let pc
′ = pc ⊔I lr and pc′′ = pc ⊔I lr. We do a case distinction on b:
– If b = hon we get pc ⊑I lr, hence pc
′ = lr. and because of of pc
′ ⊑I pc we also get pc
′′ = lr and the claim follows.
– If b 6= hon we have pc = ⊤I We hence also have pc∗ = ⊤I and the claim follows.
• (T-REDIR) The claim follows from the transitivity of ⊑I
We now show that if server code containing variables is well typed in a typing environment typing these variables, then the
code is also well typed after instantiating these variables with concrete values of the same type.
Lemma 11 (Server Substitution). Whenver we have Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c : ℓs
′,pc∗ and we have a substituion σ with
dom(σ) = dom(ΓX ) and ∀x ∈ dom(ΓX ). σ(x) = vτxx with τx ⊑ℓa ΓX (x) then for all Γ
′
X , we have Γ
′, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) cσ :
ℓs
′,pc∗∗ with Γ′ = (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV).
Proof. We do the proof by induction on the typing derivation.
• (T-BSEQ): Then c = c1, c2. The claim follows by applying the induction hypothesis to s1 and s2 using lemma 10 and
applying rule (T-SEQ)
• (T-SKIP): The claim follows trivially.
• (T-SETSESSION): The claim follows from lemma 9 and the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
• (T-SETGLOBAL): The claim follows from lemma 9 and the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
• (T-LOGIN): The claim follows from lemma 9 and the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
• (T-START): The claim follows from lemma 9 and the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
• (T-IF): Then c = if se then c1 else c2 with
– Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ .
– pc′ = pc ⊔I I(τ)
– Γ, ℓs,pc
′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c1 : ℓs
′′,pc1
– Γ, ℓs,pc
′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c2 : ℓs
′′′,pc2
By induction we know
– Γ′, ℓs,pc
′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c1σ : ℓs
′′,pc∗1
– Γ′, ℓs,pc
′ ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c2σ : ℓs
′′′,pc∗2
By lemma 9 we know that Γ′, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa
seσ : τ The claim then follows by applying rule (T-IF).
• (T-AUTH) The claim follows from lemma 9 and the transitivity of ⊑ℓa .
• (T-PRUNETCHECK) The claim follows from lemma 9 and the fact that there is no subtyping on credentials of high
confidentiality.
• (T-OCHCKSUCC) The claim follows trivially.
• (T-OCHCKFAIL) The claim follows trivially.
• (T-TCHECK) The claim follows from lemma 9.
• (T-REPLY) Let variables be assigned as in the rule. The claim then follows by applying lemma 9 for all sek. The claim then
follows immediately.
• (T-REDIR) Let variables be assigned as in the rule. The claim then follows by applying lemma 9 for all sek.
We now show that typing of server expressions is preserved under evaluation.
Lemma 12 (Server Expression Typing). Let S = (D,φ, t) be a server with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S. and let ⌈c⌋
l,µ
R,i,j ∈ running(S). Then
for any server expression se, if Γ, jlabel(j) ⊢seℓa se : τ then Γ, jlabel(j) ⊢
se
ℓa
eval i,j(se,D) : τ .
Proof. Proof by induction over the expression se.
• se = vτv : Then eval i,j(se,D) = se and the claim is trivial.
• se = se1 ⊙ se2: By induction analog to case in in lemma 5.
• se = @r : straightforward from property 1 of definition 11 using (T-EGLOBREF) and (T-ESUB)
• se = $r : straightforward from property 2 of definition 11 using (T-ESESREF) and (T-ESUB)
• se = fresh()τf : straightforward from (SE-FRESH), (T-FRESH) and (T-ENAME)
Next, we show that whenever a server thread is typable with the session label ×, then it is also typable with any other
session label.
Lemma 13 (Server Typing with ℓs = ×). Whenever we have Γ,×,pc ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c : ℓs
′,pc then we also have
Γ, ℓs,pc ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) c : ℓs
′′,pc for all ℓs, where ℓs
′′ = × or ℓs
′ = ℓs
′′.
Proof. This is simple by inspecting the typing rules and the observation that ℓs = × implies that the session memory cannot
be used. Hence the code that is typed with ℓs = × can be typed with any session label. Furthermore, if the session label is
set to a different label during typing, this is unaffected by the old session label.
We are now ready to show that whenever a well-typed server takes an internal step, it results in another well-typed server.
Lemma 14 (Server Subject Reduction). Let S be a server with Γ0 ⊢ℓa,usr S and S
α
−→ S′. where α ∈ {•, ♯[~v]ιb,ιuℓ } Then we
have Γ0 ⊢ℓa,usr S
′.
Proof. Let S = (D,φ, t) and let S′ = (D′, φ′, t′) Then there exists ⌈c⌋l,µR,i,j ∈ running(S) with (D,φ, ⌈c⌋
l,µ
R,i,j)
α
−→
(D′, φ′, ⌈c′⌋l
′,µ
R,i,j′ ).
Because of rules (S-LPARALLEL), (S-RPARALLEL) and (T-PARALLEL) it is sufficient to show Γ0 ⊢ℓa,usr (D,φ, ⌈c
′⌋l
′,µ
R,i,j′ ),
assuming Γ0 ⊢ℓa,usr (D,φ, ⌈c⌋
l,µ
R,i,j).
We chose b, ℓs1, pc1 and Γ as in rule (T-RUNNING):
Let b =


hon if µ = hon ∧ ιb = usr
csrf if µ = att ∧ ιb = usr
att if µ 6= usr
and let ℓs1 = jlabel(j) and let pc1 = l.
With Γ0 = (ΓU ,ΓX ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV) and Γ
′
R@ = (ιb = usr) ? ΓR@ : { 7→ ℓa} we let Γ = (ΓU ,ΓX ,Γ
′
R@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV).
We furthermore let ℓs2 = jlabel(j
′) and pc2 = l
′.
We now show that S′ fulfills all properties of definition 11.
However, for property 4 of definition 11 we will show the following stronger claim: Whenever Γ, ℓs1,pc1 ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c :
ℓs1,pc
′
1 we have Γ, ℓs2,pc2 ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c′ : ℓs
′
2,pc
′
2 where ℓs
′
1 = × or ℓs
′
1 = ℓs
′
2
We perform the proof by induction the step taken.
• (S-SKIP). This case is trivial.
• (S-SEQ) Then we know
– c = c1; c2
– (D,φ, ⌈c1⌋
l,µ
R,i,j)
α
−→ (D′, φ′, ⌈c′1⌋
l′,µ
R,i,j′)
– c′ = c′1; c2.
All properties of definition 11 except for property 4 follow immediately by the induction hypothesis applied to c1.
By rule (T-SEQ) we know that for some pc′′1 and ℓs
′′
1
– Γ, ℓs1,pc1 ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c1 : ℓs
′′
1 ,pc
′′
1
– Γ, ℓs
′′
1 ,pc
′′
1 ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c2 : ℓs
′
1,pc
′
1
By induction we know that for some pc2,pc
′
2,ℓs2,ℓs
′
2
– Γ, ℓs2,pc2 ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c1 : ℓs
′
2,pc
′
2
– pc′2 ⊑I pc
′
1
– ℓs
′′
1 = × or ℓs
′′
1 = ℓs
′
2
Using lemma 10 we get Γ, ℓs
′′
1 ,pc
′
2 ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c2 : ℓs
′
1,pc
′′
2 with pc
′′
2 ⊑I pc
′
1
Usung lemma 13 we furthermore get Γ, ℓs
′
2,pc
′
2 ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c2 : ℓs
′′
2 ,pc
′′
2 with ℓs
′′
2 = × or ℓs
′′
2 = ℓs
′
1
Using (T-SEQ) we can then conclude Γ, ℓs2,pc2 ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c′1; c2 : ℓs
′′
2 ,pc
′′
2
• (S-IFTRUE) then
– c = if se then c1 else c2
– eval i,j(se,D) = true
τ
– j′ = j
– l′ = l ⊔I I(τ)
– c′ = c1.
All properties of definition 11 except for property 4 follow immediately by the induction hypothesis applied to c1.
By (T-IF) we know
– Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ
′
– pc′ = pc1 ⊔I I(τ)
– Γ, ℓs1,pc
′ ⊢cℓa,C c1 : ℓs
′
2,pc
′
2
– ℓs
′
2 = ℓs
′
1 or ℓs
′
1 = ×
By lemma 12 we know that τ ⊑ℓa τ
′. Hence pc2 = l
′ ⊑I pc′. We thus have by lemma 10 that Γ, ℓs2,pc2 ⊢
c
ℓa,C
c1 : ℓs
′
2,pc
′
2
with pc′2 ⊑I pc
′
1 and ℓs
′
2 = ℓs
′
1 or ℓs
′
1 = × and the claim follows.
• (S-IFFALSE) then the claim follows analog to the previous one.
• (S-TCTRUE) Then
– c = if tokenchk(se, se′) then c′
– eval i,j(se,D) = v
τ1
1
– eval i,j(se
′, D) = vτ21
– v1 = v2
– l′ = l
– j′ = j
All properties of definition 11 except for property 4 are trivial.
We know that typing was done using rule (T-TCHK) or (T-PRUNETCHK). Hence we know:
We want to show that (T-TCHK) was used. To this end, we assume that (T-PRUNECHK) was used and show a contradiction
By rule (T-TCHKPRUNE) we know
– se = x for some x and Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa x : τ
′
1
– se′ = r for some r and Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa r : τ
′
2
– τ2 = cred(ℓ)
– τ1 6= cred(ℓ)
– cred(ℓ) 6⊑C C(ℓa)
By lemma 12 we know that τ1 ⊑ℓa τ
′
1 and τ2 ⊑ℓa τ
′
2. By the definition of ⊑ℓa , we know that τ1 = τ
′
1. Since the set of
credentials at label label (τ1) is disjoint from the set of the set of any other values, and since v1 = v2, we know that also
τ1 = τ2. Using the definition of ⊑ℓa we get τ2 = τ
′
2. We hence have τ
′
1 = τ
′
2 which contradicts the assumption.
We thus know that (T-TCHK WAS USED) and we get Γ, ℓs1,pc1 ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c′ : ℓs
′
1,pc
′
1 and the claim follows.
• (S-TCFALSE) Then
– c = if tokenchk(se, se′) then c′′
– c′ = reply (error, skip, {})
– eval i,j(se,D) = v
τ1
1
– eval i,j(se
′, D) = vτ21
– v1 6= v2
– l′ = l
– j′ = j
All properties of definition 11 except for property 4 are trivial.
By (T-REPLY) we immediately get Γ, ℓs1,pc1 ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
reply (error, skip, {}) : ℓs1,pc1.
• (S-RESET) All properties of definition 11 are trivial, where property 4 follows immediately from (T-RESET).
• (S-RESTORESESSION) We have
– c = start se
– c′ = skip
– eval i,j(se,D) = v
τ
– v ∈ dom(D$)
– l′ = C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa) ? ⊥ : label (τ)
– j′ = v
All properties of definition 11 except for property 4 are trivial.
By (T-START) we get
– Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : cred(ℓ)
– ℓs
′
1 = (C(cred(ℓ)) ⊑C C(ℓa)) ? ℓa : ℓ
By lemma 12 we know that τ ⊑ℓa cred(ℓ)
′ We distinguish two cases:
– If C(cred(ℓ)) ⊑C C(ℓa) then also C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa) and we have ℓs = ⊥ = l′.
– If C(cred(ℓ)) 6⊑C C(ℓa) we know τ = cred(ℓ) and we have ℓs = ℓ = l′.
• (S-NEWSESSION) We immediately get property 1, 3 of definition 11. Property 1 follows immediately using rule (T-EUNDEV)
since the freshly created memory is empty. Property 4 follows analog to the previous case.
• (S-SETGLOBAL) We immediately get property 2, 3, 4 of definition 11.
We have c = @r := se and eval i,j(se,D) = v
τ
We know using rule (T-SETGLOBAL) that
– Γ′,@r ⊢srℓa ref(τ
′) :
– Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ
′
– pc ⊑I I(τ ′)
Using lemma 12 we know τ ⊑ℓa τ
′.
We distinguish two cases:
– ιu = usr Then by rule (T-RUNNING) Γ = Γ
′ and the claim follows
– ιu 6= usr Then by rule (T-RUNNING), with Γ′ = (Γ′U ,Γ
′
X ,Γ
′
R@ ,Γ
′
R$
,Γ′V) we have ΓR@ = { 7→ ⊥} and the claim
follows.
• (S-SETSESSION) We immediately get property 1, 3, 4 of definition 11. Property 2 follows from rule (T-SETSESSION) and
lemma 12.
• (S-LOGIN) We immediately get property 1, 2, 4 of definition 11. Property 3 follows from rule (T-LOGIN).
• (S-AUTH) All properties are trivial
• (T-OCHCKSUCC) Then
– c = if originchk(L) then c
– R = n, u, ιb, o
– o ∈ L
All properties of definition 11 except for property 4 are trivial.
We know that typing was done using rule (T-OCHK) or (T-PRUNEOCHK). Hence we know:
We want to show that (T-OCHK) was used. To this end, we assume that (T-PRUNECHK) was used and show a contradiction
By rule (T-OCHKPRUNE) we know
– ∀l ∈ L.I(ℓa) 6⊑I l
– u ∈ P
– b = csrf
We hence have I(ℓa) 6⊑I o.
Then the claim follows from property 5 of definition 11.
• (T-OCHCKFAIL) This case is analog to the case of rule (T-TCHKCFAIL)
We now show that any expression that is well typed in an honest typing branch is also well-typed when typing in the
attacker’s setting and that all expressions have type ℓa in the attacked setting.
Lemma 15 (Attacker Server Expression Typability). For all server expressions se we have if
• Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ
• ∀x ∈ ~x.Γ′X (x) = ℓa
• ∀r ∈ R.Γ′R@r = ref(ℓa)
• ℓs 6= × ⇒ ℓs
′ = ℓa
• be is static (all constants are labelled as ⊥)
then we have (ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,Γ
′
R@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV), ℓs
′ ⊢seℓa se : ℓa
Proof. We prove the claim by induction over the typing derivation for Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : τ
• (T-EVAL) Since se is static, we have se = v⊥. The claim then follows since ⊥ ⊑ℓa ℓa.
• (T-EFRESH) Then we have se = fresh()τ . The claim is trivial because of b = att. .
• (T-VUNDEF) Trivial.
• (T-EVAR) Follows immediately from ΓX .
• (T-EGLOBREF) Follows immediately from ΓR@ .
• (T-ESESREF) Then we know that ℓs 6= × and hence ℓs
′ = ℓa. The claim then follows immediately from (T-ESESREF)
(and (T-ESUB) for subtyping of arbitraty low values)
• (T-EBINOP) Then the claim follows immediately by induction.
• (T-ESUB) The claim follows immediately by induction.
Next we show, that any server thread that is well typed in the honest setting is also well-typed when typing in the attacker’s
setting.
Lemma 16 (Attacker Server Typability). For all threads t = u[~r](~x) →֒ c with Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t and ∀x ∈ ~x.ΓX (x) = ℓa and
∀r ∈ R.ΓR@(r) = ℓa we have (Γ
0
U ,ΓX ,ΓR@ ,Γ
0
R$
,Γ0V),×, I(ℓa) ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,att,P)
c : ,
Proof. By Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t we know by (T-RECV) that with ΓU (u) = ℓu, ~τ , lr and m = |~x | and Γ
′
X = x1 : τ1, . . . , xm : τm we
have
(Γ0U ,Γ
h
X ,Γ
0
R@ ,Γ
0
R$ ,Γ
0
V),×, I(ℓu) ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,hon,P)
c : ,
We let Γ = (Γ0U ,ΓX ,ΓR@ ,Γ
0
R$
,Γ0V) and now show the following stronger claim: Whenever
(Γ0U ,Γ
h
X ,Γ
0
R@ ,Γ
0
R$ ,Γ
0
V), ℓsh,pch ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,hon,P)
c : ℓs
′
h,pc
′
h
then
Γ, ℓs,⊤I ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,att,P)
c : ℓs
′,⊤I
where
• ℓsh = × ⇒ ℓs = × ∧ ℓsh 6= × ⇒ ℓs = ℓa and
• ℓs
′
h = × ⇒ ℓs
′ = × ∧ ℓs
′
h 6= × ⇒ ℓs
′ = ℓa and
The proof is by on the honest typing derivation for c
• (T-SKIP) trivial
• (T-SEQ) By induction on the two subcommands
• (T-LOGIN) By lemma 16, we get that all expressions are of type ℓa. Using rule (T-ESUB) we can also treat them as
expressions of type cred((⊥C ,⊤I)). The claim then follows immediately using (T-LOGIN).
• (T-START) By lemma 16 we get that all expressions are of type ℓa. Using rule (T-ESUB) we can also treat them as
expressions of type cred(ℓa). The claim then follows immediately using (T-START)
• (T-SETGLOBAL) We have c = @r := se with Γ, ℓs
′ ⊢seℓa se : ℓa by lemma 15 and ΓR@(r) = ref(ℓa). Using subtyping we
can show Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : (⊥C ,⊤I) and Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
@r : ref((⊥C ,⊤I)) and the claim folows using rule (T-SETGLOBAL).
• (T-SETSESSION) We have c = $r := se. The claim follows analogous to the previous one, using that Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
$r : ref(ℓa)
because of ℓs = ℓa.
• (T-IF) We have c = if se then ct else cf . With Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se : (⊥C ,⊤I) by lemma 15 and rule (T-ESUB). Hence pc
′ = pc
(in rule (T-IF)) and the claim follows from the induction hypothesis for ct and cf .
• (T-AUTH): Then the claim follows immediately using rule (T-AUTHATT).
• (T-PRUNETCHECK): Impossible since this rule cannot be applied for b = hon
• (T-TOKENCHECK): By lemma 16 we get that all expressions are of type ℓa. Using rule (T-ESUB) we can also treat them
as expressions of type cred(ℓa). The claim then follows by induction and using (T-TOKENCHECK)
• (T-REPLY) From lemma 16 and rule (T-ESUB) we know that for all variables x in the freshly generated environment Γ′X
we have Γ′X (x) = (⊥C ,⊤I). Furthermore, with subtyping we can show Γ, ℓs ⊢
sr
ℓa
r : ref(pair⊥C⊤I) for all r ∈ dom(ck).
The claim then follows immediately.
• (T-REDIR) Analog to (T-REPLY)
• (T-PRUNEOCHK) Impossible since this rule cannot be applied for b = hon
• (T-OCHK) The claim follows immediately by induction.
Next we show that whenever a server receives a well typed request, the resulting running thread is also well-typed.
Lemma 17 (Server Request). Whenever a server S
α
−→ S′ with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S, α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α then
Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S
′
Proof. Let S = (D,φ, t) and S′ = (D′, φ′, t′). We show that S′ fulfills the properties of definition 11. Property 2 and 3 follow
immediately from rule (S-RECV) since the session memory and the trust mapping do not change.
• For property 1 we perform a case distinction
– if ιb 6= usr then property 1 follows from property 4 of definition 8.
– if ιb = usr then property 1 follows from property 3 of definition 8.
• For property 4 ,because of S
α
−→ S′ we know (D,φ, u[~r](~x) →֒ c)
α
−→ (D′, φ′, ⌈cσ⌋l,µn,u,ιb,i,⊥ ‖ u[~r](~x) →֒ c). It is hence
sufficient, because of rule (T-PARALLEL), to show Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P ⌈cσ⌋
l,µ
(n,u,ιb),(i,⊥)
We perform a case distinction:
– if ιb 6= usr then by rule (T-RUNNING) with b = att and ℓs = jlabel(⊥) = ×, Γ′R@ = { 7→ ℓa} we have to show
(ΓU ,ΓX ,Γ
′
R@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV), ℓs, l ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
cσ : ℓs
′, l
because of lemma 16 we get with Γ′X = x1 : ℓa · · ·xm : ℓa
(ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,Γ
′
R@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV), ℓs,⊤I ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
c : ℓs
′,⊤I
With property 2 of definition 8 we can use lemma 11 for the substitution σ and the claim follows using lemma 10.
– if ιb = usr∧µ = att then by rule (T-RUNNING) with b = csrf and ℓs = jlabel(⊥) = ×, we have to show Γ, ℓs, l ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P)
cσ : ℓs
′, l.
Since l ⊑I ⊤I using lemma 10 it is sufficient to show
Γ, ℓs,⊤I ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
cσ : ℓs
′,⊤I
From rule (T-RECV) we get with Γ′X = x1 : ℓa, . . . , xm : ℓa that
(ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV),×, I(ℓa) ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,csrf,P)
c : , I(ℓa)
With property 2 of definition 8 we can use lemma 11 for the substitution σ and the claim follows.
– if ιb = usr∧µ = hon then by rule (T-RUNNING) with b = hon andℓs = jlabel(⊥) = ×, we have to show Γ, ℓs, l ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P)
cσ : ℓs
′, l.
Since we know l ⊑I I(ℓu) by property 1 of definition 8, using lemma 10 it is sufficient to show
Γ, ℓs, I(ℓu) ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,b,P)
cσ : ℓs
′, I(ℓu)
From rule (T-RECV) we get with ΓU(u) = ℓu,~t, lr and Γ
′
X = Γ
0
X , x1 : t1, . . . , xm : tm
(ΓU ,Γ
′
X ,ΓR@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV),×, I(ℓa) ⊢
c
ℓa,(u,hon,P)
c : , I(ℓa)
With property 1 of definition 8 we can use lemma 11 for the substitution σ and the claim follows.
We now show that all responses by the server fullfill these conditions.
Lemma 18 (Server Response). Whenever a server S
α
−→ S′ with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S, α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l,µ then Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α
and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S
′
Proof. We show that α fulfills all properties of definition 9. We perform a case distinction on the rule used to type the reply.
• (T-REPLY): Property 1 follows directly fom (T-REPLY) We perform a case distinction:
– If ιb 6= usr Then we need to show property 2 which follows immediately from the typing rule, using lemma 15
– If ιb = usr and µ = hon, then property 4 follows from (T-REDIR). Properties 5 and 7 are trivial. Propertiy 8 follows rom
(T-REDIR).
– If ιb = usr and µ = att then property 4 follows from (T-REPLY). Properties 6 and definition 9 are trivial.
• (T-REDIRECT): Property 1 follows directly fom (T-REDIR) We perform a case distinction:
– If ιb 6= usr Then we need to show property 2 which follows immediately from the typing rule, using lemma 15
– If ιb = usr and µ = hon, then properties 5, 7 and 4 of definition 9 follow from (T-REPLY) and (T-FORM)
– If ιb = usr and µ = att then properties 6, 3 and 4 of definition 9 follow from (T-REPLY).
We can now define the typing of websystems, which simply states that all browsers and servers contained in the system are
well typed.
Definition 12 (System Typing). Let W be a websystem. We write Γ ⊢ℓa,usr (ℓa,K) ⊲ W , if
1) for all S ∈ servers(W ) we have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S
2) for all B ∈ browsers(W ) we have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B
3) for all B ∈ browsers(W ) with B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)ιb,l,µ and N = {n 7→ u} then
• there exists S ∈ servers(W ) with t ∈ running(S), t = ⌈c⌋l
′,µ′
(n,u,ιb),(i,j)
and l ⊑I int⊔(t) .
• or I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(u)
• or TO = (ιb, n, u, l
′, µ′)
4) for all vτ ∈ K we have τ ⊑ℓa ℓa
Next, we show that any script created by the attacker, that is served over a low integrity network connection is well-typed
in the users browser.
Lemma 19 (Attacker Browser Typability). For all scripts s and well formed environments Γ, URLs u with I(ℓa) ⊑I I(λ(u)),
∀nτ ∈ values(s). τ ⊑ℓa ℓa, vars(s) = ∅ we have Γ, I(ℓa), csrf ⊢
s
ℓa,P
s.
Proof. We first show that for all browser expressions be we have Γ, csrf ⊢beℓa be : ℓa. We show the claim by induction over be.
• be = r.
– if C(λ(r)) 6⊑C C(λ(u)) the claim follwos immediately using rule (T-BEREFFAIL)
– if C(λ(r)) ⊑C C(λ(u)) we know by the well-formedness of Γ that C(refτ (ΓR@(r))) ⊑C C(ℓa) and the claim follows
using (T-BEREF) and (T-BESUB) .
• be = vτ : The claim follows from the assumption τ ⊑ℓa ℓa and rule (T-BEVAL)
• be = dom(be′, be′′): Immedieately by rule (T-BEDOM).
• be = be1 ⊙ be2: By induction and rule (T-BEBINOP)
We now show the main claim by induction over s.
• s = s1; s2: the claim follows from the indcution hypothesis for s1 and s2 and (T-BSEQ)
• s = skip : trivial with (T-BSKIP)
• s = r := be We distinguish two cases
– if I(λ(u)) 6⊑I I(λ(r)) then the claim is trivial with rule (T-BASSIGNFAIL).
– if I(λ(u)) ⊑I I(λ(r)) then we know because of I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(u) that also I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(r). Therefore, we know by well-
formedness of Γ that if ΓR@(r) = τ with τ = cred(·) then C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa). We can hence show Γ ⊢
br
ℓa
r : ref(ℓa).
Since we know that Γ, b ⊢beℓa be : ℓa the claim follows.
• s = setdom(v, u, ~be): The claim follows from rule (T-BSETDOM), using our observation about expression types.
• s = include(u, ~be): The claim follows from rule (T-BINCLUDE), using our observation about expression types.
Finally, we show that whenever a well-formed system takes a step, it produces another well-typed system.
Lemma 20. Attacker Knowlegde for low confidentiality requests Whenever we have α = req(usr, n, u, p, ck, o)l,µ with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr
α and λ(u) ⊑C C(ℓa) then for all nτ ∈ ns(p, ck) we have C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa).
Proof. For µ = hon the claim for ns(p) follows immediately from the well-formedness of URLs and property 1 of definition 8,
otherwise the claim follows directly from property 2 of definition 8,
The claim for ns(ck) follows immediately from property 3 of definition 8.
Lemma 21 (System Subject Reduction). LetW be a websystem with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr (ℓa,K) ⊲ W and (ℓa,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓa,K′) ⊲ W ′.
Then we have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr (ℓa,K
′) ⊲ W ′
Proof. We do a proof by a case analysis over the derivation of
α
−→
• (A-NIL) If the step was taken using rule (A-NIL) then we perform an inducition on the internal step. If the step is taken
through rule (W-LPARALLEL) or (W-RPARALLEL) the claim follows by incduction. If it is taken locally in one browser or
server the claim follows from lemma 6 or lemma 14 and the fact that K = K′. Note that property 3 of definition 12 follows
from the observation that raising the server integrity label can only happen in rule (S-RESET).
• (A-BROSER) Follows immediately from lemma 7 and lemma 17. Property 3 follows from the semantics rules for browsers
and servers. Property 4 follows from lemma 20.
• (A-SERBRO) Follows immediately from lemma 18 and lemma 8. We can apply lemma 8 because of property 3 of
definition 12.
• (A-TIMEOUTSEND) Follows immediately from lemma 7.
• (A-TIMEOUTRECV) Let α′ be the response sent in the rule. Then we trivially have Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α
′ and the claim follows using
lemma 8.
• (A-BROATK) We then have W
α
−→ W ′ with α = req(usr, n, u, p, ck, o)l,µ and I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(u). The typing of the browser
follows immediately from lemma 7. Property 4 follows from lemma 20.
• (A-ATKSER) We then have W
α
−→W ′ with α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)I(ℓa),µ, where ιb 6= usr, l = I(ℓa) and µ = att.
We now have to show that α is a well-typed request, then the claim follows from lemma 17.
We hence show that α fulfills the properties of definition 8.
Since ιb 6= usr and µ = att, we have to show properties 2 and 4 of definition 8. Both claims follow immediately since
ns(p, ck) ⊆ K.
• (A-SERATK) We then have W
α
−→W ′ with α = res(ιb, n, u, u′, ck, page, s)l,µ, where n ∈ K.
From lemma 18. we get that the resulting server state is well-typed and that α is a well-typed response. We now have to
show that for all vτ ∈ K′ we have τ ⊑ℓa ℓa. Since n ∈ K. we know that λ(u) ⊑C C(ℓa) (if the server request was received
using (A-BROWSERSERVER)) or ιb 6= usr and µ = att (if the request was received using (A-ATKSER)). In the firts case,
the claim follows immediately from property 1 of definition 8. In the second case the claim follows from properties 6, 2
and 3 of definition 9.
• (A-ATKBRO) We then have W
α
−→ W ′ with α = res(ιb, n, u, u′, ck, page, s)l,µ where ιb = usr, l = I(ℓa), µ = att and
I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(u).
We now have to show that α is a well-typed response, then the claim follows from lemma 8 (which we can apply, since
µ = att).
We hence show that α fulfills the properties of definition 9.
Since ιb = usr and µ = att, we have to show properties 1, 6, 3 and 4 of definition 9.
With ns(s, page, ck), properties 1 and 6 are trivial. Property 3 follows immediately from lemma 19.
For Property 4 we look at all r ∈ ck and perform a case distinction:
– If λ(u) ⊑I λ(r) then by transitivity of ⊑I we know I(ℓa) ⊑I λ(r) and hence by well-formedness of Γ we know that if
ΓR@(r) = cred(·) then C(ΓR@(r)) ⊑C C(ℓa). We hence know that ℓa ⊑ℓa ΓR@(r).
– If λ(u) 6⊑I λ(r) then the property is trivially true.
K. Relation
We now define a notion of High Equality between different components, that will be used to relate two websystems.
Definition 13 (High Equality). We define high equality in different contexts:
1) For two (browser or server) expressions e, e′ we inductively define e =⊥I e
′ by the following rules.
x =⊥I x v
τ =⊥I v
τ
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ) ⊔I I(τ
′)
vτ =⊥I v
′τ ′
I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ) ⊔I I(τ
′)
fresh()τ =⊥I fresh()
τ ′
e1 =⊥I e2 e2 =⊥I e
′
2
e1 ⊙ e
′
1 =⊥I e2 ⊙ e
′
2
r =⊥I r
e1 =⊥I e
′
1 e2 =⊥I e
′
2
dom(e1, e2) =⊥I dom(e
′
1, e
′
2)
2) For two pages page, page′ we define page =⊥I page
′ as
dom(page) = dom(page′)
∀v ∈ dom(page). page(v) = form(ui , ~vi) ∧ page
′(v) = form(u ′i ,
~v′i) ∧ ui = u
′
i ∧ vi =⊥I v
′
i
page =⊥I page
′
3) For two scripts s, s′ we define s =⊥I s
′ as
skip =⊥I skip
s1 =⊥I s2 s2 =⊥I s
′
2
s1; s
′
1 =⊥I s2; s
′
2
be =⊥I be
′
r := be =⊥I r := be
′
∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~be|]. bei =⊥I be
′
i
include(u, ~be) =⊥I include(u,
~be′)
be =⊥I be
′ ∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~be|]. bei =⊥I be
′
i
setdom(be, u, ~be) =⊥I setdom(be
′, u, ~be′)
4) For two commands c, c′ we define c =⊥I c
′ as
skip =⊥I skip halt =⊥I halt
c1 =⊥I c2 c2 =⊥I c
′
2
c1; c
′
1 =⊥I c2; c
′
2
se =⊥I se
′ c1 =⊥I c
′
1 c2 =⊥I c
′
2
if se then c1 else c2 =⊥I if se
′ then c′1 else c
′
2
se1 =⊥I se
′
1 se2 =⊥I se
′
2 se3 =⊥I se
′
3
login se1, se2, se3 =⊥I if se
′
1 then se
′
2 else se
′
3
se =⊥I se
′
start se =⊥I start se
′
∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]. sei =⊥I se
′
i
auth ~se at l =⊥I auth ~se
′ at l
∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]. sei =⊥I se
′
i
reply (page, s, ck) with ~se =⊥I reply (page, s, ck) with ~se
′
∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]. sei =⊥I se
′
i
redirect (u, ~z, ck) with ~se =⊥I redirect (u, ~z, ck) with ~se
′
5) For two memories M , M ′ we write
M =Γ,⊥I M
′ ⇐⇒ dom(M) = dom(M ′) ∧ ∀r ∈ dom(M). I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(Γ(r)) ⇒M(r) = M(r
′)
6) For two running server threads t = ⌈c⌋l,µE,R and t
′ = ⌈c′⌋l
′,µ′
E′,R′ we let
t =⊥I t
′ ⇐⇒ c =⊥I c
′ ∧E =⊥I E
′ ∧R = R′ ∧ l = l′ ∧ µ = µ′
7) For two requests α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ (resp. α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ) and β = req(ιb
′, n′, u′, p′, ck′, o′)l
′,µ′
(resp. β = req(ιb
′, n′, u′, p′, ck′, o′)l
′,µ′ ) we let
α =⊥I β ⇐⇒ I(ℓa) 6⊑I l ⊓I l
′ ⇒
ιb = ιb
′ ∧ n = n′ ∧ u = u′∧
dom(p) = dom(p′) ∧ ∀x ∈ domain(p). p(x) =⊥I p
′(x)
∧ ∀r ∈ domain(ck). I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(Γ(r)) ⇒ ck(r) =⊥I ck
′(r)
∧ l = l′ ∧ µ = µ′
8) For two responses α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l,µ (resp. α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′
r, ck, page, s)
l,µ) and β =
res(ιb
′, n′, u′, u′r, ck
′, page′, s)
′l,µ′ (resp. β = res(ιb
′, n′, u′, u′2, ck
′, page′, s)
′l,µ′ ) we let
α =⊥I β ⇐⇒ ∀r ∈ ((dom(ck) ∪ dom(ck
′)) \ (dom(ck) ∩ dom(ck′))). I(ℓa) ⊑I I(Γ(r))∧
∀r ∈ (dom(ck) ∩ dom(ck′)). I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(Γ(r)) ⇒ ck(r) = ck
′(r)∧
I(ℓa) 6⊑I l ⊓I l
′ ⇒
ιb = ιb
′ ∧ n = n′ ∧ u = u′∧
page =⊥I page
′ ∧ s =⊥I s
′∧
l = l′ ∧ µ = µ′
9) For two authentication events α = ♯[~v]ιb,ιuℓ and α
′ = ♯[~v′]ιb
′,ιu
′
ℓ′ we let α =⊥I α
′ if
• I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ℓ) and I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ℓ′) or
• α = α′
We now define a relation between two browsers.
Definition 14 (Browser Relation). Let B = (N,K,P, T,Q,~a)usr,l,µ and B′ = (N ′,K ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ be browsers.
Then we write B ≈BΓ B
′ if
1) Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B
′
2) I(ℓa) ⊑I l ⇐⇒ I(ℓa) ⊑I l′ and I(ℓa) 6⊑I l⇒ l = l′
3) If I(ℓa) 6⊑I l then N = N ′
4) K =Γ
R@
,⊥I K
′,
5) For all t ∈ dom(P ) if P (t) = (u1, page1, l1, µ1) then I(ℓa) ⊑I l1 or t ∈ dom(P
′) with P ′(t) = (u2, page2, l2, µ2) and
u1 = u2, page1 =⊥I page2, l1 = l2 and µ1 = µ2 and vice versa
6) If I(ℓa) 6⊑I l then dom(T ) = dom(T ′) and if T = {t 7→ s} and T ′ = {t 7→ s′} then s =⊥I s
′
7) ~a = ~a′ or halt ∈ ~a ∪ ~a′.
8) If I(ℓa) 6⊑I l and Q = {α} then Q′ = {α′} with α =⊥I α
′.
Intuitively, two browsers are related if
1) Both browsers are well typed
2) Either both have low or high integrity. If the integrity is high, it must be the same.
3) If the integrity is high, then the network connections are equal
4) The cookie jars fulfill high equalitu
5) For any high integrity page in a tab of one browser, there exists a page in the same tab of the other browser, with hsame
URL, integrity and attacked mode, and a DOM that fulfills high equality.
6) For high intergrity browsers the scripts have high equality
7) The list of user actions is equal or one of them contains a halt action
8) If the browsers are in high integrity states, then the events in the output buffer must fulfill high equality.
Next, we show that high equality on browser expressions is preseved under evaluation in the browser.
Lemma 22 (Preservation of =⊥I under browser evaluation). Let be and be
′ be browser expressions with be =⊥I be
′, let M,M ′
be memories with M =Γ
R@
,⊥I M
′, let u be a URL and let page = f and page′ = f ′ be pages with page =⊥I page
′. Then
evalλu(be,M, f) =⊥I evalλu(be
′,M ′, f ′).
Proof. Let vτ = evalλu(be,M, f) and v
τ ′ = evalλu(be
′,M ′, f ′). If I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ)⊔I I(τ ′) the claim is trivial. We hence now
assume If I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ) ⊔I I(τ ′)
• be = x : Cannot happen, eval not defined on variables.
• be = vτ : Trivial
• be = be1 ⊙ be2: Then be′ = be′1 ⊙ be
′
2 with be1 =⊥I be
′
1 and be2 =⊥I be
′
2. Let v
τ1
1 = evalλu(be1,M, f), let v
τ2
2 =
evalλu(be2,M, f), let v
′τ ′1
1 = evalλu(be
′
1,M
′, f ′) and let v
′τ ′2
2 = evalλu(be
′
2,M
′, f ′). By indution we get vτ11 =⊥I v
′τ ′1
1 and
vτ22 =⊥I v
′τ ′2
2 . If I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ1) ⊔I I(τ
′
1) the claim is trivial. We hence now assume If I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ) ⊔I I(τ
′). We have
vτ = (v1 ⊙ v2)τ1⊔τ2 and v′τ
′
= (v′1 ⊙ v
′
2)
τ ′1⊔τ
′
2 , hence I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ and I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ ′ and v = v′ and the claim follows.
• be = r: Then be′ = r. The claim then follows from M =Γ
R@
,⊥I M
′.
• be = dom(be1, be2): Then be
′ = dom(be′1, be
′
2) with be1 =⊥I be
′
1 and be2 =⊥I be
′
2. Let v
τ1
1 = evalλu(be1,M, f), let
vτ22 = evalλu(be2,M, f), let v
′τ ′1
1 = evalλu(be
′
1,M
′, f ′) and let v
′τ ′2
2 = evalλu(be
′
2,M
′, f ′). By indution we get vτ11 =⊥I v
′τ ′1
1
and vτ22 =⊥I v
′τ ′2
2 . I I(ℓa) ⊑I τ1 or I(ℓa) ⊑I τ2 the claim is trivial. We hence assume I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ1 ⊔I τ2. Then we know by
that v1 = v
′
1 and v2 = v
′
2. The claim then follows from page =⊥I page
′.
Next we define a relation between two servers:
Definition 15 (Server Relation). Let S = (D,φ, t) and S = (D′, φ′, t′) Then we write S ≈SΓ S
′ if
1) Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S
′
2) Let thon1 := {t1|t1 ∈ running(t) ∧ µ(t1) = hon} and t
hon
2 := {t2|t2 ∈ running(t
′) ∧ µ(t2) = hon}. Then there is a bijection
c : thon1 → t
hon
2 such that for all t1 ∈ t
hon
1 and t2 = c(t1) ∈ t
hon
2 , if we let t1 = ⌈c⌋
l,µ
E,R and t2 = ⌈c
′⌋l
′,µ′
E′,R′ then we have
a) R = R′ and with E = i, j and E′ = i′, j′ we have i = i and
• if I(ℓa) 6⊑I l then j =⊥I j
′
b) With E = (i, j) we have D@(i) =Γ,⊥I D
′
@(i)
c) the following holds:
i) I(ℓa) ⊑I l ⇐⇒ I(ℓa) ⊑I l′ and I(ℓa) 6⊑I l ⇒ l = l′
ii) if I(ℓa) 6⊑I l1 then t1 =Γ,⊥I t2
iii) if I(ℓa) ⊑I l1 and there exists an l with I(ℓa) 6⊑I l and t
′
1 and t
′′
1 such that t1 = t
′
1; reset l; t
′′
1 then there exist t
′
2
and t′′2 such that t2 = t
′
2; reset l; t
′′
2 and vice versa.
3) We have
• for all jτ ∈ dom(D$) ∩ dom(D
′
$) with C(τ) 6⊑C C(ℓa) that D$(j) =Γ,⊥I D
′
$(j)
• for all jτ ∈ (dom(D$)\dom(D
′
$)) with C(τ) 6⊑C C(ℓa) that for all r ∈ R with I(ℓa) 6⊑I ΓR@(r) we haveD$(j)(r) = ⊥.
• for all jτ ∈ (dom(D′$)\dom(D$)) with C(τ) 6⊑C C(ℓa) that for all r ∈ R with I(ℓa) 6⊑I ΓR@(r) we haveD
′
$(j)(r) = ⊥.
4) We have that for all jτ with I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ φ(j) = φ′(j).
Intuitively, two servers are in the relation if
1) Both servers are well-typed.
2) There is a bijection between high integrity running threads. For each pair we have that
a) They have the same request context and global memory index. For high integrity threads they also have the same session
memory index.
b) High equality holds between the two global memories.
c) i) Either both threads have high or low integrity. If it is high it has to be equal.
ii) For high integrity threads, the two threads have to be high equal
iii) If the integrity of one thread is low, but it can be raised to high using a reset command, then there also has to be a
reset with a high integrity label in the other thread.
3) • For all session identifiers appearing in both threads that are secret, the session memories indexed by the identifiers are
high equal
• For all session identifires present in only one thread, that are secret, all high integrity references are unset.
4) For all high integrity session identifiers, the user information (φ) is equal.
Next, we show that high equality for server expressions is preserved under evalutation.
Lemma 23 (Preservation of =⊥I under server evaluation). Let se and se
′ be server expressions with se =⊥I se
′, let E = i, j
and E′ = i, j′ with j =⊥I j
′, let D,D′ be databases with D@(i) =Γ,⊥I ΓR@D@(i
′) and if j 6= ⊥ then D$(j) =Γ′
R$
,⊥I D
′
$(j
′)
with
∀r.Γ′R$(r) =
{
ℓ ⊓ jlabel(l) if ΓR$(r) = ℓ
cred(ℓ ⊓ jlabel(l)) if ΓR$(r) = cred(ℓ)
Then evalE(se,D) =⊥I evalE′(se
′, D′).
Proof. • be = x : Cannot happen, eval not defined on variables.
• be = vτ : Trivial
• be = fresh()τ : Trivial
• se = se1 ⊙ se2: Then se′ = se′1 ⊙ se
′
2 with se1 =⊥I se
′
1 and se2 =⊥I se
′
2 and the claim follows by induction analogous to
lemma 22.
• se = @r : Then se′ = @r . The claim then follows from D@(i) =Γ
R@
,⊥I D
′
@(i
′)′.
• se = $r : Then se′ = $r and the claim then follows from D$(j) =Γ
R$
,⊥I D
′
$(j
′).
Now we introduce a relation bewteen attacked websystems:
Definition 16 (Integrity Relation Candidate). Given a typing environment Γ, we consider two websystems (ℓa,K) ⊲ W and
(ℓa,K′) ⊲ W ′ to be in the integrity relation ≈Γ if
1) Γ ⊢ℓa,usr W and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr W
′
2) For each server S ∈ servers(W ) there exists exactly one server S′ ∈ servers(W )′ such that urls(S) = urls(S′) and vice
versa, i.e. the available URLs and the code associated to them are the same in both web systems. We will call these servers
S and S′ correspondnding servers.
3) For all servers S in W and the corresponding servers S′ in W ′ we have that S ≈SΓ S
′
4) W contains exactly one browser B = (N,K,P, T,Q,~a)usr,l,µ, and W ′ contains exactly one browser B′ =
(N ′,K ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ . and we have B ≈BΓ B
′.
Intuitively, we require that
• All servers have a matching server in the other websystem that contains the same URLS and commands (i.e., statically the
websystems are equal)
• All corresponding servers are in relation
• Both websystems contain exactly one browser, and they are in relation
Next, we show that the relation is transitive. This property is helpful for proofs of upcoming lemmas, where we consider
the case where only one of the system does a step. Then it is enough to show that the system before and after taking the step
are in the relation.
Lemma 24 (Transitivity of ≈Γ). The relation ≈Γ is transitive.
Proof. Trivial, by inspecting the single conditions.
Now we introduce the notion of deterministic terminaion. This property states that the system terminates and can only
produce a single trace.
Definition 17 (Deterministic Termination). We say that a websystem W is deterministically terminating for a user usr if there
exists exactly one unattacked trace γ such that (ℓa,K) ⊲ W
γ
−→∗(ℓa,K
′) ⊲ W ′ where W ′ = Busr(M
′, P ′, 〈〉) ‖W ′ for some
K′,W ′,M ′, P ′.
Next we define a step relation:
Definition 18 (Step Relation). A step relation is a relation between to websystems (ℓa,K1) ⊲ W1 and (ℓa,K2) ⊲ W2 that
has the following properties.
1) if (ℓa,K1) ⊲ W1
α
−→ (ℓa,K′1) ⊲ W
′
1 and α is a high integrity event then there exists
~β and K′2, W
′
2 such that
• all β ∈ ~β are of low integrity
• (ℓa,K2) ⊲ W2
~β·α
−−→
∗
(ℓa,K′2) ⊲ W
′
2
• ((ℓa,K′1) ⊲ W
′
1, (ℓa,K
′
2) ⊲ W
′
2) ∈ R
2) if (ℓa,K1) ⊲ W1
α
−→ (ℓa,K′1) ⊲ W
′
1 then ((ℓa,K
′
1) ⊲ W
′
1, (ℓa,K2) ⊲ W2) ∈ R.
Intuitively, a step relation has to fulfill the following properties:
1) Whenever the first system takes a high integrity step, then the second system can take a number of low integrity steps,
followed by the same high integrity step, and the resulting websystems are in the relation.
2) If the first system takes a low integrity step, then it remains in relation with the second system (which didn’t take a step).
Definition 19 (Integrity of events). For an event α@l we define the integrity int(α@l) = l as the integrity of the event
Now we show that whenever a browser processes a low integrity event for an internal step, then it the state before and after
taking the step are in the relation.
Lemma 25 (Low integrity browser steps). Let B = (N,K,P, T,Q,~a)usr,l,µ and B′ = (N ′,K ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ be
browsers with B
•@l′′
−−−→ B′ and I(ℓa) ⊑I l′′ and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B. Then B ≈
B
Γ B
′
Proof. We show that all the properties of definition 14 are fulfilled. In all cases property 1 follows immediately from lemma 6.
Proof by induction over the derivation of the step α
• (B-SEQ) follows from induction.
• (B-SKIP) Porperties 2, 5, 4, 3 and 7 are trivial, since l = l′, P = P ′, K = K ′, N = N ′ and ~a = ~a′. Property 6 is trivial,
since because I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) we know I(ℓa) ⊑I l ⊔I l′.
• (B-SETREFERENCE) Porperties 2, 5, 3 and 7 are trivial, since l = l′, P = P ′, N = N ′ and ~a = ~a′. Property 6 is trivial,
since because I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) we know I(ℓa) ⊑I l′.
We know that T = {t 7→ r := be}.
For property 4 we get from property 4 of definition 10 using Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B and rule (T-BASSIGN) that l ⊑I lr ⊑I I(ΓR@(r)).
Hence we have K =Γ,⊥I K
′
• (B-SETDOM) Porperties 2, 4, 3 and 7 are trivial, since l = l′, K = K ′, N = N ′ and ~a = ~a′. Properties 5 and 6 are trivial,
since because I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) we know I(ℓa) ⊑I l ⊔I l′.
We show the same for low integrity internal steps on the server side.
Lemma 26 (Low integrity server steps). Let S = (D,φ, t) and S = (D′, φ′, t′) with S
α
−→ S′ and α ∈ {•, ♯[·]··} and
I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S. Then S ≈
S
Γ S
′
Proof. We show that all the properties of definition 15 are fulfilled. In all cases property 1 follows immediately from lemma 14.
let t1 ∈ running(S) and Let t1 = ⌈c⌋
l,µ
E,R. Then there exists t
′
1 ∈ running(S
′) with t′1 = ⌈c
′⌋l
′,µ′
E′,R and (D,φ, t1)
α
−→ (D′, φ′, t′1)
We prove the claim by induciton over the derivation of step α.
• (S-SEQ) The claim follows from induction hypothesis
• (S-IFTRUE) Properties 2a, 2b 3 and 4 are trivial since E = E′, D = D′, l = l′ and φ = φ. Property 2c is trivial since
I(ℓa) ⊑I l and I(ℓa) ⊑I l′
• (S-SKIP) Properties 2a, 2b 2c 3 and 4 are trivial since E = E′, D = D′, l = l′ and φ = φ.
• (S-RESET) Then c = reset l′′ Properties 2a, 2b 3 and 4 are trivial since E = E′, D = D′, l = l′ and φ = φ. Property 2c is
trivial since I(ℓa) ⊑I l and I(ℓa) ⊑I l′.
• (S-IFFALSE) Analog to rule (S-IFTRUE)
• (S-RESTORESESSION) Properties 2b, 2c 3 and 4 are trivial since D = D′, l = l′ and φ = φ. For property 2a we do a case
distinction:
– if b 6= hon then the claim is trivial
– if b = hon then we know by rule (T-START) that this is impossible, because the rule requires a high integrity program
counter.
• (S-NEWSESSION) Properties 2b, 2c and 4 are trivial since with D = (D@, D$), D
′ = (D′@, D
′
$) we have D@ = D
′
@, l = l
′
and φ = φ.
For property 2a we do a case distinction:
– if µ 6= hon then the claim is trivial
– if µ = hon then we know by rule (T-START) that this is impossible, because we then have I(ℓa) 6⊑I l and hence
I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α).
We know that c = start se. Let jτ = evalE(se,D) For property 3 we do a different case distinction:
– if C(τ) ⊑C C(ℓa) then the claim is trivial
– if C(τ) 6⊑C C(ℓa) then the claim is trivial since for all r ∈ D$(j) we have D$(j)(r) = ⊥.
• (S-SETGLOBAL) Then we have c = @r := se.
Properties 2a, 2c 3 and 4 are trivial since with D = (D@, D$), D
′ = (D′@, D
′
$) we have E = E
′, D$ = D
′
$, l = l
′ and
φ = φ.
For property 2b we perform a case distinction
– If µ 6= hon the claim is trivial
– If µ = hon then by rule (T-SETGLOBAL) we know that I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ΓR@(r)) and the claim follows.
• (S-SETSESSION) Then we have c = $r := se.
Properties 2a, 2c 2b and 4 are trivial since with D = (D@, D$), D
′ = (D′@, D
′
$) we have E = E
′, D@ = D
′
@, l = l
′ and
φ = φ.
For property 3 we perform a case distinction
– If j ⊑C C(ℓa) the claim is trivial
– If j 6⊑C C(ℓa) then by rule (T-SETGLOBAL) we know that I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ΓR@(r)) and the claim follows.
• (S-LOGIN) we have t = ⌈login se, se′, se′′⌋l,µE,R.
Properties 2a, 2b 2c and 3 are trivial since E = E′, D = D′ and l = l′.
By rule (T-LOGIN) with Γ, ℓs ⊢seℓa se
′′ : τ we get that. I(ℓa) ⊑I τ . Property 4 then follows immediately using lemma 5.
• (S-AUTH) Properties 2a, 2b 2c 3 and 4 are trivial since E = E′, D = D′, l = l′ and φ = φ.
• (S-LPARALLEL) The claim follows from induction hypothesis
• (S-RPARALLEL) The claim follows from induction hypothesis
Now, we show the same for browsers issuing a low integrity request.
Lemma 27 (Low integrity browser request). Let B = (N,K,P, T,Q,~a)usr,l,µ and B′ = (N ′,K ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ be
browsers with B
α
−→ B′ and I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B and α = req(ιb, n, u, p, o, ck)
l′′,µ′′ Then B ≈BΓ B
′.
Proof. We perform a case distinction on the rule used:
• (B-LOAD): Impossible, since I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α)
• (B-SUBMIT): Impossible, since I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α)
• (B-INCLUDE):
Properties 2, 5, 4 and 7 are trivial, since l = l′, P = P ′, K = K ′ and ~a = ~a′. Properties 3 and 6 are trivial, since because
I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) we know I(ℓa) ⊑I l ⊔I l′. Property 1 follows immediately from lemma 7.
Next, we show the same for a low integrity browser response.
Lemma 28 (Low integrity browser response). Let B = (N,K,P, T,Q,~a)usr,l,µ and B′ = (N ′,K ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ be
browsers with B
α
−→ B′ and I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) and α = res(ιb, n, u, u′, ck, page, s)l
′′,µ′′ and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr B and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α. Then
B ≈BΓ B
′
Proof. • (B-RECVLOAD): Impossible, since I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α)
• (B-RECVINCLUDE) Property 1 follows immediately from lemma 8.
Porperties 5 and 7 are trivial, since we have P = P ′ and ~a = ~a′.
Properties 3 and 6 are trivial, since because I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) we know I(ℓa) ⊑I l′.
For porpery 4 we perform a case distinction on the r ∈ dom(ck)
– if I(λ(u)) 6⊑I λ(r) then the claim is trivial since the cookie will be ignored by the browser.
– if I(λ(u)) ⊑I λ(r) then by property 4 of definition 9 we know that l′′ ⊑I I(ΓR@(r)) and hence I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ΓR@(r)).
The claim then follows by the definition of =Γ
R@
,⊥I .
To show 2, since we know I(ℓa) ⊑I l′, we have to show I(ℓa) ⊑I l. We assume that I(ℓa) 6⊑I l and lead the assumption
to a contradiction. We know then that µ = hon. By typing we know from rule (T-BINCLUDE) that the script running in B
has been typed with the same pc as the script s. As s has been typed with a low integrity pc, so was the script in B and
the claim follows .
Now we show the same for servers receiving a low integrity request.
Lemma 29 (Low integrity server request). Let S = (D,φ, t) and S = (D′, φ′, t′) with S
α
−→ S′ and I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) and
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l′′,µ′′ Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr α. Then S ≈
S
Γ S
′
Proof. Properties 2a, 2b 2c are trivial since I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α). 3 and 4 are trivial since with D = (D@, D$), D
′ = (D′@, D
′
$)
we have D$ = D
′
$, and φ = φ. Property 1 follows immediately from lemma 17.
Now we show the same for servers sending a low integrity response.
Lemma 30 (Low integrity server response). Let S = (D,φ, t) and S = (D′, φ′, t′) with S
α
−→ S′ and I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α) and
and α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l
′′,µ′′ and Γ ⊢ℓa,usr S. Then S ≈
S
Γ S
′
Proof. Properties 2a, 2b 2c 3 and 4 are trivial since E = E′, D = D′, l = l′ and φ = φ. Property 1 follows immediately from
lemma 18.
Finally, we use the previous lemmas to show the same claim on a websystem level.
Lemma 31 (Low integrity steps). Let W a web system with (ℓa,K) ⊲ W
α
−→ (ℓa,K′) ⊲ W ′ and I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α). Then
W ≈Γ W
′.
Proof. We perform an induction on the rule used to derive the step α.
• (A-NIL) Then, if the step is derived through rule (W-LPARALLEL) or (W-RPARALLEL) the claim follows by induction.
The claim for internal browser steps follows from lemma 25. The claim for internal server steps follows from lemma 26.
• (A-BROWSERSERVER) Then the claim follows from lemma 27 for the browser step and lemma 29 for the server step, using
lemma 7.
• (A-SERVERBROWSER) Then the claim follows from lemma 30 for the server step and lemma 27 for the browser step. using
lemma 18.
• (A-TIMEOUT) Then the claim follows from lemma 25 for both browser steps.
• (A-BROATK) Then the claim follows from lemma 25 for the browser step.
• (A-ATKSER) Then the claim follows from lemma 26 for the server step.
• (A-SERATK) Then the claim follows from lemma 26 for the server step.
• (A-ATKBRO) Then the claim follows from lemma 25 for the browser step.
We now define the next high integrity state of a deterministically terminating websystem as the state that is just before
processing the next high integrity event. This state can be reached by processing a number of low integrity events. We
furthremore show that
1) this state is unique
2) The websystem before and after taking the low integrity steps are in the relation.
3) The websystem in the newly reached state is still deterministically terminating
4) The websystem has a special form (one of the few specified in the lemma)
Lemma 32 (Low integrity catch up). For every dterministically terminating W of low integrity we let nexth(W ) be the
websystem W ′ such that
• W
β
−→∗W ′ with I(ℓa) ⊑I int(β) for all β ∈ ~β.
• for all W ′′, α with W ′
α
−→W ′′ I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α)
We then know that
1) There exists such a unique W ′
2) W ≈Γ W ′
3) W ′ is deterministically terminating
4) Let B = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)usr,l,µ be the honest browser in W and let B′ be the honest browser in W ′. Then exactly one
of the following claims about W ′ holds
a) B′ = ({},M ′, P ′, {}, {}, load(t, u, σ) :: ~a)usr,l
′,µ′
b) B′ = ({},M ′, P ′, {}, {}, submit(t, u, v, σ) :: ~a)usr,l
′,µ′
c) B′ = (N ′,M ′, P ′, T ′, {}, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ with N 6= {} and there exists a server S in W ′ with t ∈ running(S) and t =
⌈reset l′′; c⌋l
′,µ′
R,E
d) B′ = (N ′,M ′, P ′, T ′, {}, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ with N 6= {} and there exists a server S in W ′ with t ∈ running(S) and t =
⌈reply (page, s, ck) with ~se⌋l
′,µ′
R,E
Proof. • Uniqueness follows from definition 17
• W ≈Γ W ′ follows from repeated application of lemma 31
• deterministic termination follows from definition 17
• The form of W ′ follows from the observation that these four points are the only ones in the rules, where we “raise the
integrity“
Next, we show that if two browsers are in the relation and one of them takes an internal high integrity step, then also the
other can take the same step and the resulting browsers are still in the relation.
Lemma 33 (High integrity browser steps). Let B1 = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)
usr,l,µ and B2 = (N
′,M ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ be
browsers with B1 ≈BΓ B2 and I(ℓa) 6⊑I l and let B1
•@ls−−−→ B′1 with I(ℓa) 6⊑I ls. Then there exist B
′
2 such that B2
•
−→ B′2 and
B′1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2.
Proof. Because of B1 ≈BΓ B2 we know
• B,pc, b ⊢sℓa,P and B
′,pc, b ⊢sℓa,P
• l = l′
• N = N ′
• K =Γ
R@
,⊥I K
′
• dom(T ) = dom(T ′) and if T = {t 7→ s} and T ′ = {t 7→ s′} then s =⊥I s
′
• ~a = ~a′
We know thatt µ = hon
We perform an indcution on the derivation of the step α.
• (B-SEQ) The claim follows by induction.
• (B-SKIP) Trivial because s =⊥I s
′
• (B-END) Trivial because s =⊥I s
′
• (B-SETREFERENCE) Then because of N = N ′, s =Γ,⊥I s
′, we can also apply (B-INCLUDE) for B2. We have that
s = r := be and s′ = r := be′ where be =⊥I be
′. If I(ℓa) ⊑I ΓR@(r) then the claim is trivial. If I(ℓa) 6⊑I ΓR@(r) then we
know by rule (T-BASSIGN) that with Γ, hon ⊢beℓa be : τ and Γ, hon ⊢
be
ℓa
be′ : τ ′ we have I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ and I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ ′. Using
that be =⊥I be
′ gives us that be = be′ and the claim follows using lemma 22 and lemma 5.
• (B-SETDOM) Then because of N = N ′, s =Γ,⊥I s
′, we can also apply (B-SETDOM) for B2. We have that
s = setdom(be, u, ~be) and s′ = setdom(be′, u, ~be′) where be =⊥I be
′ and ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~be|]. bek =⊥I be
′
k. By rule
(T-BSETDOM) we known that be = vτ and be′ = v′τ
′
are values with I(τ) = I(τ ′) = ⊥I . Hence we know v = v′ by the
definition of =⊥I . Using lemma 22 for all expressions in
~be, we get page =⊥I page
′ and the claim follows.
Next, we show the same property for browsers sending out a high integrity request.
Lemma 34 (High integrity browser request). Let B1 = (N,M,P, T,Q,~a)
usr,l,µ and B2 = (N
′,M ′, P ′, T ′, Q′, ~a′)usr,l
′,µ′ be
browsers with B1 ≈
B
Γ B2 and let B1
α
−→ B′1 with I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α) and α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
lα,µα Then there exist B′2 and
α′ such that B2
α′
−→ B′2 and α =⊥I α
′ and B′1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2.
Proof. • (B-LOAD) Then because of N = N ′, dom(T ) = dom(T ′), and ~a = ~a′ we can also apply rule (B-LOAD) in B2 and
we get B′1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2 immediately. To show α =⊥I α
′ the only non-trivial condition is ∀r ∈ dom(ck). ck(r) =⊥I ck
′(r). This
however follows immediately from K =Γ
R@
,⊥I K
′
• (B-INCLUDE) We then know that I(ℓa) 6⊑I l and because of N = N
′, s =Γ,⊥I s
′, we can also apply (B-INCLUDE) for B2
and we get B′1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2 immediately. For α =⊥I α
′ we need to show that
1) ∀x ∈ dom(p).p(x) =⊥I p
′(x)
2) ∀r ∈ dom(ck).ck(r) =⊥I ck
′(r)
The first point follows immediately from lemma 22. The second point follows immediately from K =Γ
R@
,⊥I K
′.
• (B-SUBMIT) We distinguish two cases:
– I(ℓa) 6⊑I lα Then we know that the DOM is of high integrity and because of N = N ′, dom(T ) = dom(T ′), and ~a = ~a′
we can also apply rule (B-SUBMIT) in B2 and we get B
′
1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2. immediately. For α =⊥I α
′ we need to show that
1) ∀x ∈ dom(p).p(x) =⊥I p
′(x)
2) ∀r ∈ dom(ck).ck(r) =⊥I ck
′(r)
The first point follows immediately from =⊥I on the DOM and ~a = ~a
′. The second point follows immediately from
K =Γ
R@
,⊥I K
′.
– I(ℓa) ⊑I lα Then we know that we can also apply (B-SUBMIT) in B′ and B′1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2 follows immediately. Since
I(ℓa) ⊑I lα α =⊥I α
′ is trivial.
Next we show the same property for browsers receiiving a high integrity response.
Lemma 35 (High integrity browser response). Let B1, B2 be browsers with B1 ≈BΓ B2 and let B1
α
−→ B′1 with I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α)
and α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l,µ.S Let α′ =⊥I α. Then there exist B
′
2 and such that B2
α′
−→ B′2 and B1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2
Proof. We perform a case distinction between the two possible rules.
• (B-RECVLOAD) We then know I(ℓa) 6⊑I l1 and I(ℓa) 6⊑I l2 . Then because of N = N ′, dom(T ) = dom(T ′), we can also
apply (B-RECVLOAD) for B2. We get B
′
1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2 from α =⊥I α
′.
• (B-RECVINCLUDE) We then know I(ℓa) 6⊑I l1 ⊔I l2 . Then because of N = N ′, T =Γ,⊥I T
′, we can also apply (B-
RECVINCLUDE) for B2. We get B
′
1 ≈
B
Γ B
′
2 from α =⊥I α
′.
Next we show the same property for servers taking an internal high integrity step.
Lemma 36 (High Integrity Server Steps). Let S1, S2 be servers with S1 ≈
S
Γ S2 and I(ℓa) 6⊑I l1 ⊔I l2 and let S1
α
−→ S′1 with
I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α) and α ∈ {•, ♯[·]··}. Then there exist S
′
2 and α
′ such that S2
α′
−→ S′2 and α =⊥I α
′ and S′1 ≈
S
Γ S
′
2.
Proof. Let S1 = (D1, φ1, t
0
1), S
′
1 = (D
′
1, φ
′
1, t
0′
1 ), S2 = (D2, φ2, t
0
2), S
′
2 = (D
′
2, φ
′
2, t
0′
2 ). Then there is t1 ∈ running(S1) with
t1
α
−→ t′1 and t
′
1 ∈ running(S
′
1). Let t1 = ⌈c1⌋
l1,µ1
E1,R1
and t′1 = ⌈c
′
1⌋
l′1,µ1
E′1,R1
. Let t2 ∈ running(S2) with t2 = ⌈c2⌋
l2,µ2
E2,R2
.
We now show that there are α and t′2 = ⌈c
′
2⌋
l′2,µ2
E′2,R2
. with t2
α′
−→ t′2 with α =⊥I α
′.
We perform the proof by induction over the derivation of the step α.
• (S-SEQ) Claim follows by induction.
• (S-IFTRUE) Then c1 = if se then c11 else c12 and c2 = if se
′ then c21 else c22 with se =⊥I se
′. Let vτ = evalE1(se,D1)
and v′τ
′
= evalE2(se
′, D2). Then by lemma 23 we get v
τ =⊥I v
′τ ′ . We distinguish two cases:
– If I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ) then we also have I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ ′) and we have v = v′. Hence the continuations are c11; reset l and
c21; reset l and the claim follows immediately.
– If I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ) then we also have I(ℓa) ⊑I τ ′. Then t′1 = ⌈c12; reset l1⌋
l1⊔II(τ),µ1
E1,R1
and t′2 = ⌈c22; reset l2⌋
l2⊔II(τ
′),µ2
E2,R2
where c′2 ∈ {c
′
11, c12}. The claim then follows immediately.
• (S-FALSE) This case is analog to the case of rule (T-TRUE).
• (S-TOKENCHECKTRUE) We instantiate variables analog to the case of rule (T-TRUE) and distinguish two cases:
– If I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ) then we also have I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ ′) and we have v = v′. Hence the continuations are c11 and c21 and the
claim follows immediately.
– If I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ) then we also have I(ℓa) ⊑I τ ′. Then t′1 = ⌈c12⌋
l1,µ1
E1,R1
and t′2 = ⌈c22⌋
l2,µ2
E2,R2
. Since c22 =
reply (error, skip, {}) this case is impossible due to the termination of S2
• (S-TOKENCHECKFALSE) Then t′1 = ⌈reply (error, skip, {})⌋
l1,µ1
E1,R1
and the claim is trivial, since S′1 is in a “bad” state.
• (S-SKIP) Trivial
• (S-RESET) If I(ℓa) 6⊑I l1 then the claim is trivial. Otherwise we know that c1 = reset lr where I(ℓa) 6⊑I lr
• (S-RESTORESESSION) Then c1 = start se and c2 = start se
′. with se =⊥I se
′. Then for S2 we can apply rule (S-
RESTORESESSION) or (S-NEWSESSION) and the claim follows immediately.
• (S-NEWSESSION) Analog to previous case.
• (S-SETGLOBAL) We have c1 = r := se and c2 = r := se
′ with se =⊥I se
′. By rule (T-SETGLOBAL) we know that
Γ, jlabel(j) ⊢seℓa se : τ and Γ, jlabel(j
′) ⊢seℓa se
′ : τ ′ and Γ, jlabel(j) ⊢srℓa r : τr and We distinguish two cases:
– If I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(ΓR@(r)) then also I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τr) and hence also I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ and I(ℓa) 6⊑I τ
′. The claim follows from
se =⊥I se
′ using lemma 23.
– If I(ℓa) ⊑I I(ΓR@(r)) then the claim is trivial.
• (S-SETSESSION) This case follows analog to the previous one.
• (S-LOGIN) We have c1 = login se1, se2, se3 and c2 = login se
′
1, se
′
2, se
′
3 with se1 =⊥I se
′
1, se2 =⊥I se
′
2 and se3 =⊥I se
′
3.
Let jτ1 = evalE(se3, D) and let j
τ ′
2 = evalE′(se
′
3, D
′). We distinguish two cases:
– If I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ) then also I(ℓa) ⊑I I(τ ′) and the claim follows immediately.
– If I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(τ) then j
τ
1 = j
′τ ′
1 . By rule (T-LOGIN) and lemma 5 we know that τ = cred(ℓ). Let v
τ2
2 = evalE(se2, D)
and let v
′τ ′2
2 = evalE′(se
′
2, D
′). Then by rule (T-LOGIN) and lemma 5 we know that and τ2 = τ and hence by se2 =⊥I se
′
2
we get vτ22 = v
′τ ′2
2 . With ιb = evalE(se1, D) and let ιb
′ = evalE′(se
′
1, D
′) we get using the properties of ρ that ιb = ιb
′
and the claim follows.
• (T-AUTH) Trivial
Next, we show the same property for servers receiving a high integrity request.
Lemma 37 (High Integrity Server Request). Let S1, S2 be servers with S1 ≈SΓ S2 and let S1
α
−→ S′1 with I(ℓa) 6⊑I α and
α = req(ιb, n, u, p, ck, o)
l,µ. Let α′ with α =⊥I α
′. Then there exist S′2 such that S2
α′
−→ S′2 and S
′
1 ≈
S
Γ S
′
2.
Proof. The case is covered by rule (S-RECV) We know that the URL exists on both servers S1 and S2 by the definition of ≈SΓ,
hence the step can be taken in both servers. The claim on global memories follows immediately from the claim on cookies.
Let t and t′ be the freshly generated running threads. Then t =⊥I t
′ follows from the claim on p in α =⊥I α
′ .
Next, we show the same property for servers sending a high integrity response.
Lemma 38 (High integrity server response). Let S1, S2 be servers with S1 ≈SΓ S2 and let S1
α
−→ S′1 with I(ℓa) 6⊑I α and
α = res(ιb, n, u, u
′, ck, page, s)l,µ Then there exist S′2 and α
′ such that S2
α′
−→ S′2 and S
′
1 ≈
S
Γ S
′
2 and α =⊥I α
′.
Proof. The case is covered by rule (S-REPLY)
We have c = reply (page, s, ck) with ~se and c′ = reply (page, s, ck) with ~se′ with ∀i ∈ [1 . . . |~se|]sei =⊥I se
′
i.
Let vi = evalE(sei, D) and v
′
i = evalE′(se
′
i, D
′). Then by lemma 23 we get vi =⊥I v
′
i.
With σ = {x1 7→ v1 · · ·xm 7→ vm} and σ
′ = {x1 7→ v
′
1 · · ·xm 7→ v
′
m}
We immediately get sσ =⊥I sσ
′ and pageσ =⊥I pageσ
′.
we also get ∀r ∈ dom(ck). ck(r)σ =⊥I ck(r)σ
′ and the claim follows using lemma 18.
Finally, we show the same property on websystem level.
Lemma 39 (High integrity steps). Let A1 = (K1, ℓa) ⊲ W1 and A2(K2, ℓa) ⊲ W2 be web systems with A1 ≈Γ A2 and let
A2 be deterministically terminating . Then whenever A1
α
−→ A′1 with I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α) then there exist
~β, α′ and A′2 such that
A2
~β·α′
−−−→ A′2 with α =⊥I α
′ and forall β ∈ ~β we have I(ℓa) ⊑I int(β) and A′1 ≈Γ A
′
2.
Proof. If A2 is in a low integrity state (i.e., it cannot take a high integrity step) , then let A
′′
2 = nexth(A2) as in lemma 32.
otherwise let A′′2 = A
′
2. . We then know that A2
~β
−→ A′′2 where for β ∈
~β we have I(ℓa) ⊑I int(β) and A2 ≈Γ A′′2 . By
transitivity we hence get A1 ≈Γ A′′2 .
We now show that A′′2
α′
−→ A′2 with α =⊥I α
′ and A2 ≈Γ A′2. We prove the claim by indcution over the derivation of the
step α.
• (A-NIL) Then, if the step is derived through rule (W-LPARALLEL) or (W-RPARALLEL) the claim follows by induction.
The claim for internal browser steps follows from lemma 33. The claim for internal server steps follows from lemma 36.
• (A-BROWSERSERVER) Then we can also apply (A-BROWSERSERVER) for A′′2 and the claim follows from lemma 34 for
the browser step and lemma 37 for the server in case of a high integrity request or lemma 29 for the server in case of a low
integrity request.
• (A-SERVERBROWSER) Then we can also apply rule (A-SERVERBROWSER) in A′′2 and the claim follows from lemma 38
for the server in case of a high integrity response and lemma 30 in case of a low integrity response and lemma 35 for the
browser step.
• (A-TIMEOUTSEND) Then we can also apply (A-TIMEOUTSEND) in A′′2 and the claim follows from lemma 34.
• (A-TIMEOUTRECV) Then we can also apply (A-TIMEOUTRECV) in A2” and the claim follows from lemma 35 for the
browser step.
• (A-BROATK) Then we distinguish two cases
– W2 can perform a step using (A-BROWSERSERVER): Then the claim follows from lemma 34 for the browser step and
lemma 26 for the server.
– W2 can perform a step using (A-TIMEOUTSEND) Then the claim follows from lemma 34 for the browser step.
• (A-ATKSER) Cannot happen, event is of high integrity
• (A-SERATK) Cannot happen, event is of high integrity
• (A-ATKBRO) Then we distinguish two cases:
– W2 can perform a step using (A-SERVERBROWSER): Then the claim follows from lemma 35 for the browser step.
– W2 can perform a step using (A-TIMEOUTRECV) Then the claim follows from lemma 35 for the browser step.
Using the previous lemmas, we can conclude that our candidate relation is a step relation.
Lemma 40. ≈Γ is a step relation
Proof. We show that ≈Γ fulfills the properties of definition 18. The claim for the low integrity step follows immediately from
lemma 31 and the transitivity of ≈Γ and the claim for the high integrity step follows fomr lemma 39.
L. Main Theorem
Lemma 41 (High Integrity Trace Equality). Let high(γ) be the trace containing only the events α with I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α).
Let R be a step relation.
Let A1 be an attacked and A2 and unattacked websystem with (A1, A2) ∈ R. Then if A1 generates the trace γ1, then A2
can generate a trace γ2 such that high(γ1) = high(γ2).
Proof. We prove the claim by induction over the generated trace γ, using the fact that R is a step relation.
1) Case 1: γ1 = ǫ
The claim is trivially fulfilled.
2) Case 2: γ1 = α · γ′1 :
A1 takes the step α to reach state A
′
1 and produces the trace α · γ
′
1.
a) Case 2: I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(α)
In this case A2 can take the steps ~β ·α, where I(ℓa) ⊑I int(β) for all β ∈ ~β and hence produces the trace ~β ·α · γ′2. We
hence have high(~β ·α) = α. Since (A′1, A
′
2) ∈ R, we can apply the induction hypothesis and get high(γ
′
1) = high(γ
′
2),
hence we also have high(γ1) = high(α · γ′1) = high(α · γ
′
2) = high(γ2).
b) Case 2: I(ℓa) ⊑I int(α)
In this case we have high(γ′1) = high(γ1) and since (A
′
1, A2) ∈ R, we can apply the induction hypothesis and get
high(γ2) = high(γ
′
1) = high(γ1).
Lemma 42 (High Integrity Auth Events). For any W with Γ ⊢ℓa,usr W and W
~α
−→∗W ′, if for β = ♯[~v]ιb,ιuℓ we have β ∈ ~α
and I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(ℓ) and ιb = usr or ιu = usr then we have
1) I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(β),
2) ∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~v |]. I(ℓa) 6⊑I I(int(vi))
3) I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(ιu) ∧ I(ℓa) 6⊑I int(ιb)
Proof. Let l = int(β).
The auth is produced in a step on the server using rule (S-AUTH).
We hence have
(D,φ, ⌈auth ~se at ℓ⌋l,µR,E)
β
−→ (D,φ, ⌈skip⌋l,µR,E)
with R = n, u, ιb, o and E = i, j with φ(j) = ιu.
Let
b =


att if ιb 6= usr
hon if µ = hon ∧ ιb = usr
csrf if µ = att ∧ ιb = usr
Γ′R@ =
{
ΓR@ if (ιb = usr)
{ 7→ ℓa} if (ιb 6= usr)
Γ′ = (ΓU ,ΓX ,Γ
′
R@ ,ΓR$ ,ΓV)
We then get by rule (T-RUNNING)
Γ′, jlabel(j), l ⊢cℓa,(u,b,P) auth ~se at ℓ : , l
We distinguish two cases:
• b 6= att
By typing we know from rule (T-AUTH) that with
∀k ∈ [1 . . . |~se|].Γ, ℓs ⊢
se
ℓa sek : τk
we have
I(ℓa) 6⊑I
⊔
I
1≤k≤| ~se|
I(τk) ⊔I l ⊔I I(jlabel(j))
Claim 1 and 2 hence follow immediately. Claim 3 follows using property 3 of definition 11.
• b = att Then we know that ιb 6= usr. Hence we must have φ(j) = ιu = usr. We now show that this case can also not
happen.
– If C(ρ(ιu)) 6⊑C C(ℓa) then by definition 11 we know that C(ρ(ιu)) ⊑C C(jlabel(j)). We also know C(jlabel(j)) ⊑C
C(ℓa) and we immediately have a contradiction.
– If C(ρ(ιu)) ⊑C C(ℓa) then this is in direct contradiction to our assumption.
Lemma 43 (Proof Technique). Let R be a step relation. Let W be a fresh cluster. Let (ℓa,K) be a well-formed attacker. Let
usr be an honest user. Let ~a be a list of well-formed user actions. Let A = (K, ℓa) ⊲ Busr({},~a) ‖W with (A,A) ∈ R. Then
W guarantees session integrity against any attacker (ℓa,K) for any honest user usr performing the actions ~a.
Proof. We have to show that for any attacked trace γ generated by the attacked system A there exists a corresponding unattacked
trace γ′ generated by A such that
∀I(ℓ) 6⊑I I(ℓ
′) : γ ↓ (usr, ℓ′) = γ′ ↓ (usr, ℓ′)
Applying lemma 41 , we know that there exists γ′ such that high(γ) = high(γ′). Since for all α = ♯[~v]ιsℓ′ with ℓ
′ 6⊑ ℓ we
have int(α) = ⊥I by lemma 42, the claim follows immediately.
Lemma 44 (The initial state is in ≈Γ). Assume a well-formed server cluster W0, an honest browser of the user usr Busr({},~a),
an attacker (ℓa,K) and let A = (K, ℓa) ⊲ Busr({},~a) ‖W0. If for all servers S = (D,φ, t) of W0, we have Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t, then
W ≈Γ W .
Proof. This follows immediately by checking the different conditoins of the definition of ≈Γ
Theorem 2 (Typing implies Web Session Integrity). Let W be a fresh cluster, (ℓa,K) an attacker , Γ0 a typing environment
with λ, ℓa,Γ
0 ⊢ ⋄ and let ~a be a list of well-formed user actions for usr in W with respect to Γ0 and ℓa. Assume that for all
u with ρ(usr, u) = nτ we have C(τ) 6⊑C C(ℓa) and that we have Γ0 ⊢tℓa,P t for all servers S = ({}, {}, t) in W . Then W
preserves session integrity against (ℓa,K) for the honest user usr performing the list of actions ~a.
Proof. Consider the relation ≈Γ. By lemma 40, we know that it is a step relation. Let W ′ = Busr({},~a) ‖ W . By lemma
lemma 44, we know (K, ℓa) ⊲ W
′ ≈Γ (K, ℓa) ⊲ W
′. Then we get wet session integrity immediately by lemma 43.
